Executive summary and recommendations

Introduction

On 28 June 2023, the then Premier of Victoria, the Hon Daniel Andrews MP, announced that a Board of Inquiry would be established to examine historical child sexual abuse at Beaumaris Primary School and certain other government schools from the 1960s to the 1990s.

This was not before time. For an extended period of time, a group of dedicated individuals had been advocating for an inquiry into allegations that child sexual abuse took place at Beaumaris Primary School and other government schools. Many victim-survivors and their families, loved ones and friends have waited for their experiences to be publicly acknowledged and the past actions of the Victorian Department of Education (Department) to be examined.

The Board of Inquiry has found that the Department woefully failed to protect children from the risk of child sexual abuse at Beaumaris Primary School and certain other government schools between 1960 and 1994. The failings were serious and systemic, and put many children at risk of sexual abuse.

Child sexual abuse is abhorrent. It can have life-long effects for victim-survivors. It can affect people’s mental health and wellbeing, relationships, and education and employment outcomes in ways that are profound and enduring. For some people, the weight of trauma can be too heavy to bear, and their loss causes deep grief for those left behind. The impacts are not confined to victim-survivors, but extend to their loved ones, those who witnessed the child sexual abuse and the broader community.

Despite the challenges, healing is possible. The Board of Inquiry heard about many experiences of personal healing from victim-survivors and their families — examples of courage and examples of hope. There were also many experiences shared about difficulties in finding the right help when it was desperately needed. It is important to understand the factors that contribute to healing and recovery, so that healing and recovery are within reach of all who need it.

The Board of Inquiry has examined the past to identify and understand historical wrongs. In addition, examining the past enables the broader community to move forward. By understanding where the education system failed, we can also better understand how to prevent further child sexual abuse occurring in government schools.

The Board of Inquiry

By the Order in Council establishing it, the Board of Inquiry was to establish an official public record of victim-survivors’ experiences of child sexual abuse by employees at Beaumaris Primary School and certain other government schools between 1960 and 1999.¹ In addition to requiring the Board of Inquiry to inquire into these experiences, the Terms of Reference required the inquiry to examine the Department’s response at the time.² They also specified that the Board of Inquiry was to examine appropriate ways to support healing for victim-survivors, secondary victims and affected communities, as well as to assess the effectiveness of support services for adult victim-survivors of child sexual abuse in government schools.³ The Board of Inquiry was charged with not only inquiring into and reporting on these matters, but also making any appropriate recommendations.⁴

The Board of Inquiry conducted its work and gathered information through four key streams:

• private sessions with victim-survivors, secondary victims and affected community members
• public hearings focused on truth-telling, accountability, and hope and healing
• submissions that were open to all members of the public and organisations
• research and policy work.

The Board of Inquiry engaged with those who came forward to share their experiences through a ‘participant care and support model’. This included a single point of contact and a personalised approach for each individual, counselling support, and robust record-keeping processes.

The Board of Inquiry’s report comprises six Parts:

• The preliminary material(opens in a new window) contains, in addition to this executive summary, the official documents connected to the delivery of the report, and a message from the Chair.
• Part A, The Board of Inquiry(opens in a new window), describes the establishment of the Board of Inquiry, explains how it approached its work, and contains important information concerning how it interpreted and applied the Terms of Reference.
• Part B, Experience(opens in a new window), places children’s safety in context by describing relevant policy settings and social and cultural factors present in communities between 1960 and 1999, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, before documenting experiences of child sexual abuse and its impacts from the perspective of victim-survivors. This Part also includes 15 narratives from victim-survivors, secondary victims and affected community members in which they recall their experiences, in their own words.
• Part C, Accountability(opens in a new window), describes the education system between 1960 and 1999. It includes the narratives of four of the relevant employees who were examined in depth by the Board of Inquiry, explores concepts of grooming and disclosure, and outlines various system failings by the Department at that time. It then describes how child safety settings within government schools have since improved.
• Part D, Healing(opens in a new window), support and the future, describes the factors that promote recovery from child sexual abuse and the support services currently available to victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse in government schools. It then explores barriers to effective support and how they could be addressed as part of an overall approach to healing. This Part includes the Board of Inquiry’s recommendations for the Victorian Government and the Department to support healing and address barriers to effective support. While these recommendations are drawn from the entirety of the Board of Inquiry’s work, they are particularly directed to the ‘healing’ and ‘support services’ aspects of the Terms of Reference.
• Part E, Appendices, contains a range of documents to assist and inform readers.

The victim-survivors and their supporters

Many victim-survivors have engaged with the Board of Inquiry to share their experiences of child sexual abuse. This has required great strength and courage. At times, victim-survivors have revisited deeply traumatic experiences. For some, it was the first time they had disclosed their experiences of child sexual abuse.

Partners, family members and friends have also spoken to the Board of Inquiry. They have shared how experiences of child sexual abuse affected their loved ones’ lives, as well their own. At times, they shared experiences of child sexual abuse on behalf of their loved ones.

The Board of Inquiry is deeply grateful for all those individuals who engaged with it, and does not under-estimate the resolve, effort and bravery this took. The Board of Inquiry also acknowledges those victim-survivors who have chosen not to disclose their experiences of child sexual abuse, and may never do so, including those who are no longer with us.

Most victim-survivors whose experiences were within the scope of the Terms of Reference were aged between nine and 12 years old (in Grades 4 to 6) at the time of the alleged child sexual abuse. The majority of victim-survivors were male, but some female victim-survivors also shared their experiences.

Some victim-survivors recalled that the child sexual abuse they experienced occurred once or several times. For others, the child sexual abuse they recounted was sustained over weeks, months or years.

Impacts of child sexual abuse, as shared by victim-survivors and secondary victims

The impacts of child sexual abuse are complex, varied and can extend beyond the individual to families, friends and witnesses. Some impacts are immediate, some emerge later in life, some
re-emerge, and some are sustained throughout a lifetime.

While some victim-survivors experienced acute effects of child sexual abuse in their childhood, others were more greatly impacted in their adolescence or adulthood. Some experienced profound effects across their life course, while others were not significantly affected at all.

Key stages in a victim-survivor’s life can also elicit or compound the effects of child sexual abuse; for example, disclosing the child sexual abuse, completing school, becoming a parent, losing a parent, or learning about the child sexual abuse of other victim-survivors.

IMMEDIATE IMPACTS

Victim-survivors described to the Board of Inquiry how their sense of safety had been destroyed by the child sexual abuse they experienced at the hands of school employees. Victim-survivors spoke of their immediate responses to the child sexual abuse, recalling feelings of shock, shame, guilt and confusion.

For example, one victim-survivor described his feelings of shame after being sexually abused by a teacher at school:

Another victim-survivor recalled the confusion he and other children felt when they were sexually abused during and after showering at the holiday home of a school employee, who would dry them after showering:

Some victim-survivors gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry about changes in their behaviour at or around the time of the sexual abuse they experienced as children. This included loss of interest in school or sport, declining performance at school, and problematic behaviour such as aggression or ‘acting out’.

ENDURING IMPACTS

Victim-survivors told the Board of Inquiry about the enduring effects of the sexual abuse they experienced as children, including impacts on their mental health, education and employment outcomes, and relationships.

Many victim-survivors spoke of experiencing poor mental health, including mental illnesses such as depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder and schizophrenia. Some said they experienced self-harm and suicidal thoughts.

One victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry:

Some victim-survivors also spoke of the difficulties they experienced living with complex trauma. Research shows that victim-survivors can turn to different methods to try to manage trauma, including using drugs and alcohol, gambling and engaging in criminal behaviour. Some victim-survivors develop eating disorders.

Tragically, the Board of Inquiry also heard of premature deaths considered to be related to experiences of child sexual abuse.

Victim-survivors shared that their experiences of child sexual abuse had compromised their education and employment outcomes. In some cases, this flowed on from their disengagement with school after their experience of child sexual abuse. Some victim-survivors said they were ashamed and frustrated that they were prevented from reaching their full potential.

One victim-survivor shared:

The Board of Inquiry heard how experiences of child sexual abuse adversely affected victim-survivors’ relationships. This included relationships with partners, children, siblings, other family members and friends. Some victim-survivors struggled with forming and sustaining relationships, others struggled with intimate relationships, and several felt discomfort around children.

STRENGTH AND HOPE

While the Board of Inquiry received extensive information about the negative effects of child sexual abuse, it also heard of victim-survivors demonstrating immense strength, hope and resilience. The damaging outcomes associated with child sexual abuse are not inevitable.

Some victim-survivors shared that the child sexual abuse they experienced did not have a profound impact on their lives; and while others experienced adverse and complex impacts, these did not define them. Many victim-survivors have experienced happiness and success throughout their lives. Several pursued careers enabling them to help other people and children.

One victim-survivor shared:

SECONDARY VICTIMS

The Board of Inquiry also heard from a number of secondary victims — partners, parents, siblings, children, friends and witnesses — about how the victim-survivor’s experience of child sexual abuse had affected their own lives. Secondary victims spoke of the breakdown of relationships, poor mental health, and the responsibility of caring for a loved one.

Several secondary victims shared that the impact of child sexual abuse had affected the quality of their relationships and sense of connection with the victim-survivor. For example, one secondary victim reflected that they had, at times, had to distance themselves from their partner.¹⁰

Some secondary victims spoke of the poor mental health and wellbeing they endured as a result of their loved ones’ experience of child sexual abuse. For example, one secondary victim shared:

It is clear that the impacts of child sexual abuse extend beyond the individual and touch families, friends and witnesses. Communities can also be affected.

The alleged perpetrators

Six individuals were identified as ‘relevant employees’ by the Board of Inquiry in accordance with its Terms of Reference. The Board of Inquiry has focused on four of these individuals in this report. This does not diminish the experiences of those who were allegedly sexually abused by the other two relevant employees, but reflects the extent of the information available to the Board of Inquiry in relation to these individuals.

The four relevant employees referred to in this report are Graham Steele, Darrell Ray, David MacGregor and Wyatt. ‘Wyatt’ is a pseudonym — he cannot be named for legal reasons.¹²

While three of these men have been convicted of child sexual abuse offences, for various reasons, most of the experiences of child sexual abuse shared with the Board of Inquiry did not result (or have not yet resulted) in a conviction. Accordingly, the relevant employees are referred to as ‘alleged perpetrators’ in this report.

These four alleged perpetrators were employed at Beaumaris Primary School for two years in 1971 and 1972; although for one of those years Mr MacGregor had taken leave. The Department’s records show that Mr MacGregor was on leave in 1971; however, Mr MacGregor told the Board of Inquiry that he took leave in 1972.¹³ What is clear is that in 1971 and 1972 the alleged perpetrators were all employed at Beaumaris Primary School, and for one of those years Mr MacGregor took leave. Mr Ray and Mr MacGregor also both attended Toorak Teachers’ College between 1960 and 1962. Collectively, the alleged perpetrators worked at a further 23 government primary schools.

In relation to each alleged perpetrator, the Board of Inquiry has heard about experiences of child sexual abuse from multiple victim-survivors. Victim-survivors recalled being sexually abused as children in a school library, office, sick bay or classroom. Some recalled being sexually abused in front of other students. Others recounted experiences of being sexually abused on school camps or trips away. Some victim-survivors spoke of being sexually abused on the way from school to sporting events, and at these events.

Victim-survivors spoke of how the alleged perpetrators made them feel ‘special’. Some recalled how the alleged perpetrator used their interest in a hobby, such as reading or sport, to manipulate them and isolate them from peers and other adults.

These accounts are difficult to read. They are infinitely more difficult to live through and recount.

As well as outlining information the Board of Inquiry received about four of the alleged perpetrators, Part B(opens in a new window) includes victim-survivors’ accounts of child sexual abuse by these alleged perpetrators.

The Department’s response

The Board of Inquiry found that the Department’s response at or around the relevant time was wholly inadequate. Critically, it failed to adequately protect the safety of children in the government schools within the inquiry’s scope between 1960 and 1994. The Department acknowledged that its past responses to child sexual abuse disclosures were ‘woefully inadequate or inappropriate’.¹⁴ The Board of Inquiry concluded that there were six systemic failures that contributed to the Department’s wholly inadequate response, as outlined below. Five of these failures relate to the period from 1960 to 1994. The year 1994 is significant because mandatory reporting was introduced for teachers in Victorian government schools that year. This gave rise to a range of policies and processes relating to child sexual abuse that have become more comprehensive over time. One of the six failures is not limited to that time period.

Finding one: an absence of policies and procedures

Between 1960 and 1994, there were no policies or procedures concerning child sexual abuse, including how to respond to allegations. This is despite the fact that the Department knew of the risk of child sexual abuse by teachers, and despite there being a legislative and regulatory framework in place during this period that gave the education system power to discipline staff.

Jenny Atta PSM, Secretary, Department of Education, gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that:

This meant that staff of the Department were left to respond to allegations of child sexual abuse in an inconsistent and ad hoc way — if they responded at all.

Finding two: an absence of guidance to staff

Between 1960 and 1994, there was not only a lack of policies or procedures, but also no other guidance to staff instructing them on how to identify, report, manage, respond to and prevent child sexual abuse. What little guidance existed (for example, in the form of formal instructions to teachers) focused on the physical safety of children or, disturbingly, existed only to avoid reputational damage to teachers.

The result of this was that staff did not know how to adequately respond to allegations of child sexual abuse and implement measures to protect children’s safety.

An illustrative example of this relates to Mr Ray. Multiple parents and teachers, an assistant principal, a principal and a district inspector¹⁶ were aware of Mr Ray’s alleged offending by at least 1974 and raised concerns with the Department. Yet despite increasing uneasiness about Mr Ray’s conduct, there is no record that an investigation of any substance took place. Mr Ray continued to teach in government primary schools until 1979, when he was convicted of offences related to child sexual abuse in government schools.

In regard to Mr Ray and concerns about his behaviour at that time, Dr David Howes PSM, Deputy Secretary, Schools and Regional Services, Department of Education, gave evidence that:

Finding three: a culture that prioritised the reputation of the education system over the safety of children

Between 1960 and 1994, the Department prioritised the reputation of the education system, including the schools and teachers within it, above the safety of children.

A primary example of this was the Department’s use of transfers to move teachers between schools or to non-teaching positions as a way of ‘managing’ allegations of child sexual abuse.

For example, when parents notified the Department that they had made a complaint concerning child sexual abuse to Victoria Police about Mr MacGregor, the Department’s initial response was to ask Mr MacGregor if he wished to move from Kunyung Primary School ‘to another position should tensions within the school community become untenable’.¹⁸

Even after Mr MacGregor was convicted and sentenced on charges of child sexual abuse, and found guilty of misconduct through a departmental investigation, he was able to remain an employee of the Department. He was transferred to an administrative role within the Department and was only banned from teaching for three years, to 1988.

Ms Atta gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that while the Department had mechanisms in place at that time to remove teachers who had committed child sexual abuse, they were ‘rarely, if ever, used’, and that this meant ‘[t]eachers were able to remain in their role or transfer to other schools and continue the abuse’.¹⁹

Finding four: a lack of staff training

Between 1960 and 1994, there was a lack of training to assist staff to identify risks of child sexual abuse, or to recognise, raise concerns about and appropriately respond to child sexual abuse.

The Board of Inquiry heard that on several occasions, teachers and senior staff were aware of, or at the very least were suspicious about, of the behaviour of some of the alleged perpetrators. However, the Department provided evidence that there was no training to help teachers to identify this type of behaviour as sexual abuse or to understand its seriousness, let alone to know what to do with their suspicions.²⁰

Finding five: poor record-keeping and information-sharing practices

Between 1960 and 1994, the Department had poor record-keeping and information-sharing practices concerning child sexual abuse.

With regard to record-keeping, the Department did not have any policies in place to inform staff of the need to document disclosures of child sexual abuse from adults or children; to guide them in documenting such disclosures; or the need to document any actions taken in response to such disclosures. Despite some records being kept, this meant that disciplinary processes and outcomes, and investigations into child sexual abuse, were not consistently or comprehensively recorded.

For example, the Department provided evidence that a district inspector was called in to investigate complaints about Mr Ray in 1975, but that there was ‘no record of a written investigation’.²¹ The Board of Inquiry also received evidence that the reasons for transferring teachers between schools and jobs were not always recorded or shared.

With regard to information-sharing, the Department did not have any policies instructing staff when they should share allegations of child sexual abuse with Victoria Police.

There was, however, an obligation on Victoria Police to share crime reports with the Department regarding information that a student had been sexually abused while in the care of a government school.²² Notwithstanding, the Department did not have a consistent approach regarding how it responded to these crime reports. In 1990, an official of the Department stated that ‘[t]he continued employment of teachers found guilty of indictable offences is assessed individually and a decision regarding future employment is made accordingly in each case’.²³ Dr Howes gave evidence that, during the relevant period, ‘there were no standard procedures for saying if someone is guilty of an indictable offence, here is what’s going to happen’.²⁴

As a result, a teacher convicted of child sexual abuse offences could remain an employee of the Department and might not be removed from the classroom. For example, in the case of Mr MacGregor, although the Department knew he had been convicted of child sexual abuse offences, it did not seek to have his teaching registration revoked by the relevant body, and he remained working in the Department in an administrative role.

Finding six: no systemic reviews

Finally, and putting aside the work done by the Department in response to this inquiry, the Board of Inquiry found that the Department has never undertaken a review of allegations of historical child sexual abuse. There has been:

• no review of allegations of child sexual abuse at Beaumaris Primary School and other government schools within the scope of this inquiry at or around the time of the alleged abuse (once the Department became aware of concerns or allegations of child sexual abuse by a teacher)
• no review of allegations of child sexual abuse at Beaumaris Primary School and other government schools within the scope of this inquiry when more concerns and allegations began emerging in 2000 and 2001
• no broader systemic review of allegations of historical child sexual abuse in all government schools to understand the scale of child sexual abuse across government schools on a statewide basis.

When concerns were first raised about conduct on the part of teachers at Beaumaris Primary School or other government schools within the scope of this inquiry, an adequate investigation would have sought to establish whether other concerns had been raised, or allegations made, in relation to the alleged perpetrators and what action, if any, was taken in response to those concerns or allegations. This would have enabled the Department to understand the scale of the problem, ensure its response was appropriate, and support those who may have been affected. Yet this did not occur. Nor did it occur at the time the Department became aware of criminal charges in relation to either Mr Ray, Wyatt or Mr MacGregor.

Decades later, in 2000 and 2001, there again appears to have been no attempt by the Department to undertake a review. At this time, the Department collected information from at least 14 people — former staff of the Department, students, parents and other family members — about allegations of child sexual abuse related to Mr Ray, Wyatt and Mr Steele. A failure to undertake a review meant that connections between the alleged perpetrators at Beaumaris Primary School and other government schools within the scope of this inquiry remained unexamined.

Further, while the Department has undertaken a range of work in response to this Board of Inquiry, it has not undertaken a systemic review to understand the scale of allegations of child sexual abuse across all government schools. As a result, in contrast to victim-survivors whose experiences came within the scope of this inquiry, victim-survivors from other government schools have not been afforded an opportunity to gain an understanding of the extent of child sexual abuse at their school, or of whether they were alone in their experience.

This failure has also meant that some children were put at risk of further child sexual abuse. In addition, it has limited the Department’s ability to understand, acknowledge and learn from past failures, and compromised its ability to extend support and acknowledgement to former students who have been harmed.

A systemic failure

Based on these findings, the Board of Inquiry has concluded that the Department’s response to allegations of child sexual abuse between 1960 and 1994 was an appalling and systemic failure.

The Department failed in both its action and inaction. There was a culture of covering up child sexual abuse to prioritise the reputation of the education system, including schools and teachers.

Because of a dearth of policies and procedures, there were no measures in place in the education system to identify, manage, respond to and prevent child sexual abuse.

As noted earlier, three of the four alleged perpetrators, discussed in Part C(opens in a new window), have been convicted of child sexual abuse offences. Many victim-survivors have come forward and shared with the Board of Inquiry their experiences of being sexually abused as children by the alleged perpetrators. Some victim-survivors have shared their experiences of child sexual abuse by alleged perpetrators occurring after the Department had an opportunity to intervene. Many more were put at risk because of the Department’s failures.

Healing, support and a way forward

As well as sharing their experiences of child sexual abuse, victim-survivors and secondary victims engaged with the Board of Inquiry on their thoughts, ideas and hopes in relation to healing and also in relation to support services. Experts — such as academics and government officials — and organisations also provided information and opinions on these matters.

Healing and support services are interrelated. Support services can play a key role in assisting people to heal, such as through trauma-informed therapeutic supports or facilitating connections with peers. However, healing can take many forms, and support services are not the only means by which people can recover from trauma. For example, sharing experiences and receiving acknowledgements and apologies can also support healing.

Healing

CONCEPTS OF HEALING

As explored in this report, healing is a holistic concept that includes internal, interpersonal, behavioural and external healing. That is, healing extends beyond the individual to include support networks and communities. A participant at the Board of Inquiry’s Healing Roundtable explained the importance of community involvement in healing:

Inquiries themselves can also play an important role in an individual’s healing. They provide a space for truth-telling, acknowledgement and learning. One victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry that through its process he had finally been listened to, and that other victim-survivors would benefit from hearing about people’s experiences.²⁶

Institutions, such as schools, can also play an important part in the process of healing — by being accountable for the harms they have enabled. Ways that institutions can show accountability include acknowledgements, apologies and actions to prevent further child sexual abuse.

WAYS OF HEALING

Individuals’ experiences of, and pathways towards, healing can be varied. This reflects the unique needs of victim-survivors and secondary victims, as well as the diverse impacts of child sexual abuse.

Victim-survivors spoke of different elements that had been important to their healing. For some, disclosing their experience of child sexual abuse and talking about it openly was an initial step towards healing. Others said that therapeutic supports had helped them to heal, such as engaging with a psychologist, taking a short-term residential retreat or engaging with peer support.

A number of victim-survivors shared that they need to feel a sense of justice to heal. For example, some victim-survivors perceived apologies as meaningless, while others felt that bringing the person who sexually abused them to justice was important.

Secondary victims can also play a key role in the healing of their loved one, and, in turn, may need to experience their own healing journey. Some secondary victims told the Board of Inquiry that this inquiry had contributed to their own healing process — as an opportunity to both understand their loved ones’ experiences and share their own challenges.

Support services

The Board of Inquiry defines a ‘support service’ as a service ‘that provides advocacy, support or therapeutic treatment’ to victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse in government schools.

Victim-survivors often engage with multiple support services, rather than a single service, over their life course. This reflects the varied impacts of child sexual abuse experienced by victim-survivors.

The service landscape is complex, with no single ‘service system’ that responds to the needs of victim-survivors. Rather, victim-survivors interact with mainstream service systems (for example, healthcare); the community-based sector (for example, through helplines); the justice system (for example, through legal services); specialist sexual assault services; and family violence services.

Victim-survivors spoke of engaging with a range of supports, including GPs, psychologists, psychiatrists, lawyers, specialist sexual assault support services, counsellors, alcohol and drug services, community-based organisations, and residential trauma and healing retreats.

The Department does not provide direct services to victim-survivors, but does have a scheme to provide reimbursement for counselling and psychology services. It also participates in the National Redress Scheme.

CHALLENGES ACCESSING SUPPORT SERVICES

Despite there being a range of support services that victim-survivors can use, the Board of Inquiry heard that many victim-survivors experience challenges in accessing services and having their needs met. The Board of Inquiry learned about these challenges through the perspectives of victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse in government schools, but many of them reflect broader, systemic issues.

The Board of Inquiry acknowledges that there are many dedicated and compassionate people working in the support service sector, but notes that there are systemic issues that can compromise how victim-survivors access and experience these services. Overall, the Board of Inquiry found that existing support services are not always adequate to meet the needs of victim-survivors. In summary, this relates to the following:

• Lack of support to understand and navigate complex systems — This means that
  accessing services can be confusing for victim-survivors and can serve as a barrier to identifying the services victim-survivors need.
• Poor coordination and collaboration between services — This can result in services that are not well connected for victim-survivors.
• Limited service capacity — This means that some victim-survivors are unable to access the services they need, or unable to access them for the duration of time they require. There is also a risk that if victim-survivors do not receive a timely response to begin with, they may disengage altogether.
• Inequities in access across the system — This means that some victim-survivors are pushed into the private system when the public system is at capacity. The financial costs of obtaining support in the private system can be unaffordable.
• Need for greater inclusivity — There is some evidence that male victim-survivors have difficulties engaging with specialist sexual assault services. An individual’s identity can shape the way the child sexual abuse is perpetrated and how they experience the abuse, and thus the supports they require.
• Gaps in peer support services — These services are highly valued by victim-survivors, and build connections and hope. Gaps in these services mean that victim-survivors may miss out on peer support.
• Limited social and relational support for secondary victims — This means that victim-survivors’ main support networks may miss out on their own support.
• Inadequate number of professionals with capability in responding to trauma — This means that services do not always offer the right trauma-informed support to victim-survivors.

A way forward

The Board of Inquiry was required to examine and make any recommendations regarding appropriate ways to support healing for affected victim-survivors, secondary victims and communities. Appended to this executive summary is a list of the Board of Inquiry’s recommendations; these are also discussed in detail in Chapter 18, Looking to the future(opens in a new window). These recommendations relate to:

• recognition of, reflection on and acknowledgement of historical child sexual abuse in government schools through a statewide public apology, a memorial related to child sexual abuse at Beaumaris Primary School, and processes to guide future decisions around memorials related to historical child sexual abuse in government schools
• a statewide truth-telling and accountability process for victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse in all government schools, and relevant non-government schools, and a public record of victim-survivors’ experiences and the Department’s response
• a restorative justice engagement program that enables all adult victim-survivors of child sexual abuse in government schools to access personal responses from the Department
• improved access to information, based on trauma-informed practices, to support victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse in government schools in understanding their experiences, alongside improved record management processes in the Department that are more accessible and transparent
• improvements to better meet the support needs of adult victim-survivors of child sexual abuse in government schools, including an online hub and telephone line, and improved coordination, navigation and advocacy support
• enhanced protection of personal information shared with Victorian boards of inquiry.

Looking ahead

Society cannot hope for a better future without first looking back, and acknowledging and learning from past failures. The Board of Inquiry has undertaken its work with this collective responsibility in mind.

The Board of Inquiry acknowledges the inquiries that have come before it and the evolving research dedicated to preventing and responding to child sexual abuse. These include, but are certainly not limited to, the Commonwealth Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse and the Victorian Parliamentary ‘Betrayal of Trust’ Inquiry into the Handling of Child Abuse by Religious and Other Non-Government Organisations.

Many failures regarding the Department’s response to historical child sexual abuse between the 1960s and the 1990s at Beaumaris Primary School and certain other government schools have been uncovered by the Board of Inquiry. The Board of Inquiry’s findings validate many of the long-held suspicions and frustrations of victim-survivors and their supporters.

While it was not in the Board of Inquiry’s purview to examine the Department’s current approach to managing the risk of child sexual abuse in government schools, one of the inquiry’s objectives was to ‘[r]eiterate the State’s commitment that such abuse must not happen again’.²⁷

A significant step towards preventing child sexual abuse occurred in 1994, with the legislated introduction of mandatory reporting obligations of child abuse for teachers in Victoria. Further, the Board of Inquiry has heard that the Department now has various policies and procedures in place directed to preventing and responding to child sexual abuse in government schools. Ms Atta gave evidence to the Board of inquiry that:

The Department has also introduced a range of safeguards to protect children at school, including employee screening, guidance on how to identify and report child sexual abuse, and policies for sharing information with other government agencies.

While the Board of Inquiry was not directed to examine the effectiveness of these changes, there has undoubtedly been a sea change since the 1960s in the way the Department seeks to prevent and manage child sexual abuse in government schools. These changes are designed to address many of the problems that the Board of Inquiry has uncovered.

Yet child sexual abuse continues to occur today. While it is important to unite behind a shared objective of eliminating child sexual abuse, this can only be achieved by institutions remaining vigilant and continually reviewing and reflecting on child-safe practices. It requires consistently placing the safety and best interests of children first, and taking appropriate responsibility for harm when it does occur.

Children and young people have a right to be safe at school. The Board of Inquiry hopes its work and findings will strengthen collective resolve to further reduce the risk of child sexual abuse in schools, and help ensure that appropriate steps are taken when allegations of child sexual abuse are made.

Recommendations

In accordance with its Terms of Reference, the Board of Inquiry has made the following nine recommendations to the Victorian Government. These recommendations are built upon the Board of Inquiry’s work in relation to each aspect of its Terms of Reference, but have particular relevance to two of these: appropriate ways to support healing, and the effectiveness of support services for victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse.

Recommendation 1: A statewide public apology

The Board of Inquiry recommends the Victorian Government formally apologise to all victim-survivors, secondary victims and communities affected by historical child sexual abuse in government schools. The apology should:

• be made in Parliament, with victim-survivors and secondary victims invited to be present
• specifically address the sexual abuse that occurred at Beaumaris Primary School and other government schools within the scope of the Board of Inquiry
• be accompanied by commitments to action from government.

Recommendation 2: A new memorial and a consistent process

The Board of Inquiry recommends the Department of Education:

• work with victim-survivors, secondary victims and affected community members to
  co-design the location and form of a memorial acknowledging historical child sexual abuse at Beaumaris Primary School
• consider, facilitate and fund requests for other memorials to acknowledge historical child sexual abuse in government schools in accordance with new policy guidance for memorials. This policy guidance should be trauma-informed and:
  • be developed in consultation with victim-survivors and secondary victims of historical child sexual abuse in government schools
  • provide for consistent assessment of requests for memorials, and
  • describe decision-making processes, types of memorialisation to consider and requirements for facilitating engagement with victim-survivors, secondary victims, local communities and other stakeholders.

Recommendation 3: A statewide truth-telling and accountability process

The Board of Inquiry recommends the Victorian Government establish a statewide truth-telling and accountability process for victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse in all Victorian government schools that:

• is independent and time-limited
• is available to:
  • victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse in any Victorian government school
  • victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse in a non-government school where the alleged perpetrator previously worked at a government school and allegedly committed child sexual abuse at that government school
• results in an independent public record of victim-survivors’ experiences shared through the truth-telling process, that includes recognition of past failings of the Department of Education.

Recommendation 4: A restorative engagement program

The Board of Inquiry recommends the Department of Education establish a restorative engagement program for adult victim-survivors of child sexual abuse in government schools who:

• cannot or do not wish to make a civil claim or National Redress Scheme application, or
• have finalised a civil claim against the Department of Education, without the need to make a separate application through the National Redress Scheme, or
• finalised a civil claim before Direct Personal Responses were available.

This program would allow these victim-survivors to safely share their experience of child sexual abuse and the harm caused, and receive a personal response from the Department of Education.

Recommendation 5: Improving information access

The Board of Inquiry recommends the Department of Education implement:

• trauma-informed practices for responding to requests for information and records that are related to historical child sexual abuse in government schools (including requests identified as such while being processed), including through:
  • delivery of trauma-informed training for archivists and staff in Freedom of Information units
  • development of information materials that provide transparency to people seeking records about what records may or may not be available and why
  • provision of individualised information and support to people seeking records
• a program of work to improve its records management processes, including digitising and cataloguing records to support ease of access, and publishing school records that are able to be released publicly.

Recommendation 6: A new online hub and telephone line providing information and assistance for adult victim-survivors

The Board of Inquiry recommends the Department of Education establish an online hub and telephone line for adults who are victim-survivors of child sexual abuse in government schools to seek information and initial assistance.

Recommendation 7: Improved coordination, navigation and advocacy support

The Board of Inquiry recommends the Victorian Government, in consultation with victim-survivors, develop and trial a coordination, navigation and advocacy function for adult
victim-survivors of child sexual abuse in schools.

Recommendation 8: A targeted program of work to improve service responses

The Board of Inquiry recommends the Victorian Government design and implement a targeted program of work to improve service responses to adult victim-survivors of child sexual abuse. This includes:

• in consultation with victim-survivors, designing, developing and implementing a formal peer support program for adult victim-survivors of child sexual abuse
• in consultation with sexual assault support services and Sexual Assault Services Victoria, develop a consistent approach to how adult victim-survivors of child sexual abuse may access sexual assault support services in a timely way
• reviewing and updating public-facing information of sexual assault support services to grow awareness that services are available for and responsive to people of all genders.

Recommendation 9: Legislative reform to ensure the enduring protection of personal information provided to boards of inquiry

The Board of Inquiry recommends the Victorian Government amend the Inquiries Act 2014 (Vic) to ensure that personal information identified by the relevant board of inquiry as confidential, anonymous or sensitive:

• is kept confidential for a minimum of 99 years following the end of a board of inquiry
• be exempted from the application of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) for a minimum of 99 years following the end of a board of inquiry.

These changes should apply retrospectively to this Board of Inquiry.