The Order in Council that established the Board of Inquiry under section 53(1) of the Inquiries Act 2014 (Vic) recognised:

• ‘All forms of child sexual abuse are a gross violation’ of a child’s right to protection under the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic).¹
• ‘All government school staff have a duty of care to take reasonable steps to protect children in their care from harm’.²
• ‘[S]ome government schools have failed to protect children attending government schools from child sexual abuse’.³

Relevantly to the work of this Board of Inquiry, the Order in Council acknowledged the existence of allegations that multiple employees had sexually abused multiple victim-survivors at Beaumaris Primary School in the 1960s and 1970s, and allegations that the same employees had sexually abused students at other government schools.

It was the egregious nature of these allegations that, as described in the Order in Council, led the Victorian Government to establish the Board of Inquiry. The Board of Inquiry’s work, pursuant to the Terms of Reference, was to have four main strands: the experiences of victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse by relevant employees at Beaumaris Primary School and certain other government schools; the response of the Department of Education at the time; appropriate ways to support healing for victim-survivors, secondary victims and affected community members; and whether there are effective support services for victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse in government schools.

Following its establishment on 28 June 2023, the Board of Inquiry operated at pace and with intensity for over seven months. The Board of Inquiry’s report spans six Parts and offers nine recommendations.

This Part of the report is an introduction to the Board of Inquiry’s work and operations. It describes the background and context that led to the formation of the Board of Inquiry, and outlines the considerations and choices that shaped its approach.

This Part has four chapters:

• Chapter 1, Establishment and approach(opens in a new window), provides an overview of how the Board of Inquiry came to be and how it chose to conduct its work. It affirms that the Board of Inquiry considered the needs, preferences and voices of victim-survivors to be central to its approach, while at the same time complying with its procedural fairness obligations.
• Chapter 2, Operations(opens in a new window), outlines how the Board of Inquiry established its organisational structure, governance and operating processes so that it could run effectively and with integrity.
• Chapter 3, Scope and interpretation(opens in a new window), describes how the Board of Inquiry interpreted its Terms of Reference and what decisions it made to determine whether information was within scope. It also sets out some of the challenges and complexities involved in working within the Terms of Reference.
• Chapter 4, About the report(opens in a new window), explains how to navigate this report. It also outlines how the Board of Inquiry intends its findings and recommendations to be interpreted and applied.

The Board of Inquiry listened to the voices and perspectives of over 300 members of the community who came forward to share their views, experiences and perspectives of historical child sexual abuse.

In addition to telling their deeply personal stories of child sexual abuse, victim-survivors generously shared their thoughts and points of view about their personal healing journey, including in relation to support services available to them. The Board of Inquiry also heard from secondary victims, service providers and advocacy organisations, experts and academics, legal firms and affected community members who shared their own stories, insights and expertise.

The Board of Inquiry’s operating procedures and structures all supported this comprehensive program of engagement, and the Board of Inquiry took enormous care to ensure it was sensitive to participants’ needs. The Board of Inquiry’s processes, described in Chapter 1(opens in a new window) and associated appendices, may assist future inquiries and royal commissions that engage with people who have experienced trauma.

At the same time, the Board of Inquiry was conscious of the need to conduct its work in accordance with its obligations of procedural fairness. What this involved, and how concerns raised through procedural fairness processes were addressed, are set out in Chapter 1(opens in a new window).

This Part also includes a dedicated chapter, Chapter 3(opens in a new window), which explains the scope of the Board of Inquiry and the decisions made in relation to its Terms of Reference. The Board of Inquiry’s interpretation of the Terms of Reference played an important role in driving how it approached its work. The same Chapter also discusses how the Board of Inquiry navigated certain challenging issues in relation to its scope.

The Part concludes with a detailed overview of how this report should be read and understood.

The Board of Inquiry has carefully chosen the language used in this report to ensure that it conveys its views and arguments meaningfully, and that policy makers are able to interpret them easily for implementation and other purposes.

The Board of Inquiry has created a public record that is intended to endure — offering ongoing meaning to those who contributed and extending the possibility of closure for some. In doing so, the Board of Inquiry has sought to adopt the highest standards of transparency, integrity and independence. The Board of Inquiry hopes it has proven that smaller, time-limited inquiries — such as this one — can achieve ambitious goals. The Board of Inquiry took seriously its obligation to educate the community, support healing through its processes and contribute to a robust reform agenda.

This Board of Inquiry acknowledges its privilege in being trusted to examine a dark chapter in the history of government schools in Victoria. Witnessing the strength and resolve of victim-survivors and secondary victims profoundly moved and inspired every staff member. The experiences shared with the Board of Inquiry under-score their resilience and unwavering hope for a better future. Their motivation — being to protect other children from child sexual abuse — was palpable and humbling.

Introduction

Following persistent advocacy from victim-survivors, on 28 June 2023 the Victorian Government announced a Board of Inquiry into historical child sexual abuse in Beaumaris Primary School and certain other government schools. This Chapter describes the process of establishing the Board of Inquiry and how it approached its work.

From the start, the Board of Inquiry was firmly committed to ensuring it worked in ways that were inclusive, welcoming and sensitive to the trauma and distress associated with child sexual abuse. This Chapter describes the approach the Board of Inquiry adopted in designing and delivering its functions. This included a participant care and support model that was personalised to victim-survivors, secondary victims and affected community members. This personalised model was important to ensure the inquiry not only avoided re-traumatising participants but actively contributed to their healing and recovery.

The Chapter concludes by describing the steps taken to raise awareness of the Board of Inquiry’s work and the various ways information was gathered and presented to inform this report and recommendations.

Establishment

For some time, a group of individuals steadfastly advocated for closer examination of historical child sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated in Victorian government schools. A number of these advocates shared experiences of sexual abuse that occurred while they were students at Beaumaris Primary School during the 1960s and 1970s. They wanted an inquiry that could support victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse in government schools to obtain answers about how such abuses could have happened and remained undetected or tolerated for so long. They also wanted their pain and suffering acknowledged as a step towards recovery and healing.

Inquiry announced

On 28 June 2023, the then Premier of Victoria, the Hon Daniel Andrews, announced the establishment of a Board of Inquiry into historical child sexual abuse in Beaumaris Primary School and certain other government schools. The inquiry was designed to ‘focus on a significant cluster of known abuse at Beaumaris Primary School, as well as other government schools where the same former employees worked, in the 1960s and 1970s’.¹ The Board of Inquiry was required to report back to the Government by 28 February 2024.

One victim-survivor present at Mr Andrews’s announcement reflected:

Mr Andrews acknowledged: ‘This inquiry won’t undo their pain, but we hope it gives victim-survivors the recognition and support they deserve’.³

Chair appointed

On 28 June 2023, the Lieutenant-Governor, on the recommendation of the then Premier, appointed Victorian barrister, Kathleen Foley SC, to lead the Board of Inquiry under section 53(1) of the Inquiries Act 2014 (Vic) (Inquiries Act).

Ms Foley was called to the Victorian Bar in 2009 and was appointed Senior Counsel in 2021. She was appointed to the Victorian Law Reform Commission in November 2020 as a part-time commissioner, a position she holds while continuing her work as a barrister. During her time at the Victorian Bar, Ms Foley has served as a member of the Victorian Bar Council and as a member of the executive of both the Commercial Bar Association and the Women Barristers Association. Ms Foley’s practice at the Bar is diverse and has included work involving institutional child sexual abuse.

Prior to her admission to the Victorian Bar, Ms Foley worked as an attorney in New York and as a solicitor in Western Australia. She was also an Associate to Justice Hayne AC of the High Court of Australia. In 2016, Ms Foley was awarded the Victorian Bar’s Susan Crennan AC KC award for her pro bono work. She holds a Master of Laws from Harvard Law School, and a Bachelor of Laws (Honours) and Bachelor of Arts from the University of Western Australia.

CEO and Board of Inquiry staff appointed

Nicola Farray was appointed as CEO of the Board of Inquiry in July 2023. As CEO, she employed a multidisciplinary team from a range of sectors and professional backgrounds. Ms Farray was committed to bringing a collaborative and innovative approach to the Board of Inquiry’s work, building upon her prior experience in inquiries and royal commissions, as well as her experience in the fields of public administration and social work.

Thirteen staff worked across three teams: Operations and Executive Support Team; Policy, Research and Strategy Team; and Communications, Engagement and Supports Team. The Board of Inquiry established a Legal team with lawyers from Corrs Chambers Westgarth who supported Counsel Assisting and acted as the Board of Inquiry’s solicitors.

Team members brought varied and diverse expertise to their work with the Board of Inquiry. In addition to their formal experience, staff and members of the Legal team were recruited with particular attention to their values and ability to interact with others with care, sensitivity and compassion.

More information about the structure and operations of the Board of Inquiry, including the operational structure of the team and the role the various teams played is in Chapter 2, Operations(opens in a new window).

Counsel Assisting appointed

Fiona Ryan SC, Kate Stowell and Mathew Kenneally are Victorian barristers and acted as Counsel Assisting for the Board of Inquiry. Counsel Assisting performed many critical functions for the Board of Inquiry and performed leading roles in private sessions and public hearings. During public hearings, Ms Ryan SC and Ms Stowell made opening and closing statements, led evidence and questioned witnesses. Ms Stowell and Mr Kenneally each conducted private sessions as part of the Board of Inquiry’s work, as did the Chair. This involved trauma-informed information-gathering.

Information from the public invited

As the Board of Inquiry team was appointed, its initial focus was on establishing policies and processes needed to perform its work. In August 2023, the Board of Inquiry’s website went live, with information about its purpose and scope, along with contact details for media enquiries. The Board of Inquiry established a dedicated phone line and a public email address to receive information from the public. From the outset, the Board of Inquiry made it clear that it was open to receive questions, comments and information from the community.

On 7 September 2023, the Chair held a media conference to open the Board of Inquiry’s public consultation period, inviting submissions and registrations for private sessions. At a later date, as part of the Board of Inquiry’s call for information from the community, the Board of Inquiry publicly named three alleged perpetrators who were understood to have worked at 18 government schools.

On 4 October 2023, having completed preliminary analysis of information received from victim-survivors, the Department of Education and Victoria Police, the Board of Inquiry identified an additional alleged perpetrator and a further six government schools that were within scope. Details of these alleged perpetrators and schools are given in Chapter 3, Scope and interpretation(opens in a new window).

Other establishment tasks

The Board of Inquiry also took steps to secure office space and identify appropriate facilities for private sessions and public hearings. A range of other processes and policies were established to facilitate the running of the Board of Inquiry, including those relating to governance; project planning; budget management; financial and employment delegations; confidentiality and conflict of interest declarations; and onboarding of and provision of induction manuals to staff. Where suitable, the Board of Inquiry replicated government policies and process related to staffing and operational matters, implementing controls where needed to preserve the Board of Inquiry’s independence.

The Board of Inquiry also established a secure, protected IT environment and ran procurement processes for key support services, including document management and counselling and staff support services. More information about how the Board of Inquiry ran is found in Chapter 2(opens in a new window).

A trauma-informed approach

Part of the Board of Inquiry’s task was akin to enabling truth-telling. This responsibility was made clear by the first objective of the Board of Inquiry, as described in the Order in Council, to ‘[e] stablish an official public record of victim-survivors’ experiences of historical child sexual abuse by relevant employees ...’.⁴

In Australia, truth-telling processes have been led by and for First Nations peoples to formally record evidence about the historic and ongoing impacts of colonisation.⁵ More broadly, truth-telling can help people move forward in their healing journeys by acknowledging and validating past harms and injustices. As one victim-survivor shared:

The Board of Inquiry adopted an approach that provided victim-survivors with recognition. It did so on the understanding that many had suffered social stigmatisation and been met with scepticism for a long time. To recognise this suffering, the Board of Inquiry heard victim-survivors, gave them the opportunity to share their stories in the way they wished to share them and upheld the dignity of all those who came forward.⁷

In carrying out this truth-telling aspect of its work, the Board of Inquiry conducted itself in a trauma-informed way, centred on the needs of victim-survivors and on caring for its staff. This approach was underpinned by internationally recognised best practice, including focusing on safety, voice and choice, and trustworthiness and transparency.⁸ The Board of Inquiry adopted these principles as consistent with its values. The principles are also consistent with the Board of Inquiry’s Terms of Reference, which specifically required the Board of Inquiry to:

1. [p]rovide a safe, accessible, supportive, and culturally safe forum for victims-survivors and secondary victims to participate in the inquiry, including accommodating their choices in how they wish to participate in the inquiry, while recognising that some people may not wish to share their experiences;
2. [p]rovide sensitive, culturally safe and appropriate trauma informed outreach, mental health and counselling supports for victim-survivors and secondary victims. For any person who approaches the inquiry and wishes to be heard but whose story is not within the scope ... direct the person to an appropriate external mental health, counselling, or support service …⁹

Following its establishment, the Board of Inquiry engaged with victim-survivor advocates and listened and learned about the factors they felt were important to ensure the Board of Inquiry’s work was accessible, supportive and healing. The Board of Inquiry also considered approaches adopted by similar past inquiries that examined child sexual abuse or other traumatic events, to learn what had worked well or where past processes could be improved. The Board of Inquiry also relied on literature that defined best practice approaches to promoting psychological safety in interactions with traumatised people and communities.

The Board of Inquiry was told that an important part of being trauma-informed is ensuring people feel psychologically, culturally and physically safe. The Board of Inquiry was cognisant that sharing memories of child sexual abuse was highly likely to be traumatic. Such experiences can activate threat responses that are not always conscious nor easily articulated, but can have lasting effects. Therefore, all the Board of Inquiry’s practices focused on creating safety — both actual and felt — in all its conduct and interactions.¹⁰

Being trauma-informed was central to all of the Board of Inquiry’s information gathering, including how it engaged with stakeholders, invited and received submissions, managed private sessions, conducted public hearings and approached roundtables and community engagement. The Board of Inquiry also sought to address the needs of individuals from diverse backgrounds and communities, including culturally and linguistically diverse groups, First Nations people, people with a disability, people from various faith backgrounds, and members of LGBTIQA+ communities.

In this section, when we refer to the participant care and support model, the term ‘participant’ is used to refer specifically to victim-survivors, secondary victims and affected community members.

The participant care and support model

An inquiry is far more than its final report — it is a unique opportunity for a respected authority to hear and acknowledge pain, to validate experiences, to promote accountability and to support closure and healing. For some individuals, it is the compassionate human interactions they have with the people working on an inquiry that are most significant and meaningful to them. For these reasons, the Board of Inquiry wanted to build on the experiences of past inquiries that engaged with people experiencing trauma.

For some, the Board of Inquiry provided an opportunity to speak about their experiences of child sexual abuse for the first time. For others, participation meant revisiting previously shared experiences, which sometimes had not been well-received or properly heard. The Board of Inquiry knew it was crucial to ensure that victim-survivors felt safe to share their experiences of child sexual abuse and their reactions to it, without judgement. Developing or re-building trust — and maintaining this trust throughout the life of the inquiry — was critical to the Board of Inquiry’s effectiveness.

When announcing the Board of Inquiry, Mr Andrews stated that the Board of Inquiry would provide ‘trauma-informed support for people who participate in the Inquiry’¹¹ through a ‘comprehensive support system’.¹² As discussed, the Order in Council establishing the Board of Inquiry emphasised the need for the inquiry to provide a supportive and trauma-informed space for victim-survivors. Accordingly, the Board of Inquiry employed a number of staff with professional skills and clinical experience to design and deliver its trauma-informed participant care and support model.

The objectives of the participant care and support model were not only to minimise the potential for re-traumatisation or distress for participants, but to promote choice, control, healing and empowerment at each point in their journey. The model, shown in Diagram 1, has four pillars:

• Continuity of care — The model ensured continuity of care for participants, provided by a multidisciplinary team led by a single point of contact. To enable trust to be established and maintained, the Board of Inquiry drew on methods traditionally applied in a client–therapist model¹³ to create a model that supported participants through tailored engagement, communication and care and support interventions, all provided by a consistent team.
• Personalised approaches — The Board of Inquiry developed personalised approaches based on each individual’s trauma presentation, needs and preferences. This included considering any accessibility requirements each individual had, to maximise their participation. These personalised approaches were adopted by all staff, members of the Legal team, and counselling providers to create a seamless and cohesive experience for the individual.
• Robust record-keeping — The model included record-keeping processes that minimised the possibility for error or misunderstanding among Board of Inquiry staff, and that avoided the risk of a participant having to unnecessarily repeat sensitive information.
• Appropriate staff training — The Board of Inquiry ensured all staff, legal personnel and contractors were trained and equipped to recognise and respond to both the psychological and physiological symptoms of trauma with confidence and empathy.

Roundtables

Between 29 November 2023 and 14 December 2023, the Chair of the Board of Inquiry hosted five roundtables to gather further information. These were:

• Roundtable 1 (29 November 2023): Support Services
• Roundtable 2 (29 November 2023): Healing
• Roundtable 3 (1 December 2023): Lived Experience
• Roundtable 4 (1 December 2023): Support Services
• Roundtable 5 (14 December 2023): Government’s role in provision of services and supporting healing.

The composition of the roundtables varied depending on the subject to be discussed. Overall, participants included victim-survivors and secondary victims, representatives from support and advocacy services, community members with relevant experience, researchers and academics, and government representatives. A full list of roundtable participants can be found in Appendix H, Roundtables(opens in a new window).

The purpose of the roundtables was to provide an opportunity for structured discussions on questions and issues arising from the hearings about the effectiveness of support services and appropriate ways to support healing. Each roundtable was supported by a discussion guide setting out expectations, roundtable etiquette and questions to guide the conversation.

For the roundtables on support services and healing, the Board of Inquiry invited organisations and individuals with expertise and experience in delivering support services and developing healing responses. The Board of Inquiry invited several victim-survivors and secondary victims who had already participated in private sessions to attend the Lived Experience Roundtable to obtain further input from them. A final roundtable was held with representatives from across Victorian government agencies to respond to specific themes and issues that had arisen during the hearings and previous roundtables.

Each roundtable was scheduled for two hours and hosted by either the Board of Inquiry Chair or Chief Executive Officer. Roundtables were held online, in person or through a combination of the two. Consent was sought for roundtable discussions to be audio recorded and in some cases visually recorded to enable records of proceedings to be prepared for the Board of Inquiry’s reference. In order to facilitate open discussion, the Chair or CEO advised participants that while this report may refer to themes or issues discussed at roundtables, it would generally do so without attributing particular statements to individuals. The Chair or CEO also advised participants of the Support Services and Healing Roundtables that the report would only attribute a quote to an individual if that person gave their consent. Participants at the Lived Experience Roundtable were advised that all information in the report would be anonymised, even where quotes were used (which would only be done with permission).

Roundtables built on the evidence heard at public hearings and were a valuable mechanism enabling people with a range of expertise and perspectives to contribute to the Board of Inquiry’s work. They also offered another opportunity for victim-survivors and secondary victims to participate in this work.

Targeted consultations and research

The Board of Inquiry also engaged directly with several individuals and organisations through a series of targeted consultation meetings. There were a range of reasons for these consultations — for example, to help identify potential witnesses, to seek specific information on areas of expertise or to test ideas. Further information about people and organisations consulted is in Appendix I, Consultations(opens in a new window). Concurrently, the Board of Inquiry undertook independent research and literature reviews to help inform its work.

Procedural fairness

In accordance with the Inquiries Act and with its other legal obligations, the Board of Inquiry designed and conducted its inquiry in such a way that it afforded procedural fairness to those entitled to it.

From the outset, the Board of Inquiry recognised it would likely hear allegations or receive information about persons that would require it to consider its procedural fairness obligations in relation to those persons. The Board of Inquiry developed principles for deciding how it would manage any such allegations or information. This involved deciding whether and how the Board of Inquiry might seek to explore allegations or information, as well as when and why it might publicly identify any person as a relevant employee.

The Board of Inquiry sought to engage with the three alleged perpetrators who were still alive, including through any lawyers who were retained to assist them. The Board of Inquiry explained its approach to the public hearings, including the use of Restricted Publication Orders, pseudonyms and de-identification, and advised how the alleged perpetrators and their legal representatives could access information about the hearings. In each case, the Board of Inquiry foreshadowed that it would provide draft content of this report that was adverse to them and provide them with an opportunity to provide a response to it. The Board of Inquiry also provided an open invitation for the individual to engage with the Board of Inquiry at an earlier stage if they wished to do so (that is, prior to receiving the draft report content). Only one alleged perpetrator did so, by writing to the Board of Inquiry about allegations and information in relation to them that was covered during the public hearings. Subsequently, one of these three alleged perpetrators died.

Consistent with its earlier communication, the Board of Inquiry re-engaged with the two alleged perpetrators who were still alive in relation to draft content of the report that was adverse to them, including the victim-survivor and secondary victim narratives and other specific allegations or commentary in relation to them. These individuals provided responses to the Board of Inquiry, which have been carefully considered and are addressed later in this report. More detail about the procedural fairness process in relation to each alleged perpetrator is set out in Chapter 11, The alleged perpetrators(opens in a new window).

The Board of Inquiry’s procedural fairness process also involved engaging with the State of Victoria, including the Department of Education, Department of Families, Fairness and Housing, Department of Justice and Community Safety and Victoria Police, in relation to any adverse material in relation to these agencies. As a consequence, the Board of Inquiry provided the State with certain draft chapters that contained specific findings or adverse comments for the State to review. The State provided submissions in relation to these draft chapters and the Board of Inquiry took these into account before it finalised the report. The State was not provided with any other draft chapters or content prior to finalising the report.

In terms of procedural fairness responses, one relevant employee disagreed with the Board of Inquiry using the phrase ‘victim-survivor’ in the report, on the basis it could be understood as assuming the victim-survivor experiences shared with the Board of Inquiry and included in the report are true. He requested that the term ‘alleged victim-survivor’ be adopted in all instances where there has been no conviction. Despite this suggestion, the Board of Inquiry has used the term ‘victim-survivor’. The Order in Council establishing the Board of Inquiry uses this language in the inquiry’s Terms of Reference. Further, ‘victim-survivor’ is widely accepted terminology and was the way many people identified themselves to the Board of Inquiry. The use of this term does not, and is not intended to, indicate that the Board of Inquiry has made any findings of fact in relation to the experiences of victim-survivors, secondary victims and affected community members.

The Board of Inquiry was also conscious of the risks involved in publicly identifying relevant employees. If the Board of Inquiry decided, having regard to all the circumstances, that it was not appropriate to publicly identify a relevant employee, the Board of Inquiry made Restricted Publication Orders, used pseudonyms and otherwise de-identified and protected information in relation to the relevant employee.

Lessons learned

Each inquiry aims to build on previous inquiries, and in doing so, benefits greatly from what these inquiries learned about what worked well and what could be improved. The Board of Inquiry is proud of many elements of its work, particularly its participant care and support model, which aimed to offer personalised support to participants with an experience of trauma. However, the Board of Inquiry also recognises the importance of reflecting on areas of potential improvement. It is in this spirit that some key reflections from the Board of Inquiry are presented here.

While time and resources did not allow for the Board of Inquiry to conduct a full evaluation of the participant care and support model, participants and stakeholders were encouraged to provide feedback at any point about the Board of Inquiry’s work. Some of the feedback received and insights gained about the model are summarised below, along with some informal reflections on the operation of the inquiry itself.

Reflections on the participant care and support model

As noted throughout this Chapter, the Board of Inquiry deliberately embraced a trauma-informed approach when fulfilling its objectives and addressing its Terms of Reference. In doing so, it built on the lessons learned from some previous inquiries. Some of the approaches to communication, care and support adopted were new in the context of Victorian inquiries and the Board of Inquiry wanted to understand how participants experienced them. In some part due to having a small team, the Board of Inquiry could foster a supportive culture and continuously learn and improve processes and practices in order to meet the needs and wishes of participants.

Feedback from participants, provided both formally and informally, reinforces the value of inquiries such as the Board of Inquiry engaging with the community openly and designing and implementing a comprehensive model of care and support to encourage participation. These initiatives, in and of themselves, played a crucial role in victim-survivors’ healing journeys. Victim-survivors who engaged with the Board of Inquiry frequently provided feedback about their experiences, with many noting the importance and value of a participant care and support model that met their diverse needs, was emotionally validating and recognised that support methods can be delivered through formal and informal approaches. The majority of feedback received was informal but was overwhelmingly positive, with people reporting that they were met with compassion, empathy and careful consideration of their needs.

Some victim-survivors reflected that it was rewarding to be part of a person-centred care model that was effective for both the individual and the family unit. For many, the care and support they were provided contributed to greater emotional self-control, increased interpersonal trust and feelings of empowerment, reduced self-blame, and improved attachment to their loved ones. The Board of Inquiry also acknowledges how emotionally difficult it was for many victim-survivors to engage with the inquiry’s work, given the subject matter. The Board of Inquiry hopes that its approach made that difficult journey a supported one.

Reflections on how the inquiry operated

Areas of improvement identified primarily related to the short, 12-week timeframe for participation in a private session. Some people, particularly those disclosing their experiences for the first time, felt this did not provide them sufficient time to prepare psychologically. Given the short duration of the Board of Inquiry, it was inevitable that some participants would feel that processes were rushed. For future inquiries dealing with similarly sensitive subject matter (where some participants will need a good deal of time to decide whether to even engage with the inquiry), longer overall timeframes for the inquiry should be considered.

A key feature of the participant care and support model was that victim-survivors could choose whether to engage with counsellors. For many victim-survivors, their initial response was to not engage. However, they often changed their mind after participating in a private session. Many people reported their experience participating in a private session as one that, while difficult, contributed positively to their healing, and that this prompted them to continue on a therapeutic journey. For some, participating in a private session caused quite significant emotional distress and they recognised that they needed counselling support. The flexibility of the model enabled victim-survivors to safely request counselling, and decide how it was delivered.

Some people requested counselling support for immediate family members who were not formally participating in the inquiry, such as partners, siblings and children. The Board of Inquiry understood the impact that an individual’s participation was likely to have on their families, friends, loved ones and supporters and made suitable accommodations to ensure that anyone affected by the inquiry could access counselling support. Participants valued the personalisation of care and support, with many noting informally that it increased closeness in their relationships.

The Board of Inquiry is proud of the model of support it developed and hopes that it informs future inquiries involving participants who have experienced trauma, recognising the inherent power of an inquiry process to offer acknowledgement and validation of experiences and contribute to recovery.

Introduction

This Chapter outlines the operations of the Board of Inquiry. While the previous Chapter — Chapter 1, Establishment and approach(opens in a new window) — details many of the public-facing functions of the Board of Inquiry, this Chapter describes the wide range of work occurring behind the scenes to ensure the Board of Inquiry ran smoothly from an operational perspective.

This includes the Board of Inquiry’s staffing and organisational structure, approach to governance and decision-making, and important functions relating to IT, security, facilities and records management. The Chapter also outlines the key procedural guidelines developed to assist the Board of Inquiry’s work, called practice directions.

Organisational structure and functions

The design of the Board of Inquiry as an organisation required the clear allocation of functions, responsibilities and expertise to deliver on its objectives.

In their leadership role, the CEO was supported by the Chief Adviser who assisted in the establishment and functioning of the organisation. The CEO and Chief Adviser ensured that the Chair was appropriately briefed, that significant matters were fully deliberated, and that the Board of Inquiry objectives were being achieved.

The Policy, Research and Strategy team comprised experienced policy and research officers and managers. This team conducted the Board of Inquiry’s research, informed the scope of work and lines of investigation, and supported the conduct of public hearings and roundtables. It also consulted broadly with different experts to inform the Board of Inquiry’s work. This team held primary responsibility for the drafting of this report, working closely with the Legal team.

The Communications, Engagement and Supports team was responsible for external communications, public and media engagement, and supporting victim-survivors, secondary victims and affected community members. Its members supported all engagement with stakeholders, including managing the Board of Inquiry’s website, phone line and contact email addresses. This team’s work also involved embedding trauma-informed practices and policies across the organisation, and working closely with the Counselling Support team. In supporting victim-survivor and other stakeholder participation in the Board of Inquiry, the team conducted intake assessments, managed the submissions process and coordinated all private sessions with participants. Together with Comme Consulting, the Board of Inquiry’s Media Adviser, the team liaised with the media to ensure that awareness of the Board of Inquiry’s activities was amplified in the community.

The Operations and Executive Support team provided logistical and corporate support for all the Board of Inquiry’s operations. This team managed the practicalities of private sessions, public hearings, roundtables and stakeholder engagement, and was also responsible for managing people and culture (HR), finances and contracts, information and records management, and the decommissioning of the Board of Inquiry.

The Legal team, comprised of solicitors from Corrs Chambers Westgarth, fulfilled the role of Solicitors Assisting. In that role, the Legal team provided support for public hearings and was involved in all forms of information collection and analysis (including the development of this report). The Legal team also advised the Board of Inquiry on matters relating to risk, compliance, contracts, information management, and legal issues connected to media and communications. The Head of the Legal team was also General Counsel for the Board of Inquiry.

As described in Chapter 1(opens in a new window), the Board of Inquiry also appointed Counsel Assisting to perform multiple critical functions.

Diagram 4 shows the structure and teams of the Board of Inquiry.

Governance and decision-making

Governance

The Board of Inquiry had a governance framework with supporting processes and practices to ensure the efficient functioning of the organisation and an appropriate authorising environment for decisions. Regular meetings provided opportunities for feedback and group discussion. The formal decision-making structure provided rigour, but did not stifle opportunities for sharing ideas and creative thinking. Decisions were recorded and teams debriefed in a timely manner, as appropriate, to assist with ongoing work and connection to the Board of Inquiry’s overarching strategy and direction. Decision-making was enabled through the following:

• Chair meetings — Formal weekly meetings with the Chair were attended by the CEO, executives and other relevant staff. Additional meetings were scheduled as required, particularly to deliberate on findings and recommendations. Some papers and briefings were provided to the Chair out of session.
• Executive meetings — Formal weekly meetings of the executive group discussed important issues and risks associated with the Board of Inquiry’s work program, legal matters, operations and staff wellbeing. The Chair attended these meetings during the establishment phase of work.

Risk management, business continuity and security

It was important for the Board of Inquiry to identify and mitigate any risks that may have compromised its ability to do its work successfully. Risks were identified by the Chair, the CEO and other Board of Inquiry staff over the life of the inquiry. Risk management was a standing item on the weekly executive meeting agenda and a key feature in the Board of Inquiry’s planning documents, processes and protocols.

One key risk that needed to be managed related to business continuity — ensuring the Board of Inquiry was able to maintain all the staff it needed to deliver its functions throughout the inquiry. As the Board of Inquiry was a small team operating to an ambitious deadline, the loss of one or two members of staff would have been significant. To prepare for this, people with multiple and transferrable skills were prioritised in recruitment to enable flexibility if short-term staffing gaps needed to be addressed.

Information security was another a key consideration for the Board of Inquiry. Access to the Board of Inquiry office space was highly restricted and only accessible to staff and essential contractors, with on-site attendance tracked. All visitors were checked by building security and only allowed into the building if accompanied by a Board of Inquiry staff member. There was a strict ‘clean desk’ policy and processes for managing hard-copy materials to reduce the possibility of unintended confidentiality breaches. Careful attention was given to the protection of electronic materials and resources (as discussed further below).

The Board of Inquiry also engaged a security firm to be present at its public hearings and ensure the safety of all attendees present. A carefully briefed senior security professional attended all hearings and made a valuable contribution to the sense of safety that was achieved.

Protocols and procedures

Protocol with the State

The Board of Inquiry entered into a protocol with the State of Victoria, which was finalised in September 2023. This protocol set out commitments by both the Board of Inquiry and the State to support the Board of Inquiry having timely access to documents and data, and agreed ways of working, including expectations around communication, consultation and cooperation. It also established mechanisms to efficiently manage and process documents where the State considered it had good reason to not comply with a Notice to Produce or where documents contained sensitive information that affected the extent to which they could be published (for example, in the Board of Inquiry’s report or on its website). This protocol was put into operation in conjunction with the practice directions issued by the Board of Inquiry.

Practice directions

The Board of Inquiry was empowered to issue practice directions under the Inquiries Act 2014 (Vic). These were guidelines that explained processes and procedures the Board of Inquiry would adopt in conducting its work. The Board of Inquiry made six practice directions, which were all published on its website:

1. Practice Direction No 1: General Information (12 September 2023) — which gave a general preliminary overview of how the Board of Inquiry would work, including how it would receive and treat information, issue and enforce compliance with Notices to Produce or Notices to Attend, and conduct closed hearings and private sessions. Some of these matters became the subject of specific practice directions.
2. Practice Direction No 2: Leave to Appear (12 September 2023) — which explained how the Board of Inquiry would decide whether people (other than witnesses) could appear before the Board of Inquiry in its public hearings (that is, whether it would give ‘leave to appear’). Leave to appear is sometimes sought by lawyers of interested parties who wish to ask questions of witnesses, or make arguments or submissions to an inquiry. Only the State of Victoria sought leave to appear before the Board of Inquiry. The State of Victoria did not seek to question lived experience witnesses.
3. Practice Direction No 3: Production of Documents and Document Management Protocol (26 September 2023) — which explained the format and processes for providing documents to the Board of Inquiry in compliance with a Notice to Produce. It also provided the basis upon which people could argue they had a reasonable excuse not to comply with a Notice to Produce, and included considerations relating to documents subject to secrecy or confidentiality requirements.
4. Practice Direction No 4: Private Sessions (12 September 2023) — which covered the Board of Inquiry’s processes for private sessions, including practical issues relating to information management, expenses, and the legal rights and responsibilities of participants.
5. Practice Direction No 5: Public Hearings (12 September 2023) — which described procedural matters in relation to public hearings, including how proceedings would be conducted, and provided information regarding restricted publication orders and closed hearings.
6. Practice Direction No 6: Witness Expenses Policy (revised) (8 November 2023) — which described the circumstances in which the Board of Inquiry would compensate or reimburse someone in connection with their participation in the inquiry.

Guides and guidelines

The Board of Inquiry developed a range of guides and guidelines relevant to particular functions. These included media guidelines, as well as guides for participants in private sessions and public hearings. They are discussed further in Chapter 1(opens in a new window), and the latter guides may be found in Appendices E, Private sessions and G, Information about public hearings(opens in a new window).

Finance and procurement

Under the establishing Order in Council, the Board of Inquiry was authorised to incur expenses and financial obligations up to $4.5 million.¹ In the early stages of the Board of Inquiry’s work, it was identified that the allocated budget may require review to ensure that its objectives could be fully met, and that all people who wished to participate in the inquiry could be afforded the appropriate time and support to do so. Following a request from the Board of Inquiry, the Victorian Government amended the total budget to $5.4 million.²

Financial management and internal controls

The Board of Inquiry developed a budget strategy during the early part of the establishment phase. The budget was aligned to key functions, but managed via a single cost centre and a central approval process. The Board of Inquiry appropriately and regularly reviewed the budget strategy, and adjusted it to meet the evolving requirements of the work and to manage risk.

The Board of Inquiry also implemented internal control measures from the outset as part of a robust financial management approach. It utilised the accounts payable system offered by the Department of Government Services, which had embedded controls for authorisations. Expenditure and projected expenditure were modelled frequently and closely monitored.

Procurement

The Board of Inquiry elected to adopt procurement processes consistent with relevant Victorian public sector guidelines. The most important considerations were to ensure that all procurement was robust, transparent and efficient, and achieved maximum value for public money. The Board of Inquiry either utilised relevant Victorian Government state purchase contracts for efficiency and value, or conducted competitive market processes. With the assistance of the Legal team, the Board of Inquiry developed contracts for service (and associated terms and conditions) and confidentiality deeds, and all contracts were approved by the CEO in consultation with the Chair.

IT and records management

Given its short operation, the Board of Inquiry chose to engage the Department of Government Services to provide suitable IT, security and data management. The Board of Inquiry’s IT system was segmented and established under a dedicated domain, with restricted access to uphold its independence and confidentiality. IT support and a helpdesk service were provided by Cenitex, an IT shared services provider. Given the sensitive nature of the Board of Inquiry’s work, data security was of the utmost importance.

The Board of Inquiry utilised the Microsoft SharePoint platform as its core electronic document records management system. This platform enabled multiple users to collaborate in documents simultaneously, and also provided an organisational intranet site. The intranet covered areas such as staff resources and administration, and included useful documents such as news articles and operational processes and guides. The Board of Inquiry used other Microsoft tools, including Outlook and Teams, for most internal and external communication and engagement.

The Board of Inquiry provided staff and relevant contractors with portable devices and the ability to work via the Office 365 online portal. Staff were also given policy and guidance materials regarding IT software and information security.

For the work conducted at the Yoorrook Justice Commission, including private sessions and public hearings, a restricted secure network was set up, as well as installation of a dedicated multifunctional device for secure printing, scanning and copying.

The Board of Inquiry also engaged third parties to provide and manage certain specific IT functions:

• A document management system — This was provided by Corrs Chambers Westgarth as part of its work as the Legal team, and was used to host source documentation and reference materials. It became the main repository for research materials, submissions, hearings materials such as transcripts and exhibits, correspondence, responses to Notices to Produce, and formal records of engagement activities.
• File sharing — This was also provided by Corrs Chambers Westgarth as part of its work as the Legal team. It offered a secure mechanism for the transfer and shared access of documents between different teams working for the Board of Inquiry.
• Submissions via the Board of Inquiry’s website — Plug-in software was procured to facilitate the secure input and retention of information and submissions from the public.
• Online hearing book — This system was provided by Law In Order Pty Ltd. It securely received documents from the document management system (referred to above) to enable them to be shared with parties for each public hearing.

These arrangements ensured the Board of Inquiry could meet the objectives associated with ease of access and usability, risk and business continuity, privacy and confidentiality, and retention and disposal of records and information.

People and culture

The Operations and Executive Support team coordinated and oversaw HR matters, with advice sought as needed from the Department of Government Services. The Board of Inquiry utilised the Department of Government Services’ HR Shared Services payroll function.

With the assistance of the Department of Government Services’ recruitment team, the Board of Inquiry advertised roles in July 2023 on internal and external Victorian public service careers sites and Seek. Successful candidates were hired on a mixture of secondments and fixed-term contracts. No staff members were sourced or appointed through labour-hire firms.

The Board of Inquiry sought to be a high-performing, hardworking and compassionate organisation, prioritising the wellbeing of all those who participated in the Inquiry, as well as those undertaking the Inquiry’s work. Staff came from the Victorian public service, other state public services, the Australian public service and the not-for-profit sector. They came with a range of experience in royal commissions, independent reviews, childhood trauma, legal services and public policy. Their expertise included research, legislation, communications, engagement, social work and public administration. The task of building the Board of Inquiry team involved deliberately bringing together the diverse range of skills and experience of those appointed, as well as ensuring that staff embodied the values and attributes that were crucial to the Board of Inquiry’s success.

Despite the rapid assembly of the Board of Inquiry team, staggered start dates and pressure to commence the inquiry without delay, it came together quickly. The culture of the organisation was set formally and informally at the outset, and was made clear to staff and contractors alike. People supported each other, shared ideas and genuinely worked as a team.

A trauma-informed approach would not have been possible without an appropriately trained and educated workforce driving it. While some Board of Inquiry staff had extensive expertise in trauma and social work, others required training to strengthen their skills in this area. The Board of Inquiry offered training developed by a specialist organisation, knowmore, to all staff members. This training ensured that everyone was equipped with, and understood how to apply, the core principles of trauma-aware practice in their engagement with victim-survivors. In turn, this enabled staff members to ensure victim-survivors had safe, empathic, trauma-sensitive and shame-reducing interactions whenever they engaged with the Board of Inquiry.

This training was also designed to ensure that staff were supported to protect their personal and professional wellbeing. By necessity, the Board of Inquiry exposed staff to information that was challenging to process and could elicit strong emotions. Accordingly, in addition to trauma-informed practice, training covered mental health in the workplace, vicarious trauma, fatigue and burnout, and self-care plans. A range of specific support resources were developed and made available to all members of staff. The Board of Inquiry also provided staff with unlimited 24/7 access to an independent firm of registered, experienced psychologists, with whom they could have confidential discussions about any matters that concerned them. Staff wellbeing remained a standing item on the executive meeting agenda, and a priority for all executives and managers throughout the life of the inquiry.

Premises

The Board of Inquiry needed a range of premises from which to conduct its work — not only its main office but also facilities for private sessions, public hearings and roundtables. Other than the main office (which was principally only for staff), these premises needed to be accessible and convenient for the community, and also had to promote a feeling of safety and inclusion, particularly for victim-survivors.

The Department of Government Services assisted the Board of Inquiry by identifying a self-contained, private, secure floor in the Treasury precinct which the Board of Inquiry was able to use as its main office.

The Board of Inquiry considered numerous locations for private sessions and public hearings. By arrangement, the Yoorrook Justice Commission permitted the Board of Inquiry to use its space for public hearings, private sessions and some roundtables, and also generously shared its experiences of holding public truth-telling hearings. Reflections on this space are included in Chapter 1(opens in a new window).

Steps to decommission the Board of Inquiry

Given its short life, the Board of Inquiry had to commence planning for decommissioning not long after its establishment. Consideration was given to all elements that were relevant to winding up the Board of Inquiry, including how to appropriately conclude its support for participants, communicate to the public and stakeholders, preserve relevant records, move out of facilities and farewell staff.

An important part of concluding the Board of Inquiry’s work was records management, specifically preparation for the transfer of records and their ongoing management. Following consultation with the Department of Government Services, Department of Premier and Cabinet and the Public Record Office Victoria, the Board of Inquiry ensured records were classified and categorised to facilitate retention and access according to legislative requirements. The Board of Inquiry took particular care to engage with the Department of Government Services, the Department of Premier and Cabinet and the Public Record Office Victoria regarding the treatment of records containing sensitive content.

The Board of Inquiry worked with the Department of Government Services to ensure the IT environment was correctly and securely decommissioned. Checks were also conducted to confirm all third-party systems were closed. The Operations and Executive Support team ensured that a full budget reconciliation was complete and that all contracts were closed out.

Introduction

Governments initiate inquiries for various reasons, including to investigate and explain complex events or intractable problems. At the time of establishment of an inquiry, it can be difficult to predict the nature and type of information that the inquiry may need to carry out its work, and to anticipate what other information might be uncovered during its course. It is important for terms of reference to be specific enough to give the inquiry a clear purpose and mandate that it can follow, without constraining it from considering all sources of information that may turn out to be relevant to the issues it has been asked to investigate. The Board of Inquiry acknowledges that it is difficult to strike this balance.

As foreshadowed above, all inquiries must confront the limits imposed by their terms of reference, and the present inquiry is no exception. In some instances, legal requirements will dictate hard limits. However, even the most specific terms of reference generally require a degree of interpretation, and this invites difficult decisions. Such decisions are informed by a range of factors, including both public interest and practical considerations (for example, time and available resources). They require a balancing of the ambition to do as much as possible within the scope of the terms of reference with the need to deliver public benefit within the timeframe chosen by government.

This Chapter describes how the Board of Inquiry interpreted its Terms of Reference and the decisions it made in the course of determining whether information was within scope. It also details some of the challenges the Board of Inquiry faced in respect of its Terms of Reference, particularly with regard to the identification and gathering of information, and then the setting of thresholds for investigating matters that it considered relevant.

Terms of Reference

Clause 3 of the Order in Council sets out the Terms of Reference for the Board of Inquiry.¹ These were ‘to inquire into, report on and make any recommendations considered appropriate in relation to’ the following:

1. The experiences of victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse who were abused by a relevant employee at Beaumaris Primary School during the 1960s and/or 1970s;
2. The experiences of victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse who were abused by a relevant employee in any other government school;
3. The response of the Department of Education in relation to the historical child sexual abuse described in clauses (3)(a) and (b) above, including the Department of Education and its officers’ state of knowledge and any actions it took or failed to take at or around the time of the abuse;
4. Appropriate ways to support healing for affected victim-survivors, secondary victims and affected communities including, for example, the form of a formal apology, memorialisation or other activities;
5. Having regard to other inquiries and reforms that have taken place since the historical child sexual abuse occurred, whether there are effective support services for victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse in government schools;
6. Any other matters related to these Terms of Reference necessary to satisfactorily inquire into or address the Terms of Reference.²

The Terms of Reference directed the Board of Inquiry not to inquire into:

1. The response of the State (including the Department of Education and its staff) to any complaints, legal proceedings or legal claims in relation to incidents of historical child sexual abuse in a government school, except insofar as the inquiry may establish a factual record of the state of knowledge of the Department of Education and its staff and the actions taken or not taken by the Department and its staff at or around the time of the historical child sexual abuse ...
2. Compensation and/or redress arrangements, including settlement of any civil claims, for victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse.³

A copy of the Order in Council is in Appendix A(opens in a new window).

Assessing whether information relating to experiences of child sexual abuse was within scope

The Board of Inquiry received a range of information describing experiences of child sexual abuse that fell outside the scope of the Terms of Reference. While the Board of Inquiry was not able to inquire into any information that was outside the scope of the Terms of Reference, it did carefully consider whether such information was within scope. Sometimes, further enquiries were required to assist the Board of Inquiry to understand whether the information received was within the scope of the Terms or Reference or not. If the Board of Inquiry determined the information was within scope, it then considered whether any follow-up action was required. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 1, Establishment and approach(opens in a new window), the Board of Inquiry offered appropriate support and private sessions to people who provided information about their experiences of child sexual abuse, regardless of whether their experiences came within the Board of Inquiry’s Terms of Reference.

Sometimes it was very clear that information fell outside the Terms of Reference. Examples include information that:

• did not involve child sexual abuse (for example, information about physical abuse only)
• related to child sexual abuse in settings that had no connection to a school or a school employee (for example, child sexual abuse perpetrated by a stranger at the beach or by a family member)
• related to child sexual abuse that occurred outside the relevant period identified in the Terms of Reference, being 1 January 1960 to 31 December 1999 (the relevant period is discussed further in the next section)
• related to child sexual abuse that occurred at a non-government school, such as a private or religious school
• related to child sexual abuse that occurred outside Victoria.

Sometimes it was more difficult to determine whether information fell outside the Terms of Reference. In such cases, the Board of Inquiry attempted to gather further information. This generally occurred where:

• it was difficult to determine the identity of an alleged perpetrator or confirm the school (or schools) where they worked and when
• there was information that suggested the possibility that an alleged perpetrator may be a relevant employee, but further information was needed to confirm this (for example, to confirm they had worked, and were alleged to have perpetrated child sexual abuse, at Beaumaris Primary School in the 1960s or 1970s)
• the child sexual abuse was alleged to have occurred at a government school, but it was unclear whether it was alleged to have been perpetrated by a relevant employee and therefore whether that school was within scope
• the child sexual abuse occurred outside a government school premises, but it was necessary to consider if a government school, or its activities, had ‘created, facilitated, increased, or in any way contributed to … the risk of child sexual abuse’.⁴

These issues, and how the Board of Inquiry ultimately interpreted key terms in its Terms of Reference, are explained further in the next section.

The Board of Inquiry continued to seek and receive information throughout the life of the inquiry. Whenever it received new information, the Board of Inquiry actively considered whether this new information required a revisiting of other information and initial decisions it might have made about whether such other information was out of scope.

How the Board of Inquiry interpreted its Terms of Reference

This section describes the key decisions the Board of Inquiry made about the scope of its work under the Terms of Reference. Interpreting and applying the Terms of Reference was complex, but it is important to understand how the Board of Inquiry approached this task, as it determined what information and issues are considered in this report.

In addition, this section describes the practical effect of the Terms of Reference, including decisions made by the Board of Inquiry where it was required to interpret the Terms of Reference or apply them to information received. A key challenge was the narrow definition of ‘relevant employee’ and the flow-on effects this definition had on the ability of the Board of Inquiry to consider information about other schools or alleged perpetrators. Despite the wide-ranging information received, the Board of Inquiry determined that, on the information available to it, only six people satisfied the definition of relevant employee. This in turn determined the schools and other settings in which the Board of Inquiry could consider allegations of child sexual abuse, and excluded other schools or alleged perpetrators who might otherwise have been seen as relevant.

This section also outlines how the Board of Inquiry treated certain other information, including information received about the disappearance of Eloise Worledge, a student at Beaumaris Primary School in the 1970s.

Defining the relevant period

The relevant time period, for the purposes of the Board of Inquiry’s work, was between 1 January 1960 and 31 December 1999. However, as will be explained, a question arose as to whether a narrower time period (the 1960s and the 1970s) was applicable to Beaumaris Primary School, as opposed to other government schools.

This question reflects two aspects of the Terms of Reference. The Terms of Reference defined a ‘relevant employee’ as ‘a teacher or other government school employee or contractor who sexually abused a student at Beaumaris Primary School during the 1960s or 1970s’.⁵ This meant that 1 January 1960 was the starting point of the relevant period. By clause 3(b), the Terms of Reference also contemplated consideration of ‘historical child sexual abuse’ perpetrated by these relevant employees at other government schools, defining ‘historical child sexual abuse’ as ‘sexual abuse of a child in a government school by a staff member employed by the Department of Education in a government school, where that abuse occurred on or prior to 31 December 1999’.⁶ This meant that 31 December 1999 was the end point of the relevant period.

However, the Terms of Reference drew a distinction (in clauses 3(a) and (b)) between child sexual abuse by a relevant employee at Beaumaris Primary School ‘during the 1960s and/or 1970s’ (on the one hand), and child sexual abuse by a relevant employee at any other government school (on the other hand). Because the narrower timeframe (the 1960s and/or 1970s) was only used in respect of child sexual abuse alleged to have occurred at Beaumaris Primary School, the broader timeframe (from 1 January 1960 to 31 December 1999) only applied to child sexual abuse alleged to have occurred at other government schools.

Accordingly, on a strict reading of the Terms of Reference, an allegation of child sexual abuse by a relevant employee at Beaumaris Primary School between 1980 and 1999 would fall outside the Terms of Reference. Given, however, that clause 3(f) of the Terms of Reference contemplated the Board of Inquiry considering ‘[a]ny other matters related to these Terms of Reference necessary to satisfactorily inquire into or address the Terms of Reference’, the Board of Inquiry considered it was within scope to consider any allegation of child sexual abuse by a relevant employee at Beaumaris Primary School between 1 January 1960 and 31 December 1999. It is difficult to see how the objectives of the Board of Inquiry (as set out in the Order in Council) could be met if an allegation against a relevant employee in (say) 1980 could not be inquired into as part of the Board of Inquiry’s work. This was particularly so in light of the fact, as set out in Part C(opens in a new window) of this report, that a relevant employee was employed at Beaumaris Primary School after 31 December 1979.

Determining who was a ‘relevant employee’

The concept of a ‘relevant employee’ was central to the Terms of Reference and shaped the scope of the inquiry. It was defined as follows:

A question arose as to the meaning of the language ‘who sexually abused a student’ in the definition. On one view, this could be interpreted to require (to meet the definition) a formal finding that a person had committed sexual abuse against a student; for example, a criminal conviction, a finding in a civil case or a formal disciplinary finding. However, the Board of Inquiry did not adopt this narrow interpretation for the following reasons:

• Such a narrow interpretation would be inconsistent with clause 1(e) of the Order in Council, which refers to relevant employees as ‘allegedly’ harming multiple victim-survivors and ‘allegedly’ perpetrating sexual abuse towards students. Clause 1(e) makes clear that these allegations of child sexual abuse were to be the subject of the Board of Inquiry. Clause 1(e) was not limited to formal findings of child sexual abuse.
• Such a narrow interpretation would also be inconsistent with the language of clause 2(a) of the Order in Council, which refers to establishing a ‘public record of victim-survivors’ experiences’. The language of ‘experiences’ (which is repeated in clauses 3(a) and (b)) is consistent with a focus on what victim-survivors recall and are able to share with the Board of Inquiry, rather than a focus on what has or has not been formally established in a court or disciplinary setting.
• The Board of Inquiry recognises the very real and understandable barriers to disclosure that many victim-survivors confront, and did not want to contribute to the sense of shame or self-blame that some victim-survivors carry for not reporting their child sexual abuse.
• Failures to conduct robust disciplinary investigations or police investigations into allegations of child sexual abuse were likely to have been a feature of institutional responses at that time, and requiring a formal finding of child sexual abuse would limit the ability of the Board of Inquiry to understand the extent of historical child sexual abuse and hold relevant agencies accountable for failures to act.
• Such an interpretation would have likely discouraged people from providing important information on the basis that there was no formal finding against an alleged perpetrator (or they were unsure if there was such a finding).
• Historic record-keeping practices by schools and the Department of Education (Department) may have limited the ability of the Board of Inquiry to confirm the existence of disciplinary findings.

Ultimately, the Board of Inquiry determined that six people satisfied the definition of ‘relevant employee’. The following three relevant employees are named in this report:

• Darrell Vivienne Ray (also known as Darrell Vivian Ray and Ray Cosgriff) born 14 May 1941; died 21 November 2023
• Graham Harold Steele (also known as Grahame Steele) born 3 May 1932; died 2013
• David MacGregor born 8 January 1943.⁸

A fourth person determined to be a relevant employee cannot be named in order to avoid causing prejudice to current or future criminal or civil proceedings, or otherwise giving rise to other legal issues. Instead, this person is referred to using the pseudonym ‘Wyatt’ in this report.⁹

The Board of Inquiry also heard allegations from one victim-survivor in relation to two further relevant employees, who are not named in this report. As with the other four relevant employees, the Board of Inquiry sought to investigate these two individuals, including through issuing Notices to Produce to the Department in each case seeking their employment record, information in relation to any allegations of child sexual abuse and any response to or investigation of such allegations, and information in relation to any relevant criminal or civil proceedings.¹⁰ The Department responded in each case stating that it had not found records documenting such allegations or any relevant criminal or civil proceedings.¹¹ The Department advised that the personnel files for these two relevant employees did not contain any record of disciplinary action and the Department was unable to locate any disciplinary files.¹² The Board of Inquiry’s review of the employment record for each individual did not identify any further relevant information. In the absence of any further allegations or information in relation to these two relevant employees, and taking into account the implications for them if they were named, the Board of Inquiry determined it was not appropriate to publicly identify them. The Board of Inquiry determined that the focus of its investigation would remain on the other four relevant employees in relation to whom it received a considerable amount of information. It is for this reason that these other two relevant employees are not the subject of any further detailed discussion in this report.

More broadly, the Board of Inquiry has been careful not to prejudice any criminal or civil legal proceedings or otherwise create legal issues that may adversely affect those participating in or impacted by the Board of Inquiry’s work. Importantly, it was not the role of the Board of Inquiry to make findings that child sexual abuse did or did not occur. Establishing a public record of victim-survivors’ experiences is not equivalent to (and should not be understood as) making findings of fact about particular events. Accordingly, the Board of Inquiry has not directly investigated allegations of child sexual abuse, beyond confirming basic information relevant to the Terms of Reference. As a result, the Board of Inquiry uses the term ‘alleged perpetrator’ throughout this report, including to describe relevant employees. This is not intended to be interpreted as the Board of Inquiry casting doubt on the recollections of victim-survivors and others; rather, it is intended to make clear the scope of the Board of Inquiry’s role and to safeguard the integrity of legal processes that are underway or may be initiated in the future.

Challenges with the narrow definition of ‘relevant employee’

The definition of ‘relevant employee’ was the gateway for experiences of historical child sexual abuse to be within the scope of the Board of Inquiry. If an alleged perpetrator of child sexual abuse did not meet this specific definition, then information in relation to them could not be considered for the purposes of clauses 3 (a), (b) and (c) of the Terms of Reference. The Terms of Reference were focused on persons (relevant employees) and the government schools where they worked, rather than just on the schools themselves. Accordingly, an allegation of child sexual abuse by a teacher at Mount View Primary School (for example) would only come within the scope of the Terms of Reference if the alleged sexual abuse was perpetrated by a relevant employee.

The practical effect of the definition of ‘relevant employee’ was that the Board of Inquiry could only consider experiences of child sexual abuse if it could first establish with a reasonable level of confidence that the alleged perpetrator had worked at Beaumaris Primary School between 1960 and 1979, and that the alleged perpetrator was the subject of an allegation of child sexual abuse said to have occurred at that school during that period. Once these two limbs were confirmed, experiences of child sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by that relevant employee at Beaumaris Primary School and other government schools between 1960 and 1999 came within scope.

Because each of the relevant employees worked at government schools other than Beaumaris Primary School between 1960 and 1999, this meant that sometimes critical information received from a source that confirmed an alleged perpetrator was a relevant employee could bring a range of other schools or settings within the scope of the Terms of Reference.

However, this also meant that any allegations about child sexual abuse against a person who was teaching in a government school in the Beaumaris area but was not a relevant employee (because, for example, there was no allegation of child sexual abuse by that person of a student at Beaumaris Primary School) could not be included in this report. While clause 1(e) of the Order in Council makes clear that the Victorian Government’s decision to constitute the Board of Inquiry was made against the background of allegations concerning a cluster of teachers who were allegedly perpetrating child sexual abuse at Beaumaris Primary School (and in relation to allegations of sexual abuse by those same teachers at other government schools), this limitation was a source of frustration for people who approached the inquiry with a genuine belief they would be able to have their experiences form part of the public record.

Due to the definition of ‘relevant employee’, the Board of Inquiry was unable to examine allegations of child sexual abuse in relation to one government school close to Beaumaris Primary School. It was also unable to examine allegations of child sexual abuse in relation to teachers who worked at Beaumaris Primary School and other government schools, but were not the subject of any allegations of child sexual abuse while at Beaumaris Primary School. Further it was unable to examine allegations of child sexual abuse in relation to teachers who worked at a nearby school, but did not work at Beaumaris Primary School. These include allegations relating to one teacher with links to relevant employees, which is illustrated below.

‘KYLE’

The Board of Inquiry received information about allegations of child sexual abuse against a teacher, ‘Kyle’ (a pseudonym), who worked at Beaumaris Primary School in the early 1960s before going on to work at a range of other schools in the area.¹³

Critically, the Board of Inquiry did not receive any allegations of child sexual abuse against Kyle in relation to his time at Beaumaris Primary School. The Board of Inquiry did, however, receive extensive information alleging that Kyle perpetrated child sexual abuse in a government school context during the relevant period. This included information alleging child sexual abuse by Kyle against nine separate victim-survivors. Eight of these victim-survivors attended the same government school, which was close to Beaumaris Primary School, and the ninth victim-survivor attended a nearby government school. Kyle briefly worked alongside a relevant employee at one of these local government schools for a year (referred to in Diagram 5 as School A). That relevant employee is alleged to have perpetrated child sexual abuse at that school the following year.

As the Board of Inquiry did not receive any allegations of child sexual abuse against Kyle in relation to his time at Beaumaris Primary School, Kyle did not meet the definition of a ‘relevant employee’ and, as a result, the experiences of victim-survivors who reported sexual abuse by Kyle, and the Department’s actions in relation to Kyle, were not within the scope of the Board of Inquiry’s work (except in relation to clause 3(e) of the Terms of Reference, as discussed further below). This is despite the fact that he was alleged to have sexually abused students at other government schools in close geographical proximity to Beaumaris Primary School and had at least one professional connection with a relevant employee the Board of Inquiry was examining.

Kyle was not the only teacher at a government school close to Beaumaris Primary School who was the subject of allegations by persons who came forward to the Board of Inquiry, and yet was determined not to be a relevant employee.

Determining which other government schools were within scope

For a school other than Beaumaris Primary School to be within the scope of the Terms of Reference, it needed to meet the following requirements:

• It must have been a Victorian government school at the relevant time.
• A person meeting the definition of ‘relevant employee’ must have worked there (as part of this definition, they must have worked there as teacher, employee or contractor of the Department).
• The allegations against the relevant employee must be of child sexual abuse occurring on or prior to 31 December 1999 (thereby meeting the definition of ‘historical child sexual abuse’ in the Terms of Reference).

In practice, the effect of these requirements is that the teaching history of Mr Ray, Mr Steele, Mr MacGregor and Wyatt dictated which other government schools came within scope. Essentially, it obliged the Board of Inquiry to follow the careers of these four relevant employees through to 1999. The Board of Inquiry relied on the Department to confirm information about the government schools where each relevant employee worked (including their role and length of service).

The Board of Inquiry is aware that one relevant employee went on to teach at an independent school after ceasing their employment in government schools. Due to the focus of the Terms of Reference on child sexual abuse that took place ‘in a government school’, this independent school was not within the scope of this inquiry.

In October 2023, the Board of Inquiry publicly identified the 24 schools that met all these requirements:

• Aspendale Primary School
• Beaconsfield Upper Primary School
• Beaumaris Primary School
• Belvedere Park Primary School
• Bundalong South Primary School (now closed)
• Bunyip Primary School
• Chelsea Heights Primary School
• Cowes Primary School
• Cranbourne Primary School
• Dandenong North Primary School
• Dandenong West Primary School
• Drouin South Primary School
• Emerald Primary School
• Hampton Primary School
• Kunyung Primary School
• Mirboo Primary School, now Mirboo North Primary School
• Moorabbin (Tucker Road) Primary School, now Tucker Road Bentleigh Primary School
• Moorabbin West Primary School (now closed)
• Mount View Primary School
• Ormond East Primary School, now McKinnon Primary School
• Tarraville Primary School (now closed)
• Tarwin Lower Primary School
• Warragul Primary School
• Warragul Technical School, now Warragul Regional College.¹⁴

If a relevant employee is alleged to have perpetrated child sexual abuse at one school, it invites the question of what might have occurred at other schools where they worked. It also invites the question of whether child sexual abuse might have occurred ‘in a government school context’ (discussed in the next section). The Terms of Reference permitted the Board of Inquiry to examine child sexual abuse that allegedly took place at ‘other government schools’ and in a ‘government school context’, but in each case there needed to be a connection to a relevant employee (and, therefore, Beaumaris Primary School).

Accordingly, despite a wide-ranging communications and engagement strategy, most of the information the Board of Inquiry received related to the Beaumaris community and, to a lesser extent, the surrounding areas. In this way, the Board of Inquiry’s work, pursuant to the Terms of Reference, focused on a particular community within a specific period. Even in relation to that community (Beaumaris and the surrounding areas), the Board of Inquiry’s focus was limited to schools where relevant employees taught.

Determining what other settings were within scope

The Terms of Reference define ‘in a government school’ broadly to mean ‘in a government school context’. The definition includes child sexual abuse that:

1. happened on the premises of a government school, where activities of that school took place, or in connection with the activities of that school; or
2. was engaged in by a relevant employee in circumstances (including circumstances involving settings not directly controlled by the government school) where you consider that the government school had, or its activities had, created, facilitated, increased, or in any way contributed to (whether by act or omission) the risk of child sexual abuse or the circumstances or conditions giving rise to that risk.¹⁵

This wide definition of ‘in a government school’ enabled the Board of Inquiry to consider child sexual abuse by relevant employees in settings that went beyond government school facilities or premises. For example, the Board of Inquiry considered the following settings to be within scope on the basis that they were settings where activities of the school took place or were in connection with activities of the school:

• school camps (including Somers School Camp and Berry Creek Camp)
• school sporting excursions.

The Board of Inquiry also considered that other settings came within scope where the fact that the relevant employee was in a position of trust by virtue of their status as a teacher in a government school during the relevant period, and likely held in high regard by the relevant community, would have given rise to a perception that activities involving that person were appropriate and safe for children, at school and beyond. In this context, the relationship between the government school and the relevant employee had contributed to the risk of child sexual abuse. On this basis, the Board of Inquiry considered the following settings connected to relevant employees to be within scope:

• community sporting settings (discussed in more detail below)
• a relevant employee’s home or holiday home, where the victim-survivor was a student of a government school falling within the scope of the Terms of Reference
• private settings (such as a private home or vehicle) after the victim-survivor finished primary school, where the victim-survivor was a former student of a government school falling within the scope of the Terms of Reference.

Community sporting settings

The Board of Inquiry received information about allegations of child sexual abuse in relation to several community sporting organisations in Beaumaris and the surrounding areas. The Board of Inquiry also received information about the connection of relevant employees to local sporting organisations about which the Board of Inquiry has not received any allegations of child sexual abuse.

In addition, the Board of Inquiry received information about allegations of child sexual abuse by relevant employees against children from government schools that were within scope in relation to community sporting organisation activities (for example, training for sporting events).

The Board of Inquiry carefully considered this information, which in each case suggested that it was the relevant employee’s status as a teacher during the relevant period that facilitated them introducing these children to, or otherwise being able to access these children during, such community sporting organisation activities. As set out above, given the Board of Inquiry considered the relationship between the government school and the relevant employee had contributed to the risk of child sexual abuse, this meant allegations of child sexual abuse by relevant employees in relation to community sporting organisation activities came within the scope of the Board of Inquiry’s work.

Importantly, this did not mean that the activities of the relevant community sporting organisation itself were within scope. Instead, the Board of Inquiry’s focus was on the accountability of the Department for the conduct of the relevant employees only, including (for example) any sharing of information or other actions by the Department that reflected its knowledge or management of any risks presented by the relevant employees to government school students in that context.

Other information considered relevant to Departmental accountability

The Board of Inquiry received some information about certain relevant employees that fell outside the Terms of Reference. This included information about these relevant employees’ level of (often unfettered) contact with children that continued beyond the relevant period or in settings that fell out of scope (for example, in circumstances where a teacher went on to teach in an independent school).

While the Board of Inquiry could not inquire into these matters, some of this information has been included in parts of this report. The Board of Inquiry considered such information relevant to highlighting the practical consequences of the Department’s failure to act in response to allegations of historical child sexual abuse within government schools. In practice, while some relevant employees may have left their roles as teachers in government schools, they were nonetheless able to continue to leverage their status as a teacher (or former teacher) into roles and opportunities that placed them in trusted positions with children, such as at sporting clubs. Including this information is an important component of clause 3(c) of the Board of Inquiry’s Terms of Reference, concerning the Department’s response at the time of the historical child sexual abuse.

The case of Eloise Worledge

A number of people raised the disappearance of Eloise Worledge with the Board of Inquiry.¹⁶ Eloise was eight years old when she went missing from her family home in Beaumaris in 1976.¹⁷ Victoria Police conducted an investigation and considered a range of scenarios as part of this investigation, which included the possibility that one or more sex offenders were involved in her disappearance. In 2003, a coroner found that Eloise’s disappearance ‘remains suspicious’ and presumed her to have died, but could not determine exactly where, when or how she did.¹⁸

Some victim-survivors and media outlets urged the Board of Inquiry to consider Eloise’s disappearance because:

• Eloise attended Beaumaris Primary School in the 1970s and was known to many victim-survivors. Her disappearance greatly affected the community, and those who spoke with the Board of Inquiry about Eloise clearly recalled her disappearance and how they felt about it as children.
• Eloise went missing in 1976, while two relevant employees were employed at Beaumaris Primary School.
• Media reports suggest police were not aware at the time that employees at Beaumaris Primary School were allegedly sexually abusing children and question whether this information would have altered the course of the police investigation.¹⁹

The Board of Inquiry has closely considered all information it received relating to Eloise, including information received in response to Notices to Produce and through private sessions. The information available to the Board of Inquiry did not reveal any connection between Eloise’s disappearance and the matters within the scope of the Terms of Reference.

As at the date of this report, Eloise’s disappearance remains an open investigation by Victoria Police. The Board of Inquiry encourages anyone with information connected to her disappearance to report this to Victoria Police.

Scope relating to support services

The Terms of Reference were specific in clauses 3(a) and (b) about which experiences of child sexual abuse the Board of Inquiry could inquire into and report on. However, clause 3(e) was more broadly framed. It asked the Board of Inquiry to inquire into, report on and make recommendations in relation to the following:

Given clause 3(e) was not confined to experiences of historical child sexual abuse described in clauses 3(a) and (b), the Board of Inquiry was able to receive and consider information relevant to the effectiveness of support services for victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse in government schools more generally (that is, not limited to those who shared experiences of child sexual abuse by relevant employees). Such information is set out in Part D(opens in a new window) of this report.

Concerns expressed about the Terms of Reference

The Board of Inquiry is aware of concerns raised directly with it, and more broadly in the media, about the limits imposed by the Terms of Reference.²¹ Such concerns were raised after the announcement of the Board of Inquiry and arose from time to time during the course of the inquiry.

The Board of Inquiry understands that some victim-survivor advocates with experiences of child sexual abuse at Beaumaris Primary School and their supporters had hoped for an inquiry that examined experiences of historical child sexual abuse in all Victorian government schools. They considered that although there had been a number of inquiries relating to institutional child sexual abuse over the past decade, historical child sexual abuse in Victorian government schools remained poorly understood. This was because it was considered that those inquiries often focused on abuses in private or religious schools, or related to more recent child sexual abuse.

Other advocates raised the value of the Board of Inquiry in contributing to healing, and expressed the view that this objective, as stated in clause 2(c) of the Order in Council, should not be limited to only some victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse in Victorian government schools. The Board of Inquiry heard from stakeholders that members of the victim-survivor community had experienced distress as a result of the limits on which experiences of historical child sexual abuse could be considered by the Board of Inquiry.

These concerns were expressed in a publicly released statement on 28 November 2023.²² The Chair of the Board of Inquiry wrote to the Premier about them on 30 November 2023.

The Board of Inquiry understands the concerns about its scope. However, while the Terms of Reference are narrow, it is hoped that the work of the Board of Inquiry will nonetheless have broad benefits for victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse in government schools. The approach taken by the Board of Inquiry may also prove useful for any other inquiries or processes that may be established in the future in relation to the wider cohort of victim-survivors.

Introduction

This report details the Board of Inquiry’s analysis, findings and recommendations in relation to its Terms of Reference. As outlined in the ‘Background’ section of the Order in Council establishing the Board of Inquiry, the Victorian Government set up the Board of Inquiry because of the egregious nature of allegations that multiple relevant employees sexually abused multiple students at Beaumaris Primary School in the 1960s and 1970s, and subsequently at certain other government schools.

The report details the experiences of victim-survivors who chose to share their stories with the Board of Inquiry, as well as the response by the Department of Education (Department) at or around the time of the alleged child sexual abuse.

It is difficult to comprehend the experiences shared by victim-survivors in this report, and to understand the Department’s response (or lack of response) at the time. Why where there no systems and policies in place to protect children from sexual abuse by teachers or other school employees? Why did so many people look the other way or (in some cases) take active steps to ‘move the problem on’ to another school? These are challenging but important lines of investigation that the Board of Inquiry has explored and addresses in this report.

The report also examines the impacts of child sexual abuse on victim-survivors, secondary victims and affected community members, as well as the effectiveness of existing support services for victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse in government schools. It describes a variety of ways to support healing for victim-survivors, secondary victims and affected community members, including through a formal apology, memorialisation or other activities.¹

Structure of the report

The report has six parts:

• Preliminary material(opens in a new window), contains the official documents connected to the delivery of the report, a message from the Chair and a high-level summary of the overall report.
• Part A, The Board of Inquiry(opens in a new window) (this Part), describes the establishment of the Board of Inquiry, how it approached its work, and important information on how it interpreted and applied the Terms of Reference.
• Part B, Experience(opens in a new window), places children’s safety in context by describing relevant policy settings and social and cultural factors present in communities between 1960 and 1999, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, before documenting experiences of child sexual abuse and its impacts from the perspective of victim-survivors. This Part also includes 15 narratives from victim-survivors, secondary victims and affected community members recalling their experiences, in their own words.
• Part C, Accountability(opens in a new window), describes the education system between 1960 and 1999, includes the narratives of four of the relevant employees examined in detail by the Board of Inquiry, and outlines various system failings by the Department at that time. It then explores grooming and barriers to disclosure experienced by victim-survivors, before describing how child safety settings have since improved within government schools.
• Part D, Healing, support and the future(opens in a new window), describes the factors that promote recovery from child sexual abuse and the support services currently available to victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse in government schools. It then explores barriers to effective support and how they could be addressed as part of an overall approach to healing. This Part includes the Board of Inquiry’s recommendations for the Victorian Government and the Department to support healing and address barriers to effective support. While these recommendations are drawn from the entirety of the Board of Inquiry’s work, they are particularly directed to the ‘healing’ and ‘support services’ aspects of the Terms of Reference.
• Part E, Appendices(opens in a new window), contains a range of documents to assist and inform readers.

A note on language

The Board of Inquiry recognised from the outset the importance of being thoughtful and sensitive in its use of language. Different words carry different meanings or significance for victim-survivors of child sexual abuse, and careless or insensitive language can be damaging and hurtful.

The Board of Inquiry has included ‘A note on language(opens in a new window)’ in the Preliminary material(opens in a new window) of this report, which recognises this and outlines the preferred language that the Board of Inquiry has adopted, informed by victim-survivors and by research and evidence on best practice. This note recognises that not all affected people would agree with the terms and definitions chosen, but invites understanding that they have been chosen with consideration and care.

As outlined in Chapter 1, Establishment and approach(opens in a new window), sometimes the Board of Inquiry has used particular language (for example, ‘alleged perpetrator’). The use of this language, as explained in relevant sections throughout the report, is not intended to question or diminish the recollections of victim-survivors, but is to protect the integrity of any civil or criminal proceedings and is in recognition of the fact that the Board of Inquiry’s role has not been to make findings of fact about whether abuse occurred or not.

How this report should be read and understood

The Board of Inquiry’s objectives included establishing an official public record of victim-survivors’ experiences. It has approached this task by empowering and supporting victim-survivors to share their experiences and have them recorded, publicly acknowledged in hearings and published in this report. At the same time, in undertaking its work the Board of Inquiry has been mindful of its procedural fairness obligations.

Furthermore, the analysis, findings and recommendations presented in this report aim to reflect the shared responsibility of governments, institutions and the wider Victorian community in keeping children safe. The Board of Inquiry hopes to build understanding of the significant and complex impacts that child sexual abuse can have on victim-survivors, secondary victims and affected community members. The Board of Inquiry expects this report will reinforce a collective commitment to better protect children from harm and sexual abuse into the future.

Readers should consider the Board of Inquiry’s findings and recommendations in the context of other inquiries — including the 2017 Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse and the 2013 Victorian Parliamentary Inquiry into the Handling of Child Abuse by Religious and Other Non-Government Organisations — and the reforms that followed them. These inquiries made a range of recommendations relevant to improving responses to child sexual abuse in institutional settings, many of which have since been implemented or are underway. In undertaking its work, the Board of Inquiry has sought to build upon these earlier inquiries. It has been careful to avoid duplication, and has sought to make recommendations only where it has identified clear gaps that it is uniquely placed to address.

The report as a public record

The objectives of the Board of Inquiry included the establishment of an official public record of victim-survivors’ experiences of historical child sexual abuse by relevant employees in Beaumaris Primary School and certain other government schools.²

The Board of Inquiry considered the significance of establishing a public record and what footprint it wanted to leave behind when it ceased to exist. In relation to this aspect of its work, the Board of Inquiry prioritised the hopes and wishes of victim-survivors and secondary victims, and the feedback it had received along the way.

The Board of Inquiry contemplated the role and intent of this report in developing its content, and how the report would integrate with other materials to form part of the enduring public record. Other materials include the Board of Inquiry’s website.

The Board of Inquiry acknowledges that much of the narrative surrounding its work has been shaped by the media, parliamentary debate, and public and private commentary from various community and advocacy groups. The Board of Inquiry recognises these contributions and the influence they will have on how this report is evaluated in the future.

Adopting a trauma-informed approach, the Board of Inquiry endeavoured to ensure that participation in this inquiry would not re-traumatise victim-survivors, and that all engagement supported their personal healing journeys. As part of this process, and consistently with the Board of Inquiry’s objectives and Terms of Reference, the Board of Inquiry did not approach the task of establishing an official public record as requiring it to make findings of fact about those experiences, or to forensically examine or test them. The public record reflects what the Board of Inquiry heard.

Conclusion

By committing this report to the public record, the Board of Inquiry hopes to leave a meaningful legacy on behalf of every victim-survivor, secondary victim and affected community member impacted by the events the subject of this report. This legacy must include acknowledgement and validation of the past; and, to meet the expectations of the brave individuals the Board of Inquiry has encountered, it must contribute to the prevention of child sexual abuse in the future.