This Board of Inquiry has endeavoured to conduct itself based on the principles of truth-telling. Central to this undertaking has been creating space to listen to, and understand, the experiences of victim-survivors and secondary victims.

Truth-telling is a process that allows individuals to come together to openly talk about historical wrongs and failures. It involves identifying and acknowledging past failures, understanding who was responsible for these failures, and ensuring they do not occur again.

Under clause 3(c) of its Terms of Reference, the Board of Inquiry was required to examine the response of the Department of Education (Department) to the experiences of victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse perpetrated by relevant employees at Beaumaris Primary School in the 1960s and 1970s, and by those relevant employees at certain other government schools between 1960 and December 1999. The Department’s response includes the Department ‘and its officers’ state of knowledge and any actions it took or failed to take at or around the time of the abuse’.¹

The Department is responsible for the safety and welfare of students in Victorian government schools. The Board of Inquiry has found that the Department repeatedly failed to protect children from sexual abuse between 1960 and 1999.

This Part has five chapters:

• Chapter 10, The education system(opens in a new window), outlines the policy settings, legislative framework and sociocultural factors relevant to child safety in Victorian government schools between the 1960s and 1990s.
• Chapter 11, The alleged perpetrators(opens in a new window), documents matters relevant to allegations of historical child sexual abuse by relevant employees at Beaumaris Primary School and certain other government schools. It includes case studies on the alleged perpetrators, including their employment and criminal records, the allegations of child sexual abuse, and the Department’s knowledge and response to the child sexual abuse.
• Chapter 12, Grooming and disclosure(opens in a new window), examines how the experiences of victim-survivors describe features of grooming and manipulation, both of individuals and communities. It also explores barriers to disclosure of child sexual abuse at the relevant time, and how the Department’s conduct caused or contributed to those barriers.
• Chapter 13, System failings(opens in a new window), sets out the Board of Inquiry’s findings on the Department’s response to the allegations of child sexual abuse at the time, including analysis of the Department’s actions, or inaction, and missed opportunities to intervene.
• Chapter 14, Learning and improving(opens in a new window), provides a look ahead at learnings and improvements to prevent future child sexual abuse, including a brief analysis of changes over time and contemporary child safety practices.

The Board of Inquiry’s focus on allegations against specific persons at particular schools was determined by its Terms of Reference. As set out in Chapter 3, Scope and interpretation(opens in a new window), they required the Board of Inquiry to inquire into the experiences of victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse who were sexually abused at Beaumaris Primary School by a teacher, school employee or contractor during the 1960s and 1970s (a ‘relevant employee’), and by those relevant employees at certain other Victorian government schools between 1960 and 1999. The Terms of Reference did not permit the Board of Inquiry to inquire into, for example, experiences of child sexual abuse by a teacher at a Victorian government school where the allegation was not made against a relevant employee. As a result, if an allegation was made against a teacher who did not teach at Beaumaris Primary School in the 1960s or 1970s, the Board of Inquiry could not inquire into that allegation. Throughout this Part, therefore, there is an emphasis on Beaumaris Primary School.

Notes to readers

Experiences of victim-survivors, secondary victims and affected community members

Throughout this report, the Board of Inquiry shares information that reflects some of the experiences that victim-survivors, secondary victims and affected community members shared with the Board of Inquiry.

The Board of Inquiry is deeply grateful to the victim-survivors, secondary victims and affected community members who so courageously shared their experiences of child sexual abuse. The Board of Inquiry also acknowledges those victim-survivors who have chosen not to disclose their experiences of child sexual abuse, and may never do so, including those who are no longer with us.

The Board of Inquiry asked people who engaged with it how they wanted their information to be managed. Some wished to share their experiences publicly. Some wished to do so anonymously and others wished to do so confidentially. Where people shared their experiences anonymously, the Board of Inquiry has not included any identifying information in this report. Where people shared their experiences confidentially, the Board of Inquiry used this information to inform its work, but has not included it in this report.

In relation to those who wished to share their experiences publicly, in some cases the Board of Inquiry determined that it should anonymise the information they shared. This decision was made for legal or related reasons, including in order to avoid causing prejudice to any current or future criminal or civil proceedings.

The Board of Inquiry shares the experiences of victim-survivors, secondary victims and affected community members to create an important public record of their recollections. However, the Board of Inquiry has not examined or tested these accounts for accuracy or weighed whether there is enough evidence to support criminal or civil proceedings. The approach the Board of Inquiry has taken in this regard is consistent with its objectives and its Terms of Reference.²

The Board of Inquiry expresses its immense gratitude to all who contributed, in any way, to its work. Those who shared their experiences have shaped the Board of Inquiry’s general findings and recommendations, and contributed to a shared understanding, among all Victorians, of the impact of child sexual abuse. The Board of Inquiry expects this report will reinforce the community’s commitment to better protect children from sexual abuse into the future.

Relevant employees

In the Terms of Reference, ‘relevant employee’ is defined to mean ‘a teacher or other government school employee or contractor who sexually abused a student at Beaumaris Primary School during the 1960s or 1970s’.³ The Board of Inquiry’s work has confirmed that several of these relevant employees have been convicted of multiple offences, including indecent assault and other offences against children. However, for various reasons, most of the experiences of child sexual abuse shared with the Board of Inquiry did not result (or have not yet resulted) in a criminal conviction. Accordingly, this Part refers to ‘alleged perpetrators’.

While the Board of Inquiry recognises that some of these alleged perpetrators have been convicted of offences and their child sexual abuse in relation to these offences is no longer ‘alleged’, in order to treat all experiences shared with the Board of Inquiry in the same way, and to avoid causing prejudice to any current or future criminal or civil proceedings, this Part still refers to them as ‘alleged perpetrators’. In doing so, the Board of Inquiry does not intend to devalue or minimise any of the experiences shared by victim-survivors, secondary victims or affected community members.

As set out in Chapter 3, Scope and interpretation(opens in a new window), six individuals have been identified by the Board of Inquiry as relevant employees. Four of the six relevant employees are discussed in detail in this Part. This is because more information and evidence was available to the Board of Inquiry in regard to these four relevant employees. This is no way diminishes the experiences of victim-survivors who were allegedly sexually abused as children by the two relevant employees who are not discussed in this Part.

Historical child safety policies, procedures and practices in the education system

This section summarises policies, procedures and practices in government schools related to child safety, including child sexual abuse. The Board of Inquiry’s findings regarding the use of these mechanisms, their effectiveness and policy gaps are discussed in Chapter 13, System failings(opens in a new window).

Prevention policies

As explored in Chapter 13(opens in a new window), there is no evidence before the Board of Inquiry, or any other material, to suggest that any policies were in place in the period from 1960 to 1994 in the Victorian government school system concerning child sexual abuse in schools. In 1994 mandatory reporting of child sexual abuse was introduced for teachers, which was accompanied by several policies regarding preventing and responding to child sexual abuse.

This is consistent with the evidence of Professor Lisa Featherstone, Head of School, School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, University of Queensland that there was minimal focus on child protection in schools during this period.⁷⁸ This is explored further in Chapter 5, Children’s rights and safety in context(opens in a new window).

Investigation and reporting policies and procedures

Despite having a legislative and regulatory framework in place to respond to allegations of misconduct against teachers, the Department was unable to identify any policies or procedures in place between 1960 and 1994 that provided guidance on how to manage or respond to child sexual abuse in the education system. Dr Howes gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry as follows:

Dr Howes also confirmed the Department was unable to locate any policies or procedures enforcing adherence to the legal framework.⁸⁰

The only policy the Department was able to locate that referred to misconduct with students was a memorandum issued by the Director-General in 1952 at the request of head teachers. The memorandum stated, ‘[f]rom time to time, the attention of the department is drawn to the dangers that men teachers incur through indiscreet and thoughtless actions with regard to girl pupils’.⁸¹ The memorandum advised male teachers ‘in their own interests, against any action liable to misinterpretation’, ‘never to place their hands on pupils’.⁸²

A similar memorandum was circulated to head teachers in 1960, though the reference to placing hands on pupils was removed.⁸³ The Board of Inquiry could not find any policies describing how schools should monitor or implement the memorandum, or what to do in the event of an incident.

There were also no documented policies outlining how complaints and allegations should be handled by principals, district inspectors or senior officials in the Department.

As discussed earlier, the role of inspectors (of which district inspectors were a subset) was set out in the Teaching Service Regulations 1962. The Board of Inquiry did not receive any information regarding the existence of policies guiding district inspectors on how to carry out their duties.

Jenny Atta PSM, Secretary, Department of Education, gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that there was a ‘sweep of significant change from the start of this century’ regarding policies and procedures for reporting child sexual abuse, in response to mandatory reporting.⁸⁴ Ms Atta noted that the guidance for school principals, and later for the teaching service, was ‘significantly revamped’ to provide clear policies around responding to allegations of sexual abuse.⁸⁵

These changes are discussed in detail in Chapter 14, Learning and improving(opens in a new window).

Record management policies and procedures

The Department was unable to locate any record management policies and procedures between 1960 and 1994 in relation to allegations or incidents of child sexual abuse in the Victorian education system.⁸⁶ Ms Atta gave evidence that the inability of the Department to find this information indicated an absence of record-keeping policies in the past.⁸⁷ Notably, the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (Royal Commission) also found that many schools had poor record-keeping and management procedures in place for complaints about child sexual abuse.⁸⁸

Under Regulations and General Instructions and Information (1962), district inspectors were required to provide an official report for each school and teacher annually.⁸⁹ The reports included performance information and could also cover developing trends and problems.⁹⁰ It is not clear whether this included misconduct issues, such as allegations of child sexual abuse.

The Board of Inquiry’s analysis of some of these district inspector reports did not reveal any records of child sexual abuse allegations. It is noted, however, that material available to the Board of Inquiry included a record of an interview with a former district inspector in which the inspector said that ‘records such as complaints materials’ were ‘supposed to be destroyed after a certain number of years’.⁹¹ While the Board of Inquiry did not uncover any formal policy in relation to this, it is possible an informal policy or practice of this kind existed and would in part explain the absence of records of child sexual abuse allegations.

The Teachers Tribunal was also required to report annually to the Minister and Parliament.⁹² The Board of Inquiry reviewed several annual reports prepared by the Teachers Tribunal between 1960 and 1981 (when the Teachers Tribunal was abolished). These reports included high-level information on disciplinary actions against teachers determined by the Tribunal in a given year, including the number of determinations made and the number of disciplinary actions taken, by type.⁹³ There was not sufficient detail recorded in the annual reports to understand why disciplinary action was taken in a given case. The Board of Inquiry was unable to find any information on the reporting policies that informed the annual reports, aside from legislative requirements.

In regard to the Teachers Tribunal’s communication and record-keeping, in 1973, the Victorian Teachers’ Union raised concerns that its method of communicating decisions was ‘ineffective’ and ‘inconceivable’, in that ‘decisions are not communicated or communicated tardily’.⁹⁴

The Board of Inquiry notes that the Department issued a memorandum to schools in 1963 regarding the importance of record-keeping in relation to physical accidents by students that might occur at schools.⁹⁵ However, two features of this memorandum are telling. First, its concern appears to be the need for accurate record-keeping in the event of a civil claim being brought against the Department.⁹⁶ Second, there was no mention of child sexual abuse.

Training requirements for teachers

In the 1960s and 1970s, regulations required teachers and principals to report any ‘moral impairment’ of or ‘misconduct’ by teachers that breached the Teaching Service Act.⁹⁷ Yet Ms Atta gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that during this time ‘there was no evidence of structured training of any kind that went to issues of understanding how to identify … sexual abuse [and] how to respond to [it] appropriately’.⁹⁸

The Royal Commission found that, based on its inquiry from around the 1930s onwards, ‘even where school staff observed grooming behaviour, they did not immediately recognise its link to child sexual abuse’.⁹⁹ The Royal Commission also found that the reasons for this included that staff received inadequate training and guidance.¹⁰⁰

Employment and transfer policies and practices

Under the Teaching Service Act 1958, the Teachers Tribunal was responsible for appointing permanent teachers to the teaching service.¹⁰¹ This could only occur after transfers and promotions of teachers already in the teaching service had been considered by the relevant Committee of Classifiers.¹⁰²

The Director-General could also transfer a teacher by certifying to the Minister that it was in the public interest or in the interest of efficiency that a teacher be transferred from one school to another.¹⁰³

As noted earlier, the Board of Inquiry found that no policies concerning child sexual abuse existed between 1960 and 1994, in relation to teacher employment and transfer or otherwise.¹⁰⁴

Notwithstanding the absence of policies, it is clear there was a longstanding practice in the Victorian education system of transferring teachers to other schools in response to allegations against them. The 1882 Royal Commission into the Administration, Organisation, and General Condition of the Existing System of Public Instruction noted that district inspectors who had received reports of ‘immoral conduct’ often recommended the teacher be moved to another school or different duties, rather than be dismissed altogether.¹⁰⁵ In 1882, the Department noted that it was important to consider the issue from the teacher’s perspective, to reduce the risk of reputational damage for what it saw as a ‘comparatively small offence’, such as ‘undue familiarity with a female student’.¹⁰⁶ The informal practice of transferring teachers is discussed further below.

Dr Howes gave evidence that, during the 1960s to the 1980s, the education system used transfers to uphold the reputation of teachers and considered that transfers were an appropriate disciplinary tool for child sexual abuse, rather than termination.¹⁰⁷ This is discussed in detail in Chapter 13(opens in a new window).

The Department was also unable to find any policies or procedures related to vetting teachers during recruitment to mitigate risks of child sexual abuse between 1960 and the end of 1984.¹⁰⁸

Information-sharing policies

Evidence provided by the Department to the Board of Inquiry established that there were no policies relating to how it liaised with other agencies and organisations responsible for investigating child sexual abuse, including Victoria Police, in the period from 1960 to 1994.¹⁰⁹

Looking to information that might have been shared with the Department, based on a Police Standing Order in 1957 and police manuals in the 1990s, it appears that between 1960 and 1994 there was an obligation on Victoria Police to share crime reports with the Department regarding information that a student had been sexually abused while in the care of a government school.¹¹⁰

Informal practices and culture

The organisational culture within which official policies and procedures are operationalised also has an impact on ensuring the safety of children.¹¹¹

Organisational culture refers to the shared values and beliefs that guide how people working in an organisation interact with one another and undertake their work. It manifests itself as behaviours, customs and practices.¹¹²

Unlike official policies and procedures, organisational culture is strongly influenced by covert messages, values and behaviours that flow through an organisation.¹¹³ These can significantly affect the rigour with which legal requirements, policies and procedures are implemented, as well as the behaviour of individuals.¹¹⁴

The impacts of organisational culture can be hard to measure and are rarely documented or recorded. The Royal Commission found that cultural factors within institutions, including government schools, played a significant role in how institutions considered and responded to suspicions, allegations and instances of child sexual abuse.¹¹⁵

Broad factors influencing education system culture

A range of factors influenced the culture of the education system in the 1960s and 1970s with respect to child sexual abuse, including the following:

• Sociocultural beliefs and understandings — There was a lack of understanding of or knowledge about child sexual abuse and grooming, a perception that children were to be compliant, and a tendency not to believe children who disclosed sexual abuse (discussed in Chapter 12, Grooming and disclosure(opens in a new window)).¹¹⁶
• Legislative, regulatory and policy settings — Relatively few safeguards were in place to protect children’s safety and wellbeing, especially from child sexual abuse, and there was little focus on or understanding of children’s rights (discussed in Chapter 6, Time and place(opens in a new window)).¹¹⁷

In addition, the economic and social settings underpinning education policy at the time likely had an impact on the education system’s culture.

Victoria’s population grew rapidly during the 1960s and 1970s, increasing from 2.9 million in 1960 to 3.9 million by 1980.¹¹⁸ This was due to service personnel returning after the Second World War and starting families, and immigration.¹¹⁹ A 1969 report of the Committee on State Education in Victoria noted that enrolments in secondary and technical schools had risen from 57,037 in 1952 to 185,000 in 1966, an increase of 229 per cent.¹²⁰

In response, district inspectors increasingly devoted their time to advising the Department on proposals for new schools.¹²¹ School principals began adopting more of a monitoring role in relation to performance and issues, while district inspectors took up advisory functions.¹²² A 1960 report of the Committee on State Education in Victoria, found that district inspectors could not properly carry out their functions due to the pressure of administrative duties.¹²³ The report also found that there were challenges with recruiting district inspectors with the right skills and qualities.¹²⁴

At the same time, the funding approach to government schools and non-government schools was being debated at the federal and state levels, with federal funding for government schools only starting to flow from the mid-1960s.¹²⁵ This meant schools were heavily focused on resource management. In addition, teachers were well protected by their unions, which also raised concerns with the way teacher discipline and promotions were managed through existing governance structures.¹²⁶

It was difficult to dismiss a teacher for any reason during this period. In his account of the role of district inspectors, Mr Holloway noted that unsatisfactory teachers were an inspector’s biggest challenge.¹²⁷ Mr Holloway stated that while teachers could theoretically be dismissed, in practice it was impossible.¹²⁸ Instead, inspectors were to show tolerance and encouragement towards teachers.¹²⁹

A culture of authority, reputation and efficiency

It appears that the culture of the education system in Victoria from the 1960s to the early 1990s had a strong emphasis on efficiency, protecting the education system’s reputation and maintaining public confidence. The safety and wellbeing of students was not a focus at the time. Such a culture was not consistent with taking action against teachers in relation to allegations of child sexual abuse. In this regard, Dr Howes in his witness statement referred to anecdotal evidence of a former district inspector that ‘the culture of responding to sexual abuse in a pro-active way was almost non-existent’.¹³⁰ This anecdotal evidence is consistent with the evidence heard by the Board of Inquiry and the substantial body of material considered by the Board of Inquiry as part of its work.

At the turn of the twentieth century, reforms to the education system primarily targeted improving school efficiency, student learning and the status of teachers. The 1960 report of the Committee on State Education in Victoria largely focused on efficiency measures, noting that population growth had rapidly expanded and schools were facing severe staffing shortages.¹³¹ It is telling that the report did not consider in any depth the wellbeing and safety of children.

Public sector legislation from the 1960s to the early 1990s also facilitated a culture that emphasised structure and efficiency rather than the safety or wellbeing of students. The Public Service Act 1974 (Vic) made no mention of values or morality, and was heavily focused on defining powers and structures.¹³² In contrast, the equivalent legislation today, the Public Administration Act 2004 (Vic), is underpinned by a set of principles that promote integrity, accountability and transparency.

Overall, the culture of the education system in this period appears to have been focused on managing demand and school performance, with little attention given to guarding against or responding to child sexual abuse in schools.

Furthermore, it must be remembered that during the 1960s and the 1970s, government schools and teachers held considerable institutional authority. Similar to societal attitudes within the family home, the social norms of this time dictated adult authority within schools. As a result, children were expected to be compliant and not question adults.¹³³

These beliefs brought with them a hierarchical culture that prioritised the position and voice of teachers and other adults over children. Research on organisational cultures conducted for the Royal Commission found that when organisational cultures ‘support the assumption that children are untrustworthy, staff members will be less likely to believe victims who report child sexual abuse’.¹³⁴

The Royal Commission’s report also observed that children in school settings often experienced corporal punishment and emotional abuse, which was normalised, noting that ‘[a] culture of physical and emotional abuse in schools can normalise all forms of abuse, creating fear of ramifications for speaking out or resisting’.¹³⁵

Teacher transfers

As part of the culture of the education system, it appears that the use of teacher transfers was commonplace in the management of allegations of child sexual abuse in Victorian government schools.

Dr Howes, in his evidence, referred to anecdotal evidence from a district inspector who said that district inspectors would move teachers between schools in response to allegations of child sexual abuse.¹³⁶ Dr Howes gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that this practice was characterised as ‘managing the incident’, rather than being a decision made through the formal disciplinary process.¹³⁷

It appears the reasons for such transfers were generally known only by the principal of the first school, the district inspector and a small number of other department staff, and were not disseminated more broadly within the Department.¹³⁸ Dr Howes gave evidence that the district inspector was not required to notify the receiving school or its principal as to the reason for the teacher’s transfer.¹³⁹

Dr Howes referred to anecdotal evidence from a former district inspector that the culture in the 1970s was to ‘consume our own smoke and try to solve problems when they arise as quickly as possible’.¹⁴⁰ In providing evidence to the Board of Inquiry, Dr Howes confirmed that this was ‘illustrative of the way in which matters were handled’ at the time.¹⁴¹ Dr Howes went on to say that one result of this approach was that there was no ‘imperative’ to undertake a ‘thorough investigation’.¹⁴²

As previously noted, the 1882 Royal Commission into the Administration, Organisation, and General Condition of the Existing System of Public Instruction also found that it was common for schools to transfer teachers alleged to have committed child sexual abuse to another school or position.¹⁴³

Dr Howes noted that there was a distinct shift in culture relating to the handling of child sexual abuse matters in schools in the early 1990s. Teachers were routinely directed to take leave without pay while allegations were being investigated or after a charge was laid by police. In some cases teachers resigned when allegations were made.¹⁴⁴ There was also a considerable increase in the number of primary school teachers dismissed in the 1990s compared with previous decades.¹⁴⁵

The settings, structures and practices outlined in this Chapter formed the basis upon which the Department handled child sexual assault reports and disclosures between 1960 and 1999.

Introduction

As set out in Chapter 3, Scope and interpretation(opens in a new window), the Board of Inquiry has identified six relevant employees within scope of its Terms of Reference. They are considered relevant employees as they were employed at Beaumaris Primary School and allegedly sexually abused students at this school between 1960 and 1979. Based on the amount of information available to the Board of Inquiry, this Chapter focuses on four of the six relevant employees, referred to as alleged perpetrators: Darrell Ray, Wyatt, David MacGregor and Graham Steele. ‘Wyatt’ is a pseudonym — he cannot be named for legal reasons.

This Chapter includes narratives on each of these alleged perpetrators. The narratives include information about their employment history and criminal records, what victim-survivors told the Board of Inquiry about them, and the Department of Education’s (Department’s) knowledge of and response to their behaviour.

These narratives have informed the Board of Inquiry’s analysis of and findings about the Department’s response, as set out in Chapter 13, System failings(opens in a new window).

The victim-survivors

The Board of Inquiry heard directly from dozens of victim-survivors whom Mr Ray, Wyatt, Mr MacGregor or Mr Steele allegedly sexually abused. Some victim-survivors shared experiences of sexual abuse by more than one of these alleged perpetrators. The Board of Inquiry also heard from secondary victims about their loved ones’ experiences of child sexual abuse.

In describing the accounts of victim-survivors shared with the Board of Inquiry, it is pertinent to observe there are likely to be people with relevant information who (for various reasons) did not come forward.

The child sexual abuse as described to the Board of Inquiry

The vast majority of the victim-survivors who engaged with the Board of Inquiry shared experiences of sexual abuse as young boys. As discussed earlier in this report, the Board of Inquiry also heard from some victim-survivors that they had been sexually abused as young girls. In most cases, victim-survivors said they had been sexually abused in the middle to late years of primary school.

The Board of Inquiry was told about child sexual abuse taking place in school settings, such as in classrooms and libraries; at sporting events and facilities; and during camps. The Board of Inquiry was also told about child sexual abuse occurring in the alleged perpetrators’ cars, houses and during weekends away.

The Board of Inquiry heard from victim-survivors about child sexual abuse occurring when they were alone, or when the alleged perpetrator deliberately separated them from other children and adults. In other cases, victim-survivors recalled the sexual abuse occurring in front of other children. Some victim-survivors recalled that the child sexual abuse occurred once, but others recalled it occurring over a sustained period of time.

The sexual abuse as recounted by victim-survivors comprised different kinds of conduct. This included victim-survivors having their genitals or other parts of their bodies touched or rubbed, being made to touch the alleged perpetrator’s genitals or watch them masturbate, and being penetrated by the alleged perpetrator.

The Board of Inquiry identified 24 schools as falling within its scope. Of those who engaged with the Board of Inquiry, a higher number of victim-survivors shared experiences of child sexual abuse at Beaumaris Primary School than at any of the other schools.

All forms of child sexual abuse are traumatic. The personal experiences of victim-survivors and secondary victims is included in Part B(opens in a new window).

The alleged perpetrators

This section provides detail on four of the six relevant employees, referred to as alleged perpetrators: Mr Ray, Wyatt, Mr MacGregor and Mr Steele.

Three of these alleged perpetrators — Mr Ray, Wyatt and Mr MacGregor — have been convicted of child sexual abuse offences. In addition to these convictions, many more victim-survivors have engaged with the Board of Inquiry about child sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by the four men.

Based on victim-survivors and secondary victims who have engaged with the Board of Inquiry, and materials from the Department and Victoria Police, the Board of Inquiry is aware of the following number of allegations of child sexual abuse in relation to each alleged perpetrator:

• Mr Ray: allegations of child sexual abuse relating to 60 individuals
• Wyatt: allegations of child sexual abuse relating to 28 individuals
• Mr MacGregor: allegations of child sexual abuse relating to 13 individuals
• Mr Steele: allegations of child sexual abuse relating to eight individuals.

Connections between the alleged perpetrators

The alleged perpetrators were all employed at Beaumaris Primary School for two years (1971 and 1972). The Department’s records show that Mr MacGregor was on leave in 1971, however Mr MacGregor told the Board of Inquiry he was granted leave in 1971 but took leave in 1972. What is clear is that in 1971 and 1972 the alleged perpetrators were all employed as teachers at Beaumaris Primary School, and for one of those years Mr MacGregor took leave.¹ Over the course of their careers, the alleged perpetrators worked across a total of 23 other government primary schools that fall within the Board of Inquiry’s scope. These 23 schools, as well as Beaumaris Primary School, are within scope to the extent the child sexual abuse a victim-survivor shared with the Board of Inquiry involved one of the alleged perpetrators. Most of these schools are located in the south-east region of Melbourne.

Not only were the alleged perpetrators employed together at Beaumaris Primary School for a time, at other times they worked at schools in close proximity to one another. Mr Ray and Mr MacGregor also attended Toorak Teachers’ College at the same time between 1961 and 1962.²

Information also suggests that some of the alleged perpetrators had connections outside of school.

Many people recalled that Mr Ray and Mr Steele were good friends. Former teachers at Beaumaris Primary School described Mr Ray and Mr Steele as ‘great mate[s]’.³ One teacher recalled that Mr Ray and Mr Steele would take boys ‘off for bashes [of cricket] on Fridays, and occasionally on weekends’.⁴

The Board of Inquiry also understands that Mr Ray and Mr Steele went on a holiday overseas for five months, and travelled together in a campervan.⁵

A former teacher at Beaumaris Primary School recalled that Mr Ray, Wyatt and Mr Steele were ‘close’, likely due to their interest in sport.⁶

The Board of Inquiry received information that suggested that Wyatt was close friends with another alleged perpetrator, based on their personal connections and shared activities outside of school. Due to Wyatt’s Restricted Publication Order, further detail cannot be included in this report.

The Board of Inquiry was also told that two of the alleged perpetrators had a familial relationship.

It is notable that the alleged perpetrators worked at Beaumaris Primary School at the same time, worked in other schools within close proximity to one another, and some had connections with one another outside of school. Professor Leah Bromfield, Director of the Australian Centre for Child Protection and Chair of Child Protection, University of South Australia, gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that if an individual is perpetrating child sexual abuse in an institution, this may ‘create a culture … which assists others to overcome internal inhibitions they may have to sexually abusing a child’ — for example, normalising the child sexual abuse or decreasing the fear of consequence of being caught.⁷ Relevantly, one victim-survivor recalled that Mr Ray sexually abused him while Wyatt observed.⁸

The four alleged perpetrators were also all involved in sport, through sports coaching at the schools or through sporting organisations.⁹ Some victim-survivors shared that the alleged perpetrators were respected for their sport coaching ability, and they would use these positions to bring children into their orbit.¹⁰ For further detail, see Chapter 12, Grooming and disclosure(opens in a new window).

Use of the term ‘alleged perpetrator’

Objective (a) of the Board of Inquiry’s Terms of Reference is to ‘establish an official public record of victim-survivors’ experiences of historical child sexual abuse’.¹¹ Consistent with this, the Board of Inquiry shares the following narratives as part of the public record of victim-survivors’ experiences, but does not make any findings of fact in relation to them. It has not examined or tested the information in order to make any findings, nor has it applied any legal tests that may be required to make findings in legal proceedings.

The Board of Inquiry has relied on documents from the Department and Victoria Police in relation to the employment history and criminal records of the alleged perpetrators. Due to historical record-keeping practices and the past reliance on hard copy material, the amount of available information used to prepare these narratives varies, and in some instances may be inconsistent with the recollections of and information held by victim-survivors. In addition, on 12 September 1994, there was a fire at Beaumaris Primary School that resulted in the loss of some school records dating back to when the school opened in 1915.¹² An affected community member with a connection to the school told the Board of Inquiry it was unlikely the fire would have destroyed any relevant records as the office was small and everything was sent to the Department.¹³

In preparing the narratives, the Board of Inquiry has not examined civil claims against the Department in relation to the alleged perpetrators. In accordance with its Terms of Reference, the Board of Inquiry did not inquire into:

• the response of the State of Victoria (including the Department and its staff) to any complaints (other than in relation to the Department’s response at or around the time of the alleged child sexual abuse, consistently with clause 3(c) of the Terms of Reference)
• legal proceedings or legal claims in relation to incidents of historical child sexual abuse in a government school
• compensation or redress arrangements, including the settlement of any civil claims.

In addition, and in line with its Terms of Reference, the Board of Inquiry also seeks to avoid causing prejudice to any current or future criminal or civil proceedings. Any consideration given by the Board of Inquiry to the content of civil claims would risk causing prejudice to such civil and criminal proceedings.

Alleged perpetrator narrative: Darrell Ray

Teaching history

Darrell Vivienne Ray was also known as Darrell Vivian Ray and Ray Cosgriff.

Mr Ray was born on 14 May 1941 and died during the term of the Board of Inquiry, on 21 November 2023.¹⁴

Mr Ray taught or worked in Victorian government schools for 16 years, from 1 January 1963 to 4 February 1979.¹⁵ During this time, Mr Ray primarily held the positions of teacher librarian and football, cricket and sports coach.¹⁶

Table 1 outlines Mr Ray’s employment record at Victorian government primary schools.

Outside of school, Mr Ray was also involved in a number of organisations where he had contact with children.¹⁷ Several victim-survivors told the Board of Inquiry about his role at St Kilda Little League. It appears that Mr Ray used his position at government primary schools to recruit children into the League.¹⁸ There is no record of any formal affiliation between the schools and the League.¹⁹

Table 1 Mr Ray’s employment record at Victorian government primary schools

Details of alleged child sexual abuse

Multiple individuals engaged with the Board of Inquiry to share their experiences or observations of child sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by Mr Ray. According to these accounts, Mr Ray’s child sexual abuse was flagrant and prolific.

Many of the accounts are similar and involve Mr Ray isolating and sexually abusing children in the school library. Other accounts relate to him sexually abusing children at, or on the way to, sporting events.

According to the experiences shared with the Board of Inquiry, Mr Ray used his role as a teacher librarian to lure children into his care and separate them from other children and adults. One victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry that Mr Ray had ‘groomed’ him ‘as a helper to help put the books away’.²⁵

Mr Ray’s role as a sports coach features heavily in the experiences victim-survivors shared. One victim-survivor recalled that ‘people were desperate to play little league footy’.²⁶ Another victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry that ‘it was every kid’s dream’ to play in the football teams Mr Ray coached, stating that ‘my dad kept telling me I was lucky because [Mr Ray] was the most incredible coach’.²⁷ Both victim-survivors said they were sexually abused by Mr Ray as he drove them to and from football.²⁸

Many victim-survivors recalled being sexually abused by Mr Ray in front of other children. The Board of Inquiry heard that Mr Ray would often put children on his lap and read them a book while he sexually abused them, as outlined below.

The Board of Inquiry also heard that Mr Ray sexually abused a victim-survivor while another teacher at the school observed. The victim-survivor recalled that he was first sexually abused by Mr Ray in the 1970s, when he was in early primary school.²⁹ The other teacher went on to sexually abuse the victim-survivor regularly, sometimes with Mr Ray watching on.³⁰

In a school context

Multiple victim-survivors told the Board of Inquiry about being sexually abused by Mr Ray in the school library. Mr Ray would exploit a child’s interest in books to entice them into the library during lunchtimes and outside of school hours.

One victim-survivor recalled showing an interest in a book in the library. Mr Ray told him that the book could not be borrowed and he would have to come to the library during a break to read it. The victim-survivor said that he then visited the library during lunchtime, where Mr Ray proceeded to sexually abuse him. He recalled that Mr Ray pushed him up against a desk, pressed into his back and fondled his genitals. The victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry that Mr Ray continued to talk like it was ‘normal behaviour’, and even said, ‘enjoy the book’.³¹ He recalled that, ‘I never went back [to the library] on my own … because I saw it as dangerous’.³²

Another victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry how Mr Ray used his interest in a hobby to coax him into the library. Almost every week, the victim-survivor would go into the library at lunchtime to discuss his hobby with Mr Ray. He recalled that Mr Ray would stand behind him and rub his shoulders and bottom, and then put his hands down his underpants and massage his genitals, while he had his hand down his own pants. He said that Mr Ray would masturbate and ejaculate on him.³³

Another victim-survivor said that he did ‘special classes with [Mr Ray] to improve [his] reading’. The victim-survivor recalled that Mr Ray would sexually abuse him in groups and by himself. He said that Mr Ray ‘anally raped [him] several times’ over the course of a year.³⁴

Yet another victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry that Mr Ray trapped him in the library while he was looking for a book. He recalled that Mr Ray put his hand down his pants and fondled his genitals. The victim-survivor remembered that he froze in response to the sexual abuse. He told the Board of Inquiry how he avoided being alone in the library with Mr Ray: he ‘climbed up on the lockers to see if Mr Ray was in [the library] alone’ and sometimes went home rather than going to the library.³⁵

In a submission prepared by lawyers, who represent victim-survivors who were allegedly sexually abused as children by the alleged perpetrators, it was recounted that one of their clients alleged that Mr Ray sexually abused him in the library. It was described that Mr Ray would touch the victim-survivor’s groin and genitals before the sexual abuse escalated to masturbation and digital and penile penetration.³⁶

Many victim-survivors recalled the separate office or ‘storeroom’ at the end of the library at Beaumaris Primary School where Mr Ray would allegedly isolate children and sexually abuse them.

A victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry that Mr Ray called him into the library office and asked him to sit on his knee so Mr Ray could read him a ‘special book’. He recalled that Mr Ray put his hands down his pants and rubbed his buttocks and penis.³⁷

Another victim-survivor shared with the Board of Inquiry that Mr Ray would put his hands down his pants, fondle his genitals and penetrate him in the library ‘storeroom’. He said that this occurred on multiple occasions and the sexual abuse became more severe over time.³⁸

A further victim-survivor shared that Mr Ray called him into the library office, pulled him close, and put his hands down his pants and fondled him.³⁹

Similarly, a victim-survivor was called to see Mr Ray in his office in the library. As the victim-survivor was waiting outside the office, Mr Ray ‘encircled [him] with his arms and then proceeded to slide both hands down into the front of [his] shorts and inside [his] underwear,’ and ‘briefly fondled’ him.⁴⁰

Yet another victim-survivor, who attended a different primary school, shared how Mr Ray would sexually assault him in that school’s library office. He recalled that Mr Ray would sit him on his lap and ‘put his hand up, or down, my shorts and fondle my genitals’.⁴¹

In front of other children

The Board of Inquiry also heard from several victim-survivors about Mr Ray sexually abusing children in front of other children during classes.

One victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry how he was sexually abused by Mr Ray in front of other children at Beaumaris Primary School. He can still remember the shocked looks on children’s faces as they tried to process what was happening.⁴²

Another victim-survivor, who also recalled being sexually abused by Mr Ray in his library office, said his first memory of being molested by Mr Ray was during ‘story times’ in the library. He recalled that Mr Ray would sit him on his knees and ask him to hold the book. The victim-survivor recalled that when the book was in front of him, Mr Ray would slip his hands down his pants ‘in front of the entire class of eight-year olds’.⁴³

Yet another victim-survivor shared how Mr Ray would sit children on his lap and put his hands down the back of their pants.⁴⁴

Similarly, another victim-survivor recalled that during ‘open library sessions’, Mr Ray would put a hand under his shirt — ‘down [my] back or bum’.⁴⁵

Sporting events

Other victim-survivors shared with the Board of Inquiry their experiences, and fear, of Mr Ray sexually abusing them at or on the way to sporting events.

One victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry how children feared being driven home by Mr Ray from football matches; he said, ‘you just knew that [it] was going to be an horrendous drive home’. The victim-survivor recalled one time when Mr Ray dropped the other children home first and ‘attacked’ and ‘fondled’ him.⁴⁶

Another victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry how Mr Ray would sexually abuse him in the changerooms. He recalled that Mr Ray would turn him away from the other children, pretend to tuck his jumper into his pants, and ‘grab hold of [his] genitals’ and ‘molest’ him.⁴⁷

In a submission prepared by lawyers who represent victim-survivors who were allegedly sexually abused as children by the alleged perpetrators, it was recounted that one of their clients alleged that Mr Ray fondled his genitals while driving him home after football training.⁴⁸

Broader school settings

The Board of Inquiry also heard how Mr Ray used his teaching role to engage with families and children outside of school.

Mr Ray would select children from Beaumaris Primary School to be part of St Kilda Little League. One victim-survivor recalled how Mr Ray molested him at St Kilda Little League. He said that Mr Ray sexually abused him on the way to football training, at training and on the way home.⁴⁹

Another individual told the Board of Inquiry about the sexual abuse Mr Ray allegedly perpetrated on her brothers. She recalled that Mr Ray would drive her brothers home from football training and would also take them to the drive-in cinema. She told the Board of Inquiry that her brothers disclosed that Mr Ray sexually abused them in the car at the drive-in and on the way home. On this person’s account, one child was raped and the other was fondled.⁵⁰

Criminal offending summary

The Board of Inquiry is able to provide information on four criminal proceedings where Mr Ray was convicted of a total of 37 child sexual abuse offences. The level of detail that has been provided to the Board of Inquiry in relation to each proceeding varies.

In addition, the Board of Inquiry understands that there were several active criminal proceedings that could not progress due to Mr Ray’s death in November 2023.

Based on the convictions alone, it is clear that Mr Ray sexually abused children at Victorian government primary schools over a period of at least 12 years, from 1967 to 1979.

The Board of Inquiry is also aware that Mr Ray’s conduct is the subject of a number of civil claims involving the Department. As noted earlier in this Chapter, the Department’s response to and conduct of any civil claims in relation to Mr Ray is outside the scope of the Board of Inquiry’s Terms of Reference.

Finalised criminal proceedings

August 1979

On 1 August 1979, Mr Ray pleaded guilty and was convicted of two counts of gross indecency and four counts of indecent assault on four males under 16 years of age.⁵¹ These offences occurred between 1978 and 1979, when Mr Ray was a teacher librarian adviser at Mount View Primary School.⁵² Mr Ray had contact with the victim-survivors involved in these proceedings through football.⁵³

Mr Ray pleaded guilty to all offences.⁵⁴ Mr Ray was released on a 12-month good behaviour bond and ordered to pay a fine of $500.⁵⁵

February 2001

On 15 February 2001, the County Court sentenced Mr Ray to 44 months imprisonment for 27 counts of indecent assault on 18 males under the aged of 16 years old.⁵⁶ Mr Ray pleaded guilty to all 27 counts.⁵⁷

Seven counts of indecent assault occurred between 1 January 1967 and 31 December 1970, when Mr Ray was a teacher librarian at Moorabbin (Tucker Road) Primary School.⁵⁸ The sexual assault typically involved My Ray putting his hands into children’s pants and fondling their genitals.⁵⁹ The sexual assaults mainly occurred in the library, but at times it occurred outside of school hours, after sporting events.⁶⁰

The remaining 20 counts of indecent assault occurred between 1 January 1972 and 31 December 1976, when Mr Ray was a teacher librarian at Beaumaris Primary School.⁶¹ In summary, the child sexual abuse included Mr Ray putting his hands down children’s pants and fondling and touching their genitals, buttocks and anal regions; touching and caressing children’s chests, arms and upper legs; and asking one child if they would like to touch him.⁶²

In the investigations leading up to this conviction, Mr Ray made admissions to Victoria Police that he was sexually attracted to young boys and was ‘very careful’ not to do anything at school.⁶³ He also said that ‘I suppose it’s not impossible’ that the alleged sexual abuse occurred.⁶⁴

January 2002

On 29 January 2002, Mr Ray was convicted of two counts of indecent assault against a student.⁶⁵ Mr Ray was sentenced to six months imprisonment, to be served concurrent with his 2001 sentence of 44 months.⁶⁶

December 2013

On 17 December 2013, Mr Ray was convicted of two counts of indecent assault of males under the age of 16 years old.⁶⁷ Mr Ray was sentenced to six months imprisonment.⁶⁸

The education system’s knowledge and response

The first record that the Department retains that refers to concerns about (or allegations about) sexual misconduct on the part of Mr Ray was dated 27 November 1978, when Victoria Police notified the Department of criminal charges against Mr Ray.

The Board of Inquiry has been provided with extensive information, however, that suggests a principal, as well as some senior staff, teachers and parents at Beaumaris Primary School, were aware of concerns about the sexual nature of Mr Ray’s conduct while he was a teacher librarian at the school from 1971 to 1976.⁶⁹

Despite the existence of this information, there is no information the Board of inquiry has received that suggests the Department took appropriate action to protect the safety of children.

What was known at Beaumaris Primary School about the alleged child sexual abuse

The following recollections of concerns about Mr Ray’s conduct are derived from interviews the Department conducted in 2000 and 2001 with teachers, parents and former students at Beaumaris Primary School.⁷⁰ They are not accounts given directly to the Board of Inquiry.

A former teacher informed the Department in 2001 that there was ‘innuendo’ about Mr Ray’s behaviour in the 1970s.⁷¹ The teacher was aware that a parent had made a complaint to the principal, Vern Hussey, about Mr Ray, although she was not aware of the details.⁷² The teacher was told that Mr Hussey’s response was ‘I’ll take care of it’ and ‘don’t worry it won’t happen again’.⁷³

A former teacher at the school also said that a parent had made a complaint to Mr Hussey about Mr Ray’s behaviour at some stage between 1972 and 1975.⁷⁴ In response, Mr Hussey encouraged women to ‘help out in the library’ and to ‘ferry children to and from football’.⁷⁵

A former student told the Department in 2001 that he and a fellow student reported Mr Ray’s sexual abuse to Mr Hussey in 1974.⁷⁶ The student reported that Mr Ray ‘had put his hand down the front of boys’ pants’ and ‘he had been doing this for years’.⁷⁷ The student also relayed this conversation to a teacher at Beaumaris Primary School.⁷⁸

This teacher had no specific recollection of being approached by the student.⁷⁹ The teacher recalled, however, that they were aware that a parent had made a complaint to Mr Hussey about Mr Ray’s behaviour between 1975 and 1977.⁸⁰ Mr Hussey told them that they had investigated the matter and no evidence of ‘wrongdoing’ was found.⁸¹

A former assistant principal recalled that a parent of a student, who was also a teacher at the school, made a complaint to him about Mr Ray putting his hands down their son’s pants in 1975.⁸² The assistant principal told the parent to report this to Mr Hussey.⁸³ The assistant principal escorted the parent to Mr Hussey’s office but did not attend the meeting.⁸⁴ The assistant principal believed the conversation took place and said that the district inspector was called to investigate the matter.⁸⁵ The assistant principal assumed no disciplinary action occurred and there is no record of an investigation.⁸⁶

Former parents of six children who attended Beaumaris Primary School recalled that Mr Ray would drive children to places and show ‘11-year-old boys’ magazines ‘they should not have been seeing’.⁸⁷ In the mid-1970s, one of the parents wrote a letter to the school but it was ‘pushed aside’.⁸⁸

A former parent, School Council President and friend of Mr Ray’s recalled that in 1975 the principal, Mr Hussey, told them that a parent had made a complaint about Mr Ray’s misconduct.⁸⁹ Mr Hussey asked them if they suspected there was anything inappropriate about Mr Ray.⁹⁰ They responded that they had never seen anything.⁹¹

A former bursar at the school recalled that a parent complained to Mr Hussey about Mr Ray’s behaviour in the mid-1970s.⁹² Mr Hussey informed the district inspector, who asked the parent to ‘put [his complaint] in writing’.⁹³ The parent was advised by his lawyer that if he did so, he may be charged with libel.⁹⁴ The parent declined to document the complaint, then withdrew their child from the school.⁹⁵

The former bursar also recalled that Mr Hussey took Mr Ray’s keys from him, ‘to stop him getting access to the library at weekends’.⁹⁶

Mr Ray left Beaumaris Primary School at the end of 1976 and commenced working at Mount View Primary School on 1 January 1977.⁹⁷ The Department has no record of why Mr Ray ceased working at Beaumaris Primary School and no information that suggests Mr Ray moved to Mount View Primary School as a result of concerns about his behaviour at the time.⁹⁸

In a statement to Victoria Police regarding the 2001 criminal charges, Mr Ray said he knew he had a problem with young boys when he left Beaumaris Primary School.⁹⁹

Victim-survivors also told the Board of Inquiry that they suspected that other children and teachers were aware of Mr Ray’s sexual abuse when he was a teacher librarian at Beaumaris Primary School.

One individual told the Board of Inquiry that when he was in Year 1, his family member who was in Year 3 at the time warned him to ‘never go into the librarian[’]s “cubby” alone!’¹⁰⁰

A victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry that in around 1972 or 1973, access to the library was restricted ‘overnight’.¹⁰¹

Another individual told the Board of Inquiry that he noticed Mr Ray ‘acting inappropriately towards other boys during class’. This included Mr Ray sitting boys on his knee and ‘rubbing their tummies under their shirts’. In 1975, the individual reported the inappropriate behaviour to the principal.¹⁰²

The Department’s response

Despite the history of concerns and complaints about Mr Ray’s behaviour throughout the 1970s (as set out above), the earliest contemporaneous record that the Department retains concerning allegations of Mr Ray’s sexually abusive behaviour is dated 27 November 1978.

On 27 November 1978, a handwritten file note titled ‘Teacher Discipline’ recorded a conversation between employees of the Department.¹⁰³ The author of the note recorded that Mr Ray had been charged with sexual offences against boys and that ‘I have not done anything about a suspension, pending the arrival of the [modus operandi form]’.¹⁰⁴

A handwritten notation on the Teacher Discipline file stated that Mr Ray should ‘be kept away from children at once’.¹⁰⁵

On 22 January 1979, a memorandum by the Department recommended that Mr Ray be charged before the Teachers Tribunal and pending an outcome, be ‘suspended from duty from and inclusive of 5 February 1979’.¹⁰⁶

Departmental records show that Mr Ray resigned from Mount View Primary on 5 February 1979, citing ‘other employment’.¹⁰⁷ Mr Ray’s employment record noted that he was ‘not to be re-employed without reference to the Director of Primary Education’.¹⁰⁸

The Department has no record of Mr Ray being re-employed at a Victorian government school after his resignation.¹⁰⁹

Information provided to the Board of Inquiry suggests that Victoria Police notified the Department of the allegations made against Mr Ray around the time the allegations were made.

Since the Department became aware of Mr Ray’s criminal charges, it appears that it acted relatively swiftly to remove him from his teaching position and charge him before the Teachers Tribunal.¹¹⁰ Yet, despite the restrictive note on his file that he was not to be re-employed without reference to the Director of Primary Education, it does not appear that he was formally prohibited from returning to the teaching service.¹¹¹

The Board of Inquiry understands that Mr Ray went on to teach at Rossbourne School after leaving the government school system, which likely provided him with opportunities for ongoing access to and engagement with children.¹¹² Rossbourne School is an independent secondary school for students with learning difficulties and neuro-developmental challenges.¹¹³ As it is not a government school, it is outside the Board of Inquiry’s scope. As explored in Chapter 13(opens in a new window) the Board of Inquiry found that the Department has never undertaken a systematic review to understand the scale of child sexual abuse by alleged perpetrators.

Although Rossbourne School is an independent school, given its students are a group with particular vulnerabilities and given Mr Ray taught there in circumstances where the Department had determined he should be ‘kept away from children’, if the Department decides to undertake a systematic review (which the Board of Inquiry considers should occur), it should consider including the Rossbourne School in that review. The Board of Inquiry is aware that in 1998 Mr Ray was under investigation for child sexual abuse, and there was work underway to deregister him from the teaching service.¹¹⁴

Based on the material the Board of Inquiry considered, it is clear that prior to 1978, the Department had multiple opportunities to intervene and protect children from Mr Ray’s behaviour. In particular, there were a number of reports that indicate teachers, principals and parents had serious concerns about his conduct.

Analysis of the education system’s response, and systemic failings, is provided later in this Part, in Chapter 13(opens in a new window).

The Board of Inquiry’s engagement with Mr Ray

The Board of Inquiry wrote to Mr Ray, through his lawyers, on 14 November 2023, notifying him of the Board of Inquiry and the public hearings, and providing him an opportunity to engage with or respond to the information the Board of Inquiry intended to release about him. No response was received from Mr Ray prior to his death on 21 November 2023.

Alleged perpetrator narrative: Wyatt

Teaching history

The second alleged perpetrator is subject to a Restricted Publication Order and will be referred to by the pseudonym, ‘Wyatt’. To protect the identity of certain people, the Board of Inquiry is limited in the specificity of information it can publish about Wyatt.

Wyatt was employed at Victorian government primary schools for more than two decades.¹¹⁵ Wyatt worked at Beaumaris Primary School in the early 1970s.¹¹⁶

Details of alleged child sexual abuse

The Board of Inquiry heard from several individuals who experienced child sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by Wyatt. These accounts involve Wyatt exploiting his authority as a teacher and sports coach.

The alleged child sexual abuse occurred in a school context, such as during school activities, and also within a broader school context, in interactions with students outside of school.

One victim-survivor recalled that Wyatt gave some boys ‘special attention’.¹¹⁷ Another individual described Wyatt as a having ‘volatile, explosive, volcanic rage’.¹¹⁸ Several victim-survivors and other former students told the Board of Inquiry that Wyatt used corporal punishment (or the threat of it), such as the ‘strap’, to discipline children.¹¹⁹

In a school context

One victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry that Wyatt sexually abused him approximately every two weeks for two years. The victim-survivor would be sent into the corridor adjacent to the classroom, where Wyatt would sexually abuse him by masturbating him, fondling his genitals and by Wyatt rubbing his face on the victim-survivor's face and cheek.¹²⁰

Another victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry that he was sexually abused by Wyatt at a school camp. Wyatt took the victim-survivor to his cabin and put his hands down the victim-survivor’s pants and sexually abused him.¹²¹

A further victim-survivor, who attended Beaumaris Primary School, recalled that he was sexually abused by Wyatt on a camp on two occasions. He told the Board of Inquiry that he had ‘spent over 50 years burying this in [his] subconscious’.¹²²

Another victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry about two incidents of being sexually abused by Wyatt. He recalled that he was sitting at his school desk when Wyatt leant forward to look at his work and put his hand down his pants. He recalled that Wyatt ‘grope[d]’ him and ‘massage[d]’ his genitals while Wyatt was ‘talking about something else’. The victim-survivor also recalled that Wyatt sexually abused him in front of other children — Wyatt sat the victim-survivor on his lap, in front of the class, and put his hands on his genitals.¹²³

Yet another victim-survivor recalled Wyatt ‘grooming’ him through their shared interest in sport before sexually abusing him. He described the sexual abuse as occurring on a school camp. He recalled that Wyatt was ‘hanging around the showers’ when he ‘saw [the victim-survivor] naked and attacked inappropriately’.¹²⁴

Further, several individuals told the Board of Inquiry that they had observed Wyatt sexually abusing other children.

One individual recalled that Wyatt gave a ‘whisker kiss’ to one of his friends, where Wyatt rubbed his stubble across the boy’s face. The individual believes that his parent and the other boy’s parent confronted Wyatt about the behaviour.¹²⁵

Another individual told the Board of Inquiry that he saw Wyatt sexually abuse a fellow student. The fellow student told the individual that Wyatt would regularly sexually abuse him by Wyatt putting his hands down the fellow student's pants and ‘play with his penis’.¹²⁶

Yet another individual shared that she had ‘vivid memories’ of Wyatt abusing another student when they were in primary school.¹²⁷

Broader school settings

Victim-survivors also shared experiences of Wyatt allegedly sexually abusing them outside of school. One individual recalled that he was ‘coaxed’ by Wyatt into attending his house, where he was asked to wait in the loungeroom. He recalled another teacher was present and another individual was in the shower at the time. He told the Board of Inquiry that although he left Wyatt’s house on that occasion, Wyatt continued to offer him lifts to sports training.¹²⁸

Another individual told the Board of Inquiry that Wyatt and another teacher took their siblings to the drive-in. In relation to one of the siblings, Wyatt and the other teacher ‘held [their sibling] down and raped [them]’.¹²⁹

In a submission prepared by lawyers who represent victim-survivors who were allegedly sexually abused as children by the alleged perpetrators, it was recounted that a victim-survivor was repeatedly sexually abused by Wyatt on school premises, as well as in Wyatt’s home. The child sexual abuse described in the submission involved masturbation and one attempt of anal penetration.¹³⁰

Criminal proceedings

Due to a Restricted Publication Order, no details on criminal proceedings can be provided.

The education system’s knowledge and response

The Department’s records do not reveal any knowledge of relevant concerns about Wyatt’s conduct, or allegations about Wyatt engaging in sexual abuse, prior to 1998.¹³¹ Wyatt’s files do not contain any record of disciplinary action during his time as a teacher at Victorian government primary schools.¹³²

However, during interviews the Department conducted in 2000 and 2001 with teachers, parents and former students at Beaumaris Primary School, it is clear that there were suspicions and complaints about Wyatt’s behaviour.¹³³

For example, one teacher recalled, ‘I told Wyatt a couple of times to be careful where he puts his hands on kids’.¹³⁴ Another teacher raised concerns about Wyatt’s behaviour to a colleague, because the teacher’s child was going into Wyatt’s class.¹³⁵ The colleague said it was unlikely to be a problem, because of the child's connection to the teacher.¹³⁶

One parent recalled that many people knew about Wyatt’s behaviour and reported it to the principal, but ‘he wouldn’t listen to them’.¹³⁷

These reports relate to the early to mid-1970s. Some victim-survivors who engaged with the Board of Inquiry recalled experiencing child sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by Wyatt after the mid-1970s. The Department only recorded information about sexual abuse by Wyatt after he was convicted in the mid-1990s.¹³⁸ By this time, Wyatt had resigned from his last position at a Victorian government primary school.¹³⁹

The Board of Inquiry did not receive any information that Victoria Police shared crime reports about Wyatt with the Department at the time they were made. If crime reports had been received by the Department, it is not clear the Department would have acted on the allegations, as a discretionary approach was applied to teachers who were the subject of crime reports (see Chapter 13(opens in a new window)).

The Board of Inquiry’s engagement with Wyatt

The Board of Inquiry wrote to Wyatt notifying him of the Board of Inquiry and the public hearings, and providing him with an opportunity to engage with or respond to the information the Board of Inquiry intended to release about him on 14 November 2023. On 11 January 2024 and 15 January 2024, the Board of Inquiry again wrote to Wyatt to inform him that there would be references to him and his alleged sexual abuse of children in its report. The Board of Inquiry provided Wyatt with extracts of draft report chapters relevant to him and invited him to provide a response to those extracts.

Wyatt told the Board of Inquiry that he did perpetrate child sexual abuse, about which he was ashamed.¹⁴⁰ He said he has ‘always owned up to anything [he] knew was true’ and had voluntarily and successfully completed an offenders program.¹⁴¹

Wyatt said, however, that he had no recollection of some of the victim-survivors or some of the allegations put to him.¹⁴² Wyatt could recall some victim-survivors, but denied their allegations of abuse or the experiences they recounted.¹⁴³ He sometimes provided alternative explanations of details, activities or events that were included in the experiences shared by victim-survivors.¹⁴⁴ He denied he coached a particular sport and had no memory of attending any camps.¹⁴⁵

Wyatt denied that he would ‘choose to abuse anyone in full view of others’, including in a corridor outside a classroom.¹⁴⁶ Wyatt also denied engaging in child sexual abuse with or in front of another staff member.¹⁴⁷ In particular, he denied raping a child with or in front of any person.¹⁴⁸

Wyatt said he had no knowledge of other teachers engaging in inappropriate behaviour or acting abusively.¹⁴⁹ He also said he was unaware of any ‘collusion’ between the other alleged perpetrators.¹⁵⁰

Wyatt rejected any implication that developing friendships and taking part in joint interests (for example, as a sports enthusiast) with colleagues meant they were undertaking ‘joint illegal activities’.¹⁵¹ He also rejected the suggestion that being interested in volunteering or sports was proof of ‘illegal intention’.¹⁵²

Wyatt accepted that he was a ‘disciplinarian’ but said corporal punishment was ‘common’ until about 1983.¹⁵³ He said that he used it ‘sparingly and never as a power tool’, and recalled only ever using it on one student.¹⁵⁴

Wyatt expressed that he was ‘devastated’ by the impact on one victim-survivor and said he was ‘genuinely remorseful for any real harm [he] caused’.¹⁵⁵

In accordance with the Board of Inquiry’s Terms of Reference and approach to this inquiry, the Board of Inquiry has not made any findings of fact in relation to allegations of child sexual abuse in this report. The inclusion of Wyatt’s response to allegations relevant to him, as set out above, should not be understood as the Board of Inquiry accepting or endorsing Wyatt’s response.

Alleged perpetrator narrative: David MacGregor

Teaching history

David MacGregor was born on 8 January 1943.¹⁵⁶ Mr MacGregor taught or worked in Victorian government schools for more than 22 years, from 1 January 1963 to 27 May 1985.¹⁵⁷ Throughout his career, Mr MacGregor held a number of positions, including classroom teacher, sports coach and guitar teacher, and was involved in a number of sports clubs.¹⁵⁸

In May 1985, Mr MacGregor was transferred to an administrative role within the Department, where he worked for more than three years before transferring to another administrative role within the Department until December 1992.¹⁵⁹ Mr MacGregor retired from the Department, effective 31 December 1992.¹⁶⁰ Mr MacGregor’s transfer into non-teaching roles is discussed further below.

Table 2 outlines Mr MacGregor’s employment record and roles in other organisations.

Table 2 Mr Macgregor’s employment record at Victorian government primary schools and the Department, and roles in organisations

Details of alleged child sexual abuse

A number of individuals who engaged with the Board of Inquiry said they experienced or witnessed child sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by Mr MacGregor.

These accounts often related to Mr MacGregor using his role as classroom teacher, sports coach or music teacher to gain access to a child and isolate them from their peers and other adults.

In a school context

The Board of Inquiry heard from several victim-survivors who said they were sexually abused by Mr MacGregor in a school context. Some of these instances were described as occurring during sport or music classes, or when travelling between school settings, such as to sports training.

One victim-survivor recounted how Mr MacGregor wrapped his arms around him and thrust his genitals into his back. He recalled that Mr MacGregor groaned and rubbed himself on the victim-survivor’s back for about five to six seconds. Afterwards, the victim-survivor gave Mr MacGregor a ‘filthy look’. The victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry that ‘[Mr MacGregor’s] relaxed stance, hands on his hips, and the semi-satisfied smirking sneer on his face is etched in my memory’.¹⁶⁶

Another victim-survivor, who attended Beaumaris Primary School, recalled that Mr MacGregor touched her inappropriately while they were in his car. She knew at the time that Mr MacGregor’s conduct was wrong.¹⁶⁷

Yet another individual shared her experience in a sports class. She recalled that Mr MacGregor wore loose shorts and had his legs bent and wide open, with his penis visible to students for the duration of the class. The individual said that ‘something was not at all right’ about it and described the incident as ‘not a brief accident, but a sustained and clearly intentional revealing of his genitals while he sat and gave instructions and chatted to the class’.¹⁶⁸

Broader school settings

The Board of Inquiry also heard from individuals in relation to Mr MacGregor’s conduct in broader school settings.

One victim-survivor shared how Mr MacGregor would often visit her house and he ‘gained trust’ with her parents through sport. She recounted that Mr MacGregor would sexually abuse her during music lessons. Mr MacGregor would press his penis into her back and touch her chest under her clothes.¹⁶⁹

One individual recalled that Mr MacGregor held an end-of-year school party for her school class at his family home, which had a swimming pool. During the party, Mr MacGregor took a group of students inside to show them his bedroom. She recalled ‘I felt it was very strange that he took some of us inside to show us his bedroom. I can still see the room all these years on and wonder why he thought that was an appropriate thing to do. I thought it was odd then and still do’.¹⁷⁰

On 26 November 2023, journalist Russell Jackson, at the ABC, published an article outlining victim-survivor accounts of Mr MacGregor’s sexual abuse.¹⁷¹ Some material in the article was new information to the Board of Inquiry. This included allegations that Mr MacGregor led sexually explicit classroom ‘singalongs,’ dated a 15-year-old girl (when he was 31 years old) and looked up a girls’ skirt while he was at Beaumaris Primary School.¹⁷² It was reported that the latter experience was made known to the principal at Beaumaris Primary School but the principal told the student off, saying angrily, ‘[y]ou could ruin this man’s career’.¹⁷³

Criminal offending summary

The Board of Inquiry is aware of two finalised criminal proceedings involving Mr MacGregor.

August 1985

In 1985, Mr MacGregor was charged with three criminal offences related to child sexual abuse: indecent assault, committing acts of gross indecency and publishing an obscene article.¹⁷⁴ The criminal proceedings were instigated in December 1984, when a parent of a student at Kunyung Primary School made a complaint to Victoria Police about Mr MacGregor’s behaviour.¹⁷⁵

The criminal proceedings related to three victim-survivors sexually abused by Mr MacGregor while they were students at Kunyung Primary School in 1983 and 1984.¹⁷⁶

In statements to Victoria Police, victim-survivors described Mr MacGregor sexually abusing them at Mr MacGregor’s house, car and boat.¹⁷⁷ Based on information provided by the Department, the sexual abuse involved Mr MacGregor:

• showering while the victim-survivors were in his home
• encouraging them to shower
• playing pornographic films
• touching their penises
• masturbating in the presence of children.¹⁷⁸

In the Melbourne Magistrates’ Court on 16 August 1985, Mr MacGregor pleaded guilty and was convicted of one charge of indecent assault (involving two counts) on persons aged under 16 years old.¹⁷⁹ Mr MacGregor was sentenced to three years probation, psychological or psychiatric treatment, and to pay costs of $25 to the Court.¹⁸⁰

After being notified of the criminal convictions, the Department conducted an internal investigation into Mr MacGregor’s behaviour, as a result of which he was charged with offences under the Teaching Service Act 1981 (Vic) (Teaching Service Act). The internal investigation also resulted in Mr MacGregor’s transfer to an administrative role, as discussed later in this Chapter.

July 1994

In July 1994, Mr MacGregor was again convicted on charges relating to child sexual abuse. In this instance, the convictions were in relation to charges of gross indecency and indecent assault in 1980, which occurred while he was employed at Chelsea Heights Primary School.¹⁸¹ Mr MacGregor was sentenced to six months and four months imprisonment, respectively, for the gross indecency and indecent assault charges.¹⁸² Both sentences were suspended for two years.¹⁸³

The education system’s knowledge and response

The Department

The Department’s evidence to the Board of Inquiry was that it first became aware of allegations about the sexual nature of Mr MacGregor’s conduct on 27 February 1985, when the parents of the victim-survivors involved in the 1985 criminal proceedings wrote to the Department.¹⁸⁴ The Department advised the parents that it would conduct its own investigation into the matters.¹⁸⁵

In March 1985, the Department invited Mr MacGregor to discuss his wishes regarding ‘school placement as a result of impending charges being laid by the Victoria Police’.¹⁸⁶ On 2 April 1985, a meeting took place between Mr MacGregor, a representative from the Victorian Teachers’ Union, and a Department representative (the Assistant Regional Director, Western Port Region).¹⁸⁷

During this meeting, Mr MacGregor opposed being transferred and the Department advised him to contact the Department ‘of any wish to transfer to another position should tensions within the school community become untenable’.¹⁸⁸

Based on a subsequent letter between officials of the Department, the Department determined that ‘[w]ithout further specific evidence we are unable to proceed’ with the investigation into Mr MacGregor.¹⁸⁹ It does not appear, however, that there was any concerted attempt to gather further information. In his evidence to the Board of Inquiry, Dr David Howes PSM, Deputy Secretary, Schools and Regional Services, Department of Education, described the departmental investigation as follows: ‘[o]n any way in which that word [investigation] should be used, that was as good as doing nothing’.¹⁹⁰

A memo was addended to the letter, where the author stated that he was ‘uneasy’ about ‘pushing [Mr MacGregor] off on a technical excuse which could be remedied’.¹⁹¹ There is no further information, however, indicating if or how this unease was responded to.

The Department advised the parents that it could not obtain information from Victoria Police about the investigation on foot, and that following its own initial investigation, it had ‘insufficient evidence upon which to proceed’.¹⁹²

Mr MacGregor continued teaching at Kunyung Primary School for another month.

On 24 May 1985, the parent again wrote to the Department, this time enclosing copies of the statements made to the police.¹⁹³

On 28 May 1985, the Department responded to the letter and said that Mr MacGregor had been transferred to a non-teaching position, effective 27 May 1985.¹⁹⁴ This date was one day prior to the letter being sent to the parent, indicating the likelihood that the Department only made this decision as a result of the parent’s letter on 24 May 1985. Mr MacGregor was transferred to a temporary administrative position in the Western Port Region office within the Department.¹⁹⁵

In September 1985, minutes from a meeting of the Kunyung Primary School Council show that Council members were told that if questions were addressed to them about Mr MacGregor’s transfer, they should answer that ‘[it] was an administrative transfer’.¹⁹⁶

From the information available, the Board of Inquiry concludes that Mr MacGregor was transferred to an administrative role because of the allegations against him, but that this reason was not formally noted or shared within the education system. In giving evidence to the Board of Inquiry, Dr Howes agreed with the Board of Inquiry that there appeared to be ‘a culture of sweeping this all under the carpet’ within the Department.¹⁹⁷

After Mr MacGregor’s criminal conviction on 16 August 1985, the Department commenced a second investigation into Mr MacGregor’s behaviour as it related to the criminal charges.¹⁹⁸ Mr MacGregor was charged with seven offences under the Teaching Service Act concerning masturbating in front of two children, touching two children on the penis and showing pornographic films to three children.¹⁹⁹

While this investigation was ongoing, Mr MacGregor was appointed as a relief teacher in the South Central Region, based at Hawksburn Primary School, for the 1986 school year.²⁰⁰ The General Secretary of the Victorian Teachers’ Union sought clarity from the Department on Mr MacGregor’s appointment, given the ongoing departmental investigation.²⁰¹ On 31 January 1986, the Department wrote to Mr MacGregor, stating that he was to remain at the Western Port Region office, ‘pending the outcome of Departmental Charges’.²⁰² It appears that the Department only made this decision based on the letter from the Union representative.

On 4 and 22 July 1986, the Department held two disciplinary hearings regarding Mr MacGregor’s charges.²⁰³ The Department found him guilty of six of the seven charges.²⁰⁴

The Department concluded that Mr MacGregor’s penalty should take into consideration his long record as a ‘successful and respected member of the Teaching Service’ and the evidence of character witnesses, including a former principal of Kunyung Primary School.²⁰⁵

As such, Mr MacGregor was not dismissed from the teaching service but was appointed to a permanent, non-teaching, administrative role in the Western Port Region office.²⁰⁶

Mr MacGregor remained in an administrative role and after 20 September 1988 was permitted to apply for another teaching position, three years after the Department found him guilty of offences involving child sexual abuse.²⁰⁷

In 1988, Mr MacGregor successfully applied for a teaching position at Langwarrin Primary School and was due to commence in 1989.²⁰⁸ The principal of Langwarrin Primary School and community members objected to the appointment on the basis of Mr MacGregor’s publicly known conviction.²⁰⁹ Following this complaint, the Department rescinded the offer and Mr MacGregor was instead transferred to another non-teaching administrative role in the Southern Metropolitan Region office in the Department.²¹⁰

While Mr MacGregor was in this role, in February 1990, the Chisholm Institute of Technology School of Education raised a concern with the Department that Mr MacGregor was hoping to become a school principal and was working with ‘street children’.²¹¹ The Department took no action and responded to the Institute with: ‘continued employment of teachers found guilty of indictable offences is assessed individually and a decision regarding future employment is made accordingly in each case’.²¹²

Mr MacGregor remained in the Southern Metropolitan Region office until he voluntarily retired from the Department, effective 31 December 1992.²¹³

While the Department’s records do not reveal any concerns or complaints about the sexual nature of Mr MacGregor’s conduct prior to 1985, one individual told the Board of Inquiry that she had raised concerns about his behaviour much earlier in his career.

A former student at Beaumaris Primary School recalled telling a teacher about Mr MacGregor inappropriately touching her.²¹⁴ Mr MacGregor warned her about telling people about his behaviour.²¹⁵ However, this was the only information the Board of Inquiry received suggesting concerns had been raised before 1985.

Victoria Police and the Department

As described earlier, there was an obligation on Victoria Police to share crime reports with the Department regarding information that a student had been sexually abused while in the care of a government school.²¹⁶ Information provided to the Board of Inquiry suggests that the Department was first notified of the allegations against Mr MacGregor by the parents who made the complaint in February 1985. The Department also provided information outlining that it did not initially investigate these allegations because it could not obtain relevant information from Victoria Police.²¹⁷

It does not appear that if Victoria Police had shared this information when the crime reports were made, the Department would have acted differently. The Department was made aware of the allegations in February 1985 in the form of a letter from a parent, yet did not remove Mr MacGregor from the teaching service. Mr MacGregor remained a registered teacher and was employed within the Department.

In considering these actions during this period, Dr Howes agreed with the proposition put to him during the Board of Inquiry’s public hearings that after the Department received information about Mr MacGregor’s convictions, the Department ‘served to protect [Mr MacGregor]’ and ‘his role in the community’.²¹⁸ Dr Howes added that the Department’s response also served ‘to protect [Mr MacGregor’s] prospects of further employment within the Department’.²¹⁹

Analysis of the education system’s response, and systemic failings, is provided later in this Part, in Chapter 13(opens in a new window).

The Board of Inquiry’s engagement with Mr MacGregor

On 27 November 2023, the Board of Inquiry wrote to Mr MacGregor regarding the public hearings, informing him that there would be references to his name and alleged child sexual abuse. The Board of Inquiry did not receive a response. On 11 January 2024 and 15 January 2024, the Board of Inquiry again wrote to Mr MacGregor to inform him that there would be references to him and his alleged abuse in its report.

Mr MacGregor told the Board of Inquiry that he denied any conduct of a sexual nature with children other than that for which he was convicted.²²⁰ In particular, Mr MacGregor stated that ‘nothing of any sexual nature occurred’ while he was at Beaumaris Primary School.²²¹ He said he ‘did not have sex with anybody’ and said an allegation otherwise was ‘ridiculous’.²²² He denied being a paedophile.²²³

Mr MacGregor told the Board of Inquiry that he ‘would never hurt a child’.²²⁴ Mr MacGregor stated that if he did touch a child ‘it was not of a sexual nature’ and he ‘certainly never touched their private parts’.²²⁵ He said he ‘wouldn’t dream of forcing anyone into anything’.²²⁶

Mr MacGregor stated that he did not know about any offending of the other three relevant employees discussed during the Board of Inquiry’s public hearings. He expressed his view that ‘[i]t’s ridiculous to suggest there was a paedophile ring’ or to include him in any such ring.²²⁷ Mr MacGregor explained that the other three relevant employees were ‘connected’ within the community through shared activities and interests but he was ‘not part of that’.²²⁸

In accordance with the Board of Inquiry’s Terms of Reference and approach to this inquiry, the Board of Inquiry has not made any findings of fact in relation to allegations of child sexual abuse in this report. The inclusion of Mr MacGregor’s response to allegations relevant to him, as set out above, should not be understood as the Board of Inquiry accepting or endorsing Mr MacGregor’s response.

Alleged perpetrator narrative: Graham Steele

Teaching history

Graham Harold Steele may also be known as Grahame Steele.

Mr Steele was born on 3 May 1932 and died in 2013.²²⁹ Mr Steele taught or worked in Victorian government primary schools for 38 years until he resigned in January 1990.²³⁰ For the last 14 years of his career, Mr Steele held the roles of principal or deputy principal.²³¹ Table 3 outlines Mr Steele’s employment record.

Table 3 Mr Steele’s employment record at Victorian government primary schools²³²

Details of alleged child sexual abuse

The Board of Inquiry heard from several individuals who experienced or witnessed child sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by Mr Steele.

The child sexual abuse as described to the Board of Inquiry occurred in a school context, including on the premises of a school or in locations where activities of that school took place, such as camps. The sexual abuse also occurred in broader school contexts where Mr Steele used his role as teacher to engage with children outside of school, such as weekend trips away.

It is alleged that Mr Steele used his interest and involvement in sport to endear children to him. One victim-survivor described Mr Steele as ‘charismatic, strong and authoritarian’. He recalled that Mr Steele would sometimes take children out of class to set up sporting equipment and the children would feel ‘special’ when he picked them.²³⁶

Another victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry that students thought that Mr Steele’s class was ‘the best class to be in, especially if you loved sport’.²³⁷

Another individual described how Mr Steele would have a group of ‘sporty boys in his classroom with whom he would chat and joke with’. They recalled: ‘[i]t looked like they were having fun and ironically we wanted to be a part of this but were not allowed in’.²³⁸

In a school context

A number of individuals shared with the Board of Inquiry their experiences of child sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by Mr Steele in a school context — that is, on school premises, at school camps or travelling between school settings, such as to sports training.

Several victim-survivors recalled experiences of sexual abuse where Mr Steele isolated children from their peers and other adults.

One victim-survivor who attended Beaumaris Primary School described Mr Steele removing him from the classroom for ‘treatment’ of a sports injury to his stomach. The victim-survivor recalled that during this ‘treatment’, Mr Steele took off the victim-survivor’s clothes and ‘rubbed [the victim-survivor’s] stomach with one hand while he touched [the victim-survivor’s] genitals with his other hand’.²³⁹

Another victim-survivor shared a similar experience at Beaumaris Primary School. The victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry that he suffered an injury at cricket training and was touched inappropriately by Mr Steele while he was administering first aid to the victim-survivor.²⁴⁰

One victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry he was sexually abused multiple times over ‘years and years’ by Mr Steele, while Mr Steele was the principal at the victim-survivor’s school. This victim-survivor recalled that Mr Steele would take him out of class or after-school care and into his office, where he would sexually abuse him.²⁴¹

This victim-survivor also recalled being sexually abused by Mr Steele at a swimming class. He recalled that Mr Steele took him into the changerooms and assaulted him in the stalls, then made him go back to the swimming class.²⁴²

The victim-survivor also recalled how he was made to sit next to Mr Steele on a bus trip to a school camp for a few hours. He recounted that Mr Steele sexually abused him by touching him under a blanket for the entire trip.²⁴³

The victim-survivor told us that the first time he was sexually abused by Mr Steele, he reported the alleged abuse to a Safety House.²⁴⁴ He recalled that the police were called and, while he gave them a ‘detailed description’ of Mr Steele, he was too frightened to tell the police who the perpetrator was. The victim-survivor shared that, following this, Mr Steele threatened him at school and the sexual abuse continued to escalate, including to rape.²⁴⁵

The Board of Inquiry heard from other victim-survivors that Mr Steele sexually abused children at school camps.

One victim-survivor recalled that at school camp, Mr Steele dried him after a shower. He recalled that Mr Steele dried multiple children at the camp, and they all thought it was strange.²⁴⁶

Another victim-survivor shared how they were seated in a train carriage with Mr Steele and several other students on the way home from a school camp. They recalled that Mr Steele encouraged the boys to kiss the girls and ‘make sure tongues were put into each other’s mouths’.²⁴⁷

The Board of Inquiry also heard from an individual who said that as 11-year-olds, he and his friends knew about Mr Steele’s child sexual abuse. They knew that Mr Steele would sit children on his lap in his car and dry children’s genitals after they had taken showers.²⁴⁸

Broader school settings

The Board of Inquiry was also told about child sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by Mr Steele in broader school settings. Mr Steele appears to have used his role as a teacher to engage with children outside of school.

One victim-survivor, who was a student at Beaumaris Primary School, recalled being taken by Mr Steele to his family holiday house in Inverloch with around eight other boys. Mr Steele brought the victim-survivor back to the holiday house ahead of the rest of the group. He remembered that Mr Steele then stripped off the victim-survivor’s clothes, showered and dried him, and touched his genitals.²⁴⁹

The victim-survivor also shared that Mr Steele drove him back home from Inverloch during the night. The victim-survivor recalled that Mr Steele placed him on his lap and rubbed his genitals, while other young boys were sitting in the back seat.²⁵⁰

Another victim-survivor also told the Board of Inquiry about the child sexual abuse he recalled experiencing at Mr Steele’s family holiday house in Inverloch. He recalled that in 1974 Mr Steele took him and his friends to the holiday house in Inverloch. The victim-survivor was in Year 6 at Ormond East Primary School and Mr Steele was his classroom teacher.²⁵¹

The victim-survivor recalled that Mr Steele would dry him after he showered and ‘touch and fondle’ him. He told the Board of Inquiry that this happened every time he showered during the week-long trip and that Mr Steele made the boys shower three times a day.²⁵²

Criminal offending summary

Based on information provided to the Board of Inquiry by the Department and Victoria Police, it appears that Mr Steele has not been charged with child sexual abuse offences.²⁵³

The education system’s knowledge and response

In 2000, a parent of former Beaumaris Primary School students informed the Department during an interview that Mr Steele had a massage table in the school that he used to ‘rub down the kids after they played football’ and that he would also take children away for weekends or after sport games.²⁵⁴ This is the earliest record, in the material provided by the Department, of a concern raised about Mr Steele. Despite noticing this, the parent said that they had not thought (at the time their children were at the school) that Mr Steele was abusing children.²⁵⁵ This parent did, however, note the close community connection Mr Steele had to at least one other alleged perpetrator around that time.²⁵⁶ That alleged perpetrator had also been the subject of allegations of child sexual abuse around that same time.²⁵⁷

The Board of Inquiry heard from one victim-survivor that students in his class told him, years after they finished at Beaumaris Primary School, that if they got in trouble and went to the principal’s office, they would threaten the principal that they would disclose Mr Steele’s child sexual abuse if they were disciplined.²⁵⁸ Another victim-survivor recalled talking to his friends about Mr Steele’s behaviour at the time, stating that he thought it was ‘clearly evident’ that Mr Steele’s behaviour was ‘unusual’.²⁵⁹

However, the Board of Inquiry did not hear directly from any former student that they had reported concerns about Mr Steele to a teacher or principal during the relevant period. Nor did the Board of Inquiry receive any information suggesting any parent or teacher raised concerns about Mr Steele’s conduct with the Department prior to 2000.

The Board of Inquiry was told of two instances where reports about Mr Steele’s conduct were made to Victoria Police by the same victim-survivor in the mid-1980s and the late 1980s. It does not appear that those reports were conveyed to the Department. In the mid-1980s, the victim-survivor made a statement to Victoria Police alleging that he was sexually abused by Mr Steele when he was a child. He told the Board of Inquiry that the police took no action, and he was later told that the police ‘couldn’t find’ his statement.²⁶⁰

In the late 1980s, the same victim-survivor again contacted Victoria Police to report sexual abuse by Mr Steele. However, it was not until the early 2000s that Victoria Police contacted the victim-survivor about taking action against Mr Steele. Victoria Police asked him if he would wear a covert recording device and confront Mr Steele. The victim-survivor agreed to assist in the hope of protecting other children. He confronted Mr Steele in the very house in Inverloch where he recalled being sexually abused. Mr Steele denied the claims.²⁶¹ No further information was provided to the Board of Inquiry about how, or if, the investigation progressed.

At least one victim-survivor who engaged with the Board of Inquiry recalled alleged child sexual abuse by Mr Steele after these complaints were made to Victoria Police during the 1980s.

As described in Chapter 10, The education system(opens in a new window), there was an obligation on Victoria Police to share crime reports with the Department regarding information that a student had been sexually abused while in the care of a government school.²⁶² The Board of Inquiry did not receive any information that Victoria Police did share crime reports about Mr Steele with the Department at the time they were made. If crime reports had been received by the Department, it is not clear the Department would have acted on the allegations, as a discretionary approach was applied to notifications of crime reports (see Chapter 13(opens in a new window)).

Mr Steele remained teaching in Victorian government primary schools until 31 January 1990.²⁶³

Analysis of the education system’s response, and systemic failings, is provided later in this Part, in Chapter 13(opens in a new window).

The Board of Inquiry’s engagement with Mr Steele

Due to Mr Steele’s death, the Board of Inquiry was not required to engage in a procedural fairness process in relation to the allegations of child sexual abuse against him.

The Department’s knowledge of the alleged perpetrators

The Board of Inquiry considers it is clear from the evidence it has received and from other information provided that, in some instances, employees of the Department were aware of allegations of child sexual abuse well before the Department took any action to protect children’s safety.

In relation to Mr Ray, concerns were raised at least by 1974 — but possibly as early as 1972 — about his conduct. Multiple concerns appear to have been raised around 1975. By the end of 1976, Mr Ray had left Beaumaris Primary School and commenced working at a new school. Despite the mounting concerns about Mr Ray’s behaviour at Beaumaris Primary School, there is no evidence that a meaningful investigation of his conduct was carried out. Significantly, Mr Ray was later charged with child sex offences against a child at the new school.²⁶⁴ Mr Ray was able to continue teaching until 1979. This is despite concerns being raised some years before he was convicted of child sexual abuse and left the Department. The Department’s inaction put numerous children at risk of sexual abuse.

In relation to Wyatt, concerns were raised and complaints were made about his conduct in the early 1970s. Yet, no action was taken and Wyatt continued to teach for more than two decades, until his resignation. The Department’s inaction put numerous children at risk of sexual abuse.

In relation to Mr MacGregor, it was only the actions of parents that led to the Department moving him to an administrative role away from teaching children, notwithstanding child sexual abuse charges being made against him. Even when he was convicted, he was able to remain employed and continue to take advantage of the benefits of a departmental role until he chose to retire in 1992. Even though he was not teaching, his continued employment within the Department afforded him status and facilitated his continued access to children in other ways. The Department’s failure to have policies or protocols in this regard compromised the safety of children.

In relation to Mr Steele, it is striking that reports to Victoria Police in the mid-1980s and in the late 1980s that he had sexually abused school children do not appear to have been conveyed to the Department, despite the fact he was still teaching. As will be discussed in Chapter 13(opens in a new window), the Department had no policies or protocols in place to ensure the sharing of information of this kind between the Department and Victoria Police. Mr Steele remained a teacher until 31 January 1990, and his roles included that of principal. The Department’s failure in this regard compromised the safety of children.

Introduction

This Chapter explores grooming as a concept and considers how, alongside other factors, it contributes to barriers to disclosure. The Chapter also explores challenges victim-survivors have experienced in disclosing child sexual abuse.

‘Grooming’ refers to how a perpetrator manipulates a child, family, institution or community to enable their offending behaviour. ‘Disclosure’ refers to when a child conveys or attempts to convey that they were sexually abused. Grooming can create barriers to disclosure, including normalising the sexual abuse, making it unlikely that a child will disclose the sexual abuse or will be believed if they do.

Grooming behaviour

Understanding grooming

The Board of Inquiry has adopted the same definition of grooming as the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (Royal Commission):

As this definition makes clear, grooming targets not only the individual child but also those around them, such as their family and the perpetrator’s workplace.²

Grooming does not always lead to child sexual abuse, and child sexual abuse can occur in the absence of grooming.³ Perpetrators may also use tactics such as force and threats to inflict child sexual abuse.⁴ Research suggests, however, that child sexual abuse in schools almost always begins with grooming.⁵

The concept of grooming only emerged in academic publications in the 1980s.⁶ In his evidence to the Board of Inquiry, Professor Patrick O’Leary, Co-Lead of the Disrupting Violence Beacon and Director of the Violence Research and Prevention Program, Griffith University, explained that the way grooming was understood evolved with better knowledge about child sexual abuse — including that it was not a ‘rare event’ and was not only perpetrated by strangers.⁷

The lack of understanding and awareness of grooming in the 1960s to the 1980s increased the vulnerability of children.⁸ As Professor Lisa Featherstone, Head of School, School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, University of Queensland, explained in her evidence to the Board of Inquiry, without an understanding of grooming, parents may have been encouraged ‘to leave their children with men who showed an interest in their child’, for example, in the context of sports coaching or music lessons.⁹

The Board of Inquiry heard evidence about a number of strategies and behaviours that are typically used by perpetrators to groom children. These include:

• creating a trusted relationship with the child, parents and co-workers
• small and progressive breaches of the child’s boundaries, such as non-sexual touching
• introducing the child to sexual content, such as talking about sex or showing the child pornography
• involving the child in rule-breaking behaviour, such as taking alcohol and drugs
• making the child feel loved, special or fearful.¹⁰

Professor O’Leary gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that grooming may be gendered, with different tactics used to groom boys and girls. He explained that the tactics that may be used to groom young boys include:

• providing special privileges, such as selection in sports teams
• providing access to adult themes, such as through pornography
• forging positive relationships and generating the belief that the child is ‘special’.¹¹

For girls, grooming often involves emotional manipulation (such as through gift-giving), rather than strategies focused on ‘prestige or privilege’.¹²

At the time grooming is occurring, grooming behaviours can often be perceived as ‘normal’ or ‘helpful’.¹³ Professor O’Leary explained that ‘it is much harder to recognise grooming behaviours as they are occurring’, rather than retrospectively, because they can be legitimate behaviours.¹⁴ For example, research indicates that spending time with children outside of the classroom or holding hands, on their own, could be seen as signs of going ‘above and beyond’ and being interested in a student’s development.¹⁵ Analysis from the Royal Commission suggests that such behaviours, when only seen as individual actions instead of collectively, do not give rise to a need to examine the conduct in more detail.¹⁶

Despite the concept of grooming not being understood in the 1960s and 1970s, the victim-survivors who shared their experiences with the Board of Inquiry described conduct by the alleged perpetrators that meets the description of grooming, as outlined below.

Alleged perpetrator behaviour

This section of the report examines the types of behaviour and techniques victim-survivors recalled being used by the alleged perpetrators, rather than the experiences of sexual abuse shared by victim-survivors, which is considered in Chapter 7, Experiences of sexual abuse and its impact in childhood(opens in a new window). The behaviours and techniques described by many victim-survivors meet the description of grooming, as discussed below.

Grooming children

The Board of Inquiry heard many accounts from victim-survivors that detailed how the alleged perpetrator made them feel ‘special’ and ‘loved’. Some alleged perpetrators used a child’s interest in hobbies, such as reading and sport, to endear themselves to the child and isolate them from other children.

One victim-survivor described how Darrell Ray used his interest in books to coax him into the library at lunchtimes, where it is alleged that he would sexually abuse him.¹⁷

Similarly, another victim-survivor recalled that Mr Ray used his interest in a particular hobby to entice him into the library at lunchtimes, where he said Mr Ray would sexually abuse him.¹⁸

Another victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry that Mr Ray ‘groomed’ him as a ‘helper to put the books away’.¹⁹

Yet another victim-survivor recalled that he would feel ‘special’ when Graham Steele singled him out to help set up sports equipment.²⁰

A submission prepared by lawyers representing victim-survivors who were allegedly sexually abused as children by the alleged perpetrators includes an account of one victim-survivor who said he was a ‘shy and lonely boy’ and that Mr Ray befriended him when he would visit the library during lunchtimes.²¹ He alleged that ‘[a]fter several weeks to months of grooming’, Mr Ray repeatedly sexually abused him.²²

Many victim-survivors told the Board of Inquiry how the alleged perpetrators would use their positions as sports coaches to bring children within their orbit. As discussed in Chapter 11, The alleged perpetrators(opens in a new window), a number of the allegations of child sexual abuse made against Mr Ray involve abuse allegedly occurring in connection with sporting activities.

One victim-survivor, allegedly sexually abused by Mr Ray, told the Board of Inquiry that Mr Ray was one of the best coaches he had, and that he ‘blossomed’ as a footballer.²³

Mr Ray selected boys from Beaumaris Primary School to play in the St Kilda Little League Football Club.²⁴ One victim-survivor recalled that boys were ‘desperate’ to play in this league.²⁵

The Board of Inquiry was also told about experiences of child sexual abuse being normalised, which is a form of grooming. One victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry that Mr Ray ‘always sort of had his hands on you’, and that this ‘normalised’ the physical contact. He recalled that the regular physical contact ‘became almost normal’.²⁶

Another victim-survivor recalled that while Mr Ray was sexually abusing him in the library, he continued to talk to him like it was ‘normal behaviour’.²⁷

Grooming families

As noted above, grooming does not only refer to the grooming of a child.²⁸ The Board of Inquiry heard evidence that perpetrators can also groom families and communities, and the institutions perpetrators work in.²⁹

Perpetrators may groom family members who offer safety and protection to the child, such as parents, siblings, other family members, carers and guardians.³⁰ For example, grooming may involve sharing part of the ‘caring burden’.³¹

Typically, perpetrators undertake the grooming of family members to increase the child’s and the family’s trust in the perpetrator and to create the impression that the perpetrator does not pose a risk to the child.³² Grooming families can also ensure that disclosures of child sexual abuse are not believed.³³

One victim-survivor recalled that he was often physically sick after Wyatt sexually abused him.³⁴ He recounted that on many occasions his mother was asked to come and pick him up from school and that Wyatt would flirt with his mother when she did so.³⁵ He told the Board of Inquiry that Wyatt was ‘methodical and knew what he was doing in striking this relationship with his mother’.³⁶

Another victim-survivor recalled that Mr Ray would often visit his home and was a ‘close friend of [his] parents’.³⁷

A victim-survivor, allegedly sexually abused by David MacGregor, said that Mr MacGregor would often visit her house and ‘gain trust’ and be ‘matey’ with her parents. She recalled that Mr MacGregor would sexually abuse her during music lessons after school.³⁸

Several victim-survivors told the Board of Inquiry that the alleged perpetrators would exploit ‘vulnerable’ families to gain access to children.

A sibling of victim-survivors who were sexually abused by Mr Ray recalled that Mr Ray ‘saw a vulnerable family’ and ‘slowly worked his way in’. Mr Ray would come to their house and have cups of tea with their parents. The sibling recounted that Mr Ray used his position as a local teacher to establish trust and then offer to drive the children to sports training.³⁹

Another victim-survivor recalled that Mr Steele targeted him because he knew he was from a ‘broken home’ and his family did not have any money.⁴⁰

Grooming communities

At a community level, grooming is focused on establishing the perpetrator’s credibility in and service to the community.⁴¹ Professor O’Leary described this as ‘the positioning of oneself so that the community feels they have a need, and the person has stepped in at the right time’; for example, coaching a sports team.⁴²

Grooming communities can quell suspicions about a perpetrator’s offending and make it hard for community members to believe allegations of child sexual abuse.⁴³ Professor Featherstone gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that ‘[t]his was particularly the case where the perpetrator was integrated into the community, such as where they were involved in sports coaching and had a wife and children’.⁴⁴

The alleged perpetrators falling within the scope of this inquiry were integrated in the community in various ways, but in particular through their positions as school teachers and sports coaches at the local primary school and through their involvement in local sporting clubs.⁴⁵

Professor Featherstone gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that community integration enables perpetrators to have access to children both at school and after school, and to ‘have intimate access to children such as [in] change rooms and [while] driving children to and from sporting events’.⁴⁶

Community integration also assists a perpetrator to be considered a person of good character, or a ‘good bloke’.⁴⁷ Professor Leah Bromfield, Director of the Australian Centre for Child Protection and Chair of Child Protection, University of South Australia, explained that perpetrators of institutional child sexual abuse have shown themselves to be ‘highly skilled in grooming their colleagues, children’s parents and community members to enable them to access children and to be considered above reproach’.⁴⁸

This concept of being ‘above reproach’ means that perpetrators need make little attempt to conceal their behaviour; for example, they may perpetrate child sexual abuse in front of other people.⁴⁹

Being ‘above reproach’ may also mean that a perpetrator is considered of ‘good character’, which can reduce their punishment.⁵⁰ Professor O’Leary gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that a ‘good character reference is all about … grooming’ and demonstrates how grooming can increase a perpetrator’s credibility and ‘social likeability’.⁵¹ In the case of Mr MacGregor, as discussed in Chapter 11(opens in a new window), charges relating to child sexual abuse under the Teachers Service Act 1981 (Vic) were found to be proved by the Department of Education (Department) in 1986.⁵² In considering Mr MacGregor’s penalty, the Department took into consideration a range of matters, including the evidence of character witnesses.⁵³ The Department determined that Mr MacGregor should not be dismissed from the teaching service, but instead appointed to a non-teaching role and banned from applying for another teaching position until late 1988.⁵⁴

One victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry that, at the time, some students admired or looked up to the alleged perpetrators.⁵⁵ She hoped that this would not be the case again, now that more is known about the allegations of child sexual abuse.⁵⁶

Grooming in schools

Perpetrators may deliberately choose to work in schools because of the respect and authority teaching positions afford, as well as the access to children schools provide.⁵⁷

Professor Michael Salter, Professor of Criminology, School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that during the 1960s and 1970s, government schools were ‘attractive’ places for perpetrators to work as they provided access to ‘diverse cohorts of potential victims’.⁵⁸ Staff had authority over children and there were a range of opportunities to groom children and their families.⁵⁹

Similarly, Dr Katie Wright, Associate Professor, Department of Social Inquiry, La Trobe University, gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that in schools there is an ‘institutional authority embodied in teachers’.⁶⁰ This was compounded in the 1960s and 1970s because of children’s ‘greater deference to adult authority’.⁶¹ This meant that children were expected to be compliant, and school staff ‘could exert considerable power over children’.⁶²

Teachers were regarded as ‘good people doing good work’, and male teachers were seen as ‘exemplary men helping young people’.⁶³ Professor Featherstone’s evidence was that these views made it difficult to criticise their behaviour.⁶⁴

Being part of a trusted institution meant that perpetrators were in a position to groom families and build trust and respect.⁶⁵ This could lead to perpetrators acting with a ‘sense of impunity’, meaning that they may take greater risks that could expose their behaviour.⁶⁶

Certainly, the child sexual abuse described by victim-survivors to the Board of Inquiry was often brazen. As discussed in Chapter 11(opens in a new window), for example, some victim-survivors recalled being abused in public. Many victim-survivors told the Board of Inquiry that they were deliberately sexually abused in front of other children, or that they witnessed this sexual abuse.

Two former students at a school where Wyatt worked told the Board of Inquiry that they observed Wyatt sexually abusing children in front of them.⁶⁷ One former student said they had clear memories of what happened in Wyatt’s classroom.⁶⁸

A number of victim-survivors also recalled Mr Ray sexually abusing children during classes and in front of other children.⁶⁹

The varied ways in which perpetrators groom children, families, institutions and communities is relevant to understanding if, how and when children disclose sexual abuse. The very nature of grooming establishes barriers to disclosure. Other barriers to disclosure are also discussed in the next section.

Barriers to disclosing child sexual abuse

Common barriers to disclosure

As noted earlier, ‘disclosure’ refers to when a victim-survivor conveys, or attempts to convey, their experience of sexual abuse. Disclosure is often an iterative process rather than a single event.⁷⁰ It can occur in different ways to different people, and can happen throughout a victim-survivor’s life course.⁷¹ It may be intentional, accidental, partial or complete.⁷² It may take many forms and might be verbal or non-verbal; for example, it can be conveyed through behavioural cues such as heightened anxiety.⁷³

Disclosure is important.⁷⁴ It may be the first step to stopping the child sexual abuse, preventing its perpetuation and ensuring access to support services.⁷⁵

Yet research suggests that a large number of victim-survivors do not disclose child sexual abuse until years after the abuse occurred.⁷⁶ For example, based on the experiences of the 6,875 victim-survivors that the Royal Commission engaged with through private sessions, it took an average of 23.9 years for victim-survivors to disclose child sexual abuse.⁷⁷ Men generally took longer than women to disclose — the average was 25.6 years for males and 20.6 years for females.⁷⁸

In the course of this inquiry, many victim-survivors said that they did not disclose their experience of child sexual abuse until many years after it occurred, and in some cases, decades. Professor O’Leary also gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that ‘many victim-survivors of child sexual abuse delay their disclosure well into adulthood’.⁷⁹ There are multiple reasons why a child may not disclose sexual abuse, including:

• feelings of guilt and shame
• the child’s inability to comprehend what child sexual abuse is and the gravity of the abuse
• threats by the perpetrator
• grooming, such as control and manipulation
• intimidation, such as corporal punishment⁸⁰
• loyalty to the perpetrator
• fear of not being listened to or believed.⁸¹

The response of the person to whom disclosure is made is often just as important as the disclosure itself. Negative responses to disclosure can cause children to withdraw their disclosures.⁸² Children can feel further guilt and shame, and their experience of sexual abuse can be minimised.⁸³ In addition, the disclosure itself can be traumatic.⁸⁴

Conversely, reasons why victim-survivors may disclose their experiences of child sexual abuse while they are still children include understanding what child sexual abuse is, and being directly asked if they have experienced sexual abuse.⁸⁵

This Chapter focuses on disclosure as it relates to victim-survivors who have engaged with the Board of Inquiry. It includes a discussion of barriers to disclosure in the 1960s and 1970s.

Barriers to disclosure in the 1960s and 1970s

As discussed in Chapter 6, Time and place(opens in a new window), there were a range of sociocultural factors in the 1960s and 1970s that shaped attitudes towards children and understandings of child sexual abuse. For example, there was a power imbalance between children and adults that worked against children speaking up and raising issues that affected them.⁸⁶ In a school context, teachers held positions of authority, and used forms of corporal punishment to discipline and control children.⁸⁷ These factors made it difficult for children to disclose sexual abuse.

The Board of Inquiry heard from victim-survivors about the power imbalance highlighted above and the associated fear of speaking up. One victim-survivor recalled that children were not allowed to speak until they were spoken to. He added that in his experience children had to do what they were told, or they would get a ‘flogging’.⁸⁸

Another victim-survivor shared that growing up, ‘[m]y parents were pretty much of that view, kids don’t have rights, [you should be] seen and not heard, do what you’re told’.⁸⁹

Similarly, another victim-survivor recalled that people had so much trust in teachers that they did not question anyone in authority.⁹⁰ This meant that, even if a child did disclose sexual abuse, they would not necessarily be believed if it was a child’s word against an adult’s.

Other sociocultural factors that worked as a barrier to disclosure in the 1960s and 1970s included limited understandings of child sexual abuse, and sex and sexuality not being openly discussed.⁹¹ At this time, there was a reluctance to have open conversations about child sexual abuse.⁹² These factors contributed to feelings of shame and a culture of remaining silent.

Professor Salter gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that another barrier to disclosure during this time was related to the prevalence of homophobia.⁹³ As discussed in Chapter 6(opens in a new window), homophobia prevented boys disclosing child sexual abuse because of the perception that they would be blamed or ‘under suspicion for homosexuality’.⁹⁴ Professor Daryl Higgins, Director, Institute of Child Protection Studies, Australian Catholic University, explained that homophobia made it ‘particularly difficult’ for children sexually abused by a person of the same gender to disclose, be believed, and receive appropriate support.⁹⁵

As Professor Bromfield indicated, in the 1960s and 1970s perpetrators were able to take advantage of the fact there was a low likelihood of a child disclosing, or being believed if they did disclose.⁹⁶

Experiences of barriers to disclosure

As discussed earlier in this Chapter, many victim-survivors do not disclose child sexual abuse until adulthood. Furthermore, research indicates that victim-survivors commonly repress memories, question whether the child sexual abuse happened, and feel uncertain about the accuracy of their memories.⁹⁷

Some victim-survivors told the Board of Inquiry that they had ‘buried’ or ‘suppressed’ their memories of the child sexual abuse, and that this only emerged in adulthood.⁹⁸ For example, one victim-survivor said that he had buried his experience so deeply, ‘it took my psychologist a heap of effort to get it out of me’. Once he had opened up, however, ‘it was like a bomb’.⁹⁹

For other victim-survivors, they had clear memories of experiencing child sexual abuse, but for a range of reasons they had not disclosed the abuse for a very long time.

As described below, the reasons for delaying disclosure vary, but they generally align with the literature on common barriers to disclosure. Many of these barriers to disclosure were significant, due to the social and cultural context of the 1960s and 1970s in Australia.

Internal barriers

One of the main reasons for victim-survivors not disclosing their experiences of child sexual abuse is related to internal barriers, such as feelings of shame, guilt and self-blame; that is, a perceived responsibility for the abuse.¹⁰⁰

A 2020 study conducted in the United States of America, involving 76 participants who had experienced child sexual abuse, found that the most common of these internal barriers to disclosure were feelings of shame, self-blame and fear of not being taking seriously.¹⁰¹

Similarly, a 2023 Irish study of 30 individuals who had experienced child sexual abuse found that a ‘prominent’ barrier to disclosure was self-blame.¹⁰² Some participants felt that their ‘inaction’ or ‘not fighting back’ led them to believe that the sexual abuse was their fault.¹⁰³

This research aligns with the experiences some victim-survivors shared with the Board of Inquiry.

For example, one victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry that after he was sexually abused, he did not tell anyone because he thought that he would be humiliated. The victim-survivor thought that people would wonder why he did not stop the sexual abuse.¹⁰⁴

Similarly, a victim-survivor recalled that his ‘overriding emotions’ after his sexual abuse were ‘shame and confusion’. The victim-survivor said he ‘locked [the memory]’ and ‘put [it] aside’.¹⁰⁵

A further victim-survivor recalled that he did not talk about the child sexual abuse he experienced for many years because of the ‘shame and embarrassment’ he felt.¹⁰⁶

Another victim-survivor recalled going ‘bright red’ after he was sexually abused and feeling like he was doing a ‘walk of shame’. While the victim-survivor disclosed the sexual abuse to his mother, he ‘convinced’ her not to make a complaint as he ‘did not want the attention’.¹⁰⁷

Dr Rob Gordon OAM, Clinical Psychologist and trauma expert, gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that sexual abuse can be perceived by a child as a violation of ‘basic hygiene and cleanliness’, which can make the child feel ‘disgusting’ and ‘dirty’ and contribute to poor self-esteem and self-loathing.¹⁰⁸ This can compound feelings of shame.

Lack of open discussion about sex and sexuality

Another common barrier to disclosing child sexual abuse in the 1960s and 1970s related to a culture of not talking openly about sex and sexuality.¹⁰⁹

Research indicates that a motivation to disclose child sexual abuse ‘is not enough’, and there must also be someone who a victim-survivor trusts will listen to them and believe them.¹¹⁰ A 2020 qualitative meta-analysis of studies from 1998 to 2018 found that key enablers of disclosure included access to a trusted person and an expectation that disclosures would be believed.¹¹¹

Several victim-survivors told the Board of Inquiry that child sexual abuse was not something that was discussed at that time.

One victim-survivor reflected that ‘[b]ack then you didn’t really talk about it, didn’t even talk about it with your parents’.¹¹²

Similarly, a victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry that sexual abuse was not talked about in the 1970s, and ‘[p]eople who did raise it weren’t listened to’.¹¹³

Another victim-survivor said that ‘[i]n those days you never spoke to your parents about these things’.¹¹⁴ He said this was especially the case in relation to the alleged perpetrator, because he was ‘in a trusted position as a school teacher’ and was a friend of the victim-survivor’s parents.¹¹⁵

One victim-survivor did recall telling his mother about being sexually abused, and told the Board of Inquiry that she did not take it seriously.¹¹⁶

Limited understandings of child sexual abuse

As explored in Chapter 6(opens in a new window), the widespread reluctance to talk openly about sex and sexuality in the 1960s and 1970s also contributed to society’s limited understandings of child sexual abuse.

Several victim-survivors told the Board of Inquiry that they had difficulty understanding, identifying and processing the child sexual abuse, which compromised their ability to disclose.

One victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry that they ‘were not educated’ on child sexual abuse, and explained ‘while I knew it was inappropriate, I was not aware of the importance of notifying parents [and] teachers’.¹¹⁷

Similarly, another victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry that he did not ‘have the skills to understand what was happening to [him], why, or what [he] should do about it’.¹¹⁸

Yet another victim-survivor shared that he felt anxious and afraid, and said that ‘[e]motionally I didn’t know how to cope’ with the child sexual abuse. At times, he would dissociate when the sexual abuse occurred.¹¹⁹

Other victim-survivors explained that they thought the alleged perpetrator’s conduct was highly unusual at the time, but they did not realise that it was sexual abuse.¹²⁰

There is evidence that even today, victim-survivors of child sexual abuse may not understand that the abuse was wrong at the time they experienced it.¹²¹ Research recognises that the realisation that child sexual abuse is ‘not normal’ is a factor that helps victim-survivors to disclose their experiences.¹²²

Threats and intimidation

The Royal Commission found that it was difficult for some children to disclose sexual abuse if they felt threatened by the perpetrator.¹²³ Similarly, an Irish study of 30 individuals who had experienced child sexual abuse found that a common barrier to disclosure was the fear that ‘things would get worse’.¹²⁴

Some victim-survivors who shared experiences of child sexual abuse with the Board of Inquiry explained that they were too afraid to disclose the sexual abuse as children because of the alleged perpetrator’s threatening and intimidating behaviour.

One victim-survivor recalled that after she complained about Mr MacGregor’s sexual abuse to an adult, Mr MacGregor approached her in the schoolyard and warned her about telling people about his behaviour.¹²⁵

Another victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry that Mr Steele took him and several other children to an abattoir, where they witnessed the slaughtering of animals. The victim-survivor perceived this as a warning that they must not disobey Mr Steele.¹²⁶

Yet another victim-survivor shared that when he tried to disclose child sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by Mr Steele, Mr Steele threatened him and said: ‘it’s only going to make it worse for you [and your family]’.¹²⁷

As discussed in Chapter 7(opens in a new window), some victim-survivors also recalled the use of corporal punishment to instill fear and discomfort in children. Several victim-survivors recalled Wyatt’s physical abuse and intimidating behaviour. One victim-survivor said that Wyatt would ‘inflict the strap on him’ before sending him out to the corridor, where he would sexually abuse him.¹²⁸ He shared how Wyatt would raise the strap above his head and then use ‘force’ to strap it down onto his palms.¹²⁹

Another individual told the Board of Inquiry that Wyatt appeared to enjoy the fear he instilled in children by threatening to use the strap.¹³⁰

One victim-survivor recalled that Wyatt would kick boys and physically abuse them in a violent manner.¹³¹

Another victim-survivor told the Board of Inquiry that Wyatt would threaten him and tell him he would be harmed if he told anyone about the sexual abuse.¹³² He also shared that Mr Ray would threaten him with physical harm if he spoke out.¹³³

Yet another victim-survivor recalled the excessive physical abuse that Mr Steele would inflict on him with a ruler. Mr Steele would strike him across the back and bottom with the ruler, and then proceed to sexually abuse him.¹³⁴

Responses to disclosures

As explored earlier in this Part, some children, parents and teachers tried to raise their experiences of, and concerns about, child sexual abuse at or around the relevant time.

The Board of Inquiry heard that parents raised concerns with teachers about the alleged perpetrators’ behaviour, and that teachers raised similar concerns with their colleagues and a principal.

Numerous adults reported Mr Ray’s child sexual abuse to the principal of Beaumaris Primary School, Mr Vern Hussey, in the mid-1970s. Available records reveal that the principal’s response diminished the seriousness of the allegations. Mothers of students were encouraged to ‘help out in the library’, where it was alleged Mr Ray’s child sexual abuse took place, and Mr Ray’s keys were confiscated to prevent him accessing the library on the weekends.¹³⁵ However, nothing else was done. There is very little evidence of whether or how the principal escalated the concerns that were raised with him. As discussed in Chapter 11(opens in a new window), a former assistant principal recalled that, on one occasion, a district inspector was called in to investigate a complaint by the parent of a student. The former assistant principal assumed no disciplinary action occurred and there is no record of an investigation.¹³⁶ The Board of Inquiry has received no primary evidence that Mr Ray was investigated in response to these complaints. He remained a teacher in Victorian government schools until 1979. Accordingly, although it appears the principal acknowledged that Mr Ray posed a risk to children, the ultimate response to the allegations against Mr Ray was completely inadequate.

In another incident, as discussed in Chapter 11(opens in a new window), several parents informed the Department that they had made complaints about Mr MacGregor’s behaviour to Victoria Police.¹³⁷ It appears that the responsibility of keeping the Department informed about Mr MacGregor’s criminal charges was shouldered by those parents. Due to the parentsʼ persistence, the Department finally took action and temporarily transferred Mr MacGregor to a non-teaching role.¹³⁸

Despite concerns being raised at the time about the conduct of alleged perpetrators, the Victorian education system failed to adequately respond. The Department’s complete absence of relevant policies and procedures in the 1960s to the 1990s, as well as a lack of staff training in respect of child sexual abuse, meant that there was no guidance in relation to how to identify and respond to allegations of child sexual abuse.¹³⁹ This meant that individuals were often unable to identify child sexual abuse, and even if they did, there was no clear process for them to report or otherwise deal with their suspicions.¹⁴⁰ The lack of policies and procedures also served to create the impression that child sexual abuse was not a serious matter in need of a robust response.

As a result, the education system itself did not adequately guard against the risks of child sexual abuse; nor did it adequately respond when the risks were brought to its attention.

The lack of appropriate responses to disclosures and complaints further stifled people’s willingness to disclose.

Introduction

The Board of Inquiry repeatedly heard from victim-survivors and secondary victims that the education system, and individuals within it, failed to protect children from sexual abuse in Victorian government schools from 1960 up to at least 1994. During the Board of Inquiry’s public hearings, the Department of Education (Department) itself frankly acknowledged its various failures.

In this report, ‘the education system’ includes the Department, officials in the Department, and members of the teaching service, such as teachers and principals.

Chapter 11, The alleged perpetrators(opens in a new window), provides a detailed summary of the experiences of child sexual abuse that victim-survivors shared with the Board of Inquiry. It also outlines what was known (and what was not known) within the education system at the time and how the system responded to disclosures and reports of child sexual abuse.

In relation to Darrell Ray and Wyatt, Chapter 11 shows that despite being aware of a number of concerns about the sexual nature of their conduct involving students, the education system took inadequate action to protect students from the risk of harm. In relation to David MacGregor, Chapter 11(opens in a new window) shows that parents needed to pressure the Department to take action in light of the criminal charges against him before the Department moved him from the classroom, and even then, despite having been convicted, the Department continued to employ him until he chose to retire. In relation to Graham Steele, the Board of Inquiry did not receive any information to indicate that Victoria Police conveyed to the Department the serious allegations of child sexual abuse made against him. There was no protocol in the Department to ensure that such allegations were conveyed from Victoria Police to the Department, and Mr Steele continued to teach until early 1990.

Chapter 11(opens in a new window) highlights the opportunities the education system missed to respond to concerns and complaints about the conduct of the alleged perpetrators: Mr Ray, Wyatt, Mr MacGregor and Mr Steele.

As discussed in Chapter 6, Time and place(opens in a new window), in the 1960s and 1970s sex and sexuality was not well understood and there was limited understanding of child sexual abuse. However, these contextual matters do not excuse the education system for failing to manage the risk of child sexual abuse in its schools. Schools were the place where parents and carers sent their children to be safe. Child safety should have always been the education system’s paramount priority. Yet the concept of child safety and welfare was not introduced into legislation concerning the education system until 1980.¹ Further, even though it was understood that child sexual abuse in schools could occur, Dr David Howes PSM, Deputy Secretary, Schools and Regional Service, Department of Education, provided evidence that between 1960 and 1984, the Education Act 1958 (Vic), the Teaching Service Act 1958 (Vic) (Teaching Service Act) and the Public Service Act 1958 (Vic) (Public Service Act) only referred to child safety in the context of children’s physical safety.²

This Chapter examines the adequacy of the education system’s response to historical child sexual abuse in government schools. In particular, it considers:

• the existence and effectiveness of the Department’s policies and procedures in preventing and responding to child sexual abuse in government schools between 1960 and 1999
• the Department’s culture at that time and how it enabled child sexual abuse to occur.

The Chapter sets out the Board of Inquiry’s findings about the education system, including the Department. It shows that there were repeated and systemic failures to respond to and prevent child sexual abuse.

A catastrophic failing

By today’s standards, it is hard to imagine any government institution, let alone a school, that would not have in place a full suite of child safety policies and procedures. Today, there are clear frameworks that require the education system to quickly respond to any form of child sexual abuse occurring in a government school (as explored in Chapter 14, Learning and improving(opens in a new window)).

While child sexual abuse may have been perceived differently between 1960 to 1999 (as Chapter 6(opens in a new window) explains), Victorian communities in the twentieth century still had strong expectations that children would be safe at school and that child sexual abuse would be responded to appropriately.

Professor Lisa Featherstone, Head of School, School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, University of Queensland, emphasised that communities at the time expected incidents of child sexual abuse to be dealt with harshly.³ Dr Katie Wright, Associate Professor, Department of Social Inquiry, La Trobe University, explained that criminal law has criminalised sexual assault of children since the early colonial period, demonstrating a clear awareness of the occurrence of child sexual abuse and the need to protect children from it.⁴ This expert evidence is consistent with the Department’s records from the relevant period, which provided many examples of parents who had raised strong concerns with the Department at the time about child sexual abuse occurring at their child’s school.

Over the decades, the understanding of the need to prevent and address child sexual abuse grew alongside other movements, including the feminist movement.⁵ By the 1980s, discussion about child sexual abuse was becoming more widespread in the Australian media and was increasingly recognised as a societal problem.⁶ From the 1980s, reforms were introduced in Australia around mandatory reporting.⁷

Despite this, the Board of Inquiry found that the Department’s response to child sexual abuse from the 1960s all the way up to the 1990s was not aligned with community expectations or social reforms.

During the Board of Inquiry’s public hearings, the Department did not shy away from its failings. Jenny Atta PSM, Secretary, Department of Education, described the Department’s past response to child sexual abuse disclosures as ‘woefully inadequate or inappropriate’.⁸ Ms Atta acknowledged that this ‘left the victims and those trying to protect them powerless, and enabled the abuse of children to continue and to spread’.⁹ Dr Howes acknowledged that it was ‘impossible to overstate how inadequate the response of the [Department]’ was to allegations of child sexual abuse.¹⁰

The Board of Inquiry has concluded that there was no single reason for this inadequacy. Instead, the Department’s response can be characterised by a series of repeated, systemic and self-reinforcing failures. As to these failures, the Board of Inquiry finds that:

1. between 1960 and 1994 there was an absence of policies or procedures concerning child sexual abuse, including how to respond to allegations¹¹
2. between 1960 and 1994 there was an absence of guidance to staff on how to manage, respond to and prevent child sexual abuse and support staff to identify and report suspected child sexual abuse¹²
3. between 1960 and 1994 there was a culture of prioritising the reputation of the education system, including schools and teachers, over the safety of children¹³
4. between 1960 and 1994 there was no training of staff to recognise, raise concerns and respond appropriately to perceived or disclosed child sexual abuse¹⁴
5. between 1960 and 1994 there were poor record-keeping and information-sharing practices regarding allegations of child sexual abuse and to reduce risks of reoffending¹⁵
6. there have been no systemic reviews led by the Department to understand the scope and scale of historical child sexual abuse in government schools from 1960 to today.

Although the Terms of Reference require the Board of Inquiry to examine the time period 1960 to 1999, the first five findings relate to the time period 1960 to 1994. This is because mandatory reporting for teachers in Victorian government schools was introduced in 1994 and was accompanied by the introduction of a range of processes relating to child sexual abuse developed by the Department.

These failings are discussed in detail throughout this Chapter.

The void where policy and procedures should have stood

As outlined in Chapter 10, The education system(opens in a new window), the evidence considered by the Board of Inquiry establishes that there were no policies or procedures in the Department between 1960 and 1994 concerning child sexual abuse, including how to respond to allegations.

This policy and procedure void existed despite the fact that there was a legislative and regulatory framework during this period that gave the education system power to discipline staff:

• under the Teaching Service Act, the Director-General could receive reports about ‘any member under his control who is guilty of a breach’ under the Act
• under the Teaching Service Regulations 1958 (Vic) (Teaching Service Regulations), which sat under the Teaching Service Act, teaching staff were not to engage in any business that would ‘impair his moral influence over his pupils’
• under the Public Service Act, the Director-General had responsibility for hearing an officer’s defence and determining the disciplinary approach for any officer who was ‘guilty of misconduct’.

Ms Atta gave evidence about the dearth of policies and procedures in the Department, stating that:

Similarly, Dr Howes gave evidence that there was repeated failure by the Department to mitigate risks against students, because of ‘the lack of documented and required policies and procedures to be followed’.¹⁷

As a result of this gap in policies and procedures, staff responded to allegations of child sexual abuse in an inconsistent and ad hoc way. This gap also meant there were no policies or procedures in place for the provision of support to victim-survivors and their families, when child sexual abuse was disclosed.

Absence of guidance and support for staff

In addition to an absence of policies and procedures, the evidence before the Board of Inquiry establishes that between 1960 and 1994, there was no guidance for staff on how to identify or report child sexual abuse, or what steps to take to investigate and respond to it.¹⁸

What little guidance existed at the time focused on the physical safety of children only or, alarmingly, existed solely for the purpose of protecting the wellbeing and employment of teachers.

This is evident in a 1958 memorandum the Department sent to head teachers, encouraging male teachers not to place their hands on female students. The memorandum stated:

Dr Howes accepted that this memorandum, and its subsequent versions, were focused on the reputation of male teachers.²⁰ He further stated that ‘the silences in this document are as telling to me as the words. There is no reference to the safety or the wellbeing of girl students, more broadly’.²¹

The evidence demonstrated that instead of clear policies and procedures, there was a devolved structure that gave principals, district inspectors and senior officials a large degree of autonomy in how they responded to allegations of child sexual abuse.²²

This lack of guidance is relevant in understanding how the education system failed to adequately respond to numerous complaints about Mr Ray’s behaviour.

The Board of Inquiry heard that between the early and mid-1970s, numerous complaints or reports of child sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by Mr Ray at Beaumaris Primary School were made by parents, students and teachers, to senior teachers and the principal, and were also referred to a district inspector.²³

Yet little was done to address Mr Ray’s behaviour, despite the seriousness of the concerns being raised. The principal did put in place some basic measures that appear to have been aimed at reducing Mr Ray’s opportunity to offend, including asking mothers to volunteer in the library (where Mr Ray worked) and removing Mr Ray’s library keys after hours.²⁴

Records indicate that the principal and district inspector intended to investigate the complaints, but there is no evidence to indicate that this occurred in a meaningful way. Commenting on these actions, Dr Howes acknowledged that there were no records available that outlined what form an investigation took, assuming it happened at all.²⁵ Dr Howes also stated that the Department had no evidence that ‘allegations were investigated in anything that would resemble a serious way’.²⁶

Mr Ray continued to teach at Beaumaris Primary School until 1976, before moving to Mount View Primary School. He was moved to Mount View Primary School notwithstanding mounting concerns about his behaviour at Beaumaris Primary School. Subsequently, he was convicted in relation to sexual offending that he perpetrated against a student between 1978 and 1979, while he worked as a teacher librarian at Mount View Primary.

During the Board of Inquiry’s hearings, it was put to Dr Howes that Mr Ray’s continued employment in the face of numerous complaints about his behaviour, about which a principal and district inspector were aware, was ‘an egregious failure of the system’.²⁷ Dr Howes agreed and gave evidence that there was a:

Dr Howes also noted that:

The Board of Inquiry received evidence indicating that the environment in the education system at the time was not supportive of people bringing complaints forward. For example, a parent was informed by the Department that they would need to put their complaint in writing, but their lawyer advised them that they may be charged with libel if they did.³⁰ In response, the parent removed their child from the school rather than pursue the complaint.³¹ The Department offered no support to the parent to pursue their complaint.

Research indicates the culture within a school setting can either encourage or deter reporting child sexual abuse.³² Staff can experience barriers to reporting, especially from administrators (such as principals or officials of the Department). An example of these barriers, based on research, is administrators failing to make official reports when information was disclosed to them, or dismissing a report outright.³³ According to this research, staff who experienced or witnessed these barriers felt reluctant to make future reports, either out of fear of having their motives questioned or because they felt like nothing would be done to act on the report.³⁴

The Board of Inquiry was also told that across the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, a common response to a disclosure of child sexual abuse was to remove the child from immediate danger rather than to report the sexual abuse to the criminal justice system.³⁵ Another response was to tell children to stay away from specific teachers, often meaning that the burden was placed on children to avoid sexual abuse.³⁶

The lack of guidance and support given to teachers about responding to child sexual abuse meant the safety of children was put at risk.

The reputation of the education system was prioritised over children’s safety

While the Board of Inquiry has found there was a dearth of policies, procedures and guidance concerning child sexual abuse between 1960 and 1994, perhaps even more concerningly, it also found that there was a culture of prioritising the education system, including the reputation of schools and teachers, above the safety of children.

The Department gave evidence that in most instances of child sexual abuse known to the Board of Inquiry, it prioritised the reputation and interests of the alleged perpetrators over the safety of children.³⁷

The primary example of this culture was the Department’s use of transfers to move alleged perpetrators between schools or into a non-teaching position as a way of ‘managing’ complaints made (or concerns raised) about their conduct.

This practice was known to have occurred as early as 1882. The 1882 Royal Commission into the Administration, Organisation, and General Condition of the Existing System of Public Instruction (1882 Royal Commission) raised concerns about district inspectors who had received reports of teachers engaging in ‘immoral conduct’ with students, and who recommended the teacher be moved to another school or different duties rather than be dismissed altogether.³⁸

When questioned by the 1882 Royal Commission, previous officials in the Department responded that it was important to consider the issue of the immoral conduct from the teacher’s perspective, to reduce the risk of reputational damage for what was seen as a ‘comparatively small offence’.³⁹

The Board of Inquiry found that the use of transfers to manage incidents of child sexual abuse continued to occur all the way up to the mid-1980s, with apparently similar cultural views to those prevalent in 1882 underpinning the practice.

A striking example of this practice is found in the way the Department handled reports of pending child sexual abuse charges against Mr MacGregor in 1985, when he was employed at Kunyung Primary School.

When impending charges against Mr MacGregor were first brought to the Department’s attention on 27 February 1985,⁴⁰ by parents who had complained to the police, the Department did not remove Mr MacGregor from the classroom. Instead, officials’ immediately invited Mr MacGregor to ʻexplore his wishes regarding school placement’ and a possible transfer to a non-teaching position.⁴¹ After Mr MacGregor objected to being moved from the school, the Department did not pursue the matter.⁴²

Further, the Department resolved to reconsider the matter only under certain circumstances. A letter from the then Assistant Regional Director of Education for the Westernport Region to the then Director of the Personnel Industrial Relations Branch of the Department emphasised that Mr MacGregor’s position as a teacher may need to be revisited if tensions escalated with the community.⁴³ The letter stated that ‘further regional action should only take place if and when a formal complaint, specifying names and allegations, is submitted’.⁴⁴ In the meantime, Mr MacGregor was allowed to continue teaching students.

The Department made this decision despite having access to legislative and regulatory mechanisms that would enable it to suspend a teacher while investigations were underway, to ensure children’s safety, and to dismiss a teacher if allegations of child sexual abuse were proven.⁴⁵

On 24 May 1985, the Department received further correspondence from a parent who had complained to the police, stating that Mr MacGregor had been charged.⁴⁶ At this time, it chose to transfer him to a non-teaching position and not remove him from the teaching service.⁴⁷ The date of transfer was effective one day before the Department responded to the parent, indicating the likelihood that the Department only made this decision as a result of the parent’s letter.⁴⁸

Dr Howes noted that the Department did not undertake investigations into Mr MacGregor until he was sentenced by the court.⁴⁹ Only after this did the Department undertake its own investigation and charge him before the Teachers Tribunal.⁵⁰

The Teachers Tribunal banned Mr MacGregor from teaching until 1988 (a suspension of just over two years) and appointed him to a regional office as a penalty.⁵¹ Mr MacGregor could apply for a teaching position once the ban had run its course.⁵²

During the Board of Inquiry’s public hearings, when asked about the Department’s decision-making in relation to Mr MacGregor at that time, Dr Howes stated:

Dr Howes also speculated that there were two reasons transfers were used in the relevant period, either formally, as a disciplinary mechanism, or informally, as an incident management strategy. First, the Department was ‘privileging the reputation and the ongoing employment of a member of staff’.⁵⁴ Second, child sexual abuse did not appear to be seen as a sufficient reason or a strong enough offence to warrant termination by the Department.⁵⁵

Ms Atta also acknowledged in her evidence that although the Department had mechanisms in place at the time of Mr MacGregor’s known offending to remove teachers who had committed child sexual abuse, they were ‘rarely, if ever, used’, and that ‘[t]eachers were able to remain in their role or transfer to other schools and continue to abuse’.⁵⁶

Ms Atta noted that the Department’s response at the time was in disconnect with community expectations and that it was actively trying to sustain the employment of an alleged perpetrator.⁵⁷ Ms Atta said that it is difficult to understand how the Department ‘whose sole purpose is the care, supervision and education of children, could be impervious’ to community expectations.⁵⁸

This behaviour and culture reflects broader findings from experts and the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (Royal Commission) about how institutions tend to respond to allegations of child sexual abuse. Dr Wright gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that institutions, including schools, traditionally responded to child sexual abuse in a ‘self-protective’ way that prioritised the institution over victim-survivors.⁵⁹

The Royal Commission also reported that schools were governed by cultures where people were not held accountable for child sexual abuse.⁶⁰ Instead, there was a tendency to prioritise the reputational and financial interests of schools and the system over the safety of a child.⁶¹

Professor Michael Salter, Professor of Criminology, School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that all children in institutional settings were ‘largely abandoned by the State when it came to detecting and prosecuting child sexual abuse’.⁶² Other evidence given by Dr Salter echoed the Royal Commission’s observations. He explained that formal and informal structures led to allegations being dismissed and the ‘reputation of the institution being prioritised over the wellbeing of the child’.⁶³ He said that these structures included having practices in place that actively ensured indications of child sexual abuse were not acted upon, due to the risk that any indications of child sexual abuse occurring at schools would bring individual offenders and schools into disrepute.⁶⁴

The Department’s culture was institution-centred rather than children-centred. As a result, not only was there no clear requirement for people within the education system with relevant authority to adequately respond to allegations of child sexual abuse or put in place appropriate measures to guard against the risk of child sexual abuse, but those people were also not motivated to take these measures. As Dr Howes acknowledged in his evidence:

Lack of staff training

The Board of Inquiry also found that between 1960 and 1994, there was no form of teacher training or instruction on how to raise concerns about concerning behaviour or alleged child sexual abuse.

Dr Howes agreed that, despite the requirement in the Teaching Service Regulations to report misconduct, there was no guidance or avenue for a teacher to report suspicions of child sexual abuse at that time.⁶⁶ Dr Howes told the Board of Inquiry that no training existed to help teachers to understand their reporting obligations,⁶⁷ including how to identify warning signs and what to do with that information.⁶⁸

As outlined in Chapter 11(opens in a new window), the Board of Inquiry heard on several occasions that some teachers and senior staff at Beaumaris Primary School and other relevant schools were, at the very least, suspicious of ‘out of the ordinary’ behaviour by alleged perpetrators. It is also clear that some employees had very strong concerns that child sexual abuse was occurring, but did not always have the knowledge or training to act on their concerns.

For example, a former assistant principal at Beaumaris Primary School recalled that a mother of a student made a complaint to him about Mr Ray putting his hands down her son’s pants in 1975.⁶⁹ The assistant principal escorted the mother to the principal to report the incident, but did not attend the meeting or follow up any further.⁷⁰ Instead, they assumed no disciplinary action occurred.⁷¹

The Board of Inquiry received other information about parents who raised concerns with teachers about the conduct of alleged perpetrators, and from teachers who had their own concerns about alleged perpetrator conduct. However, as Dr Howes accepted in his evidence, there was no training to help teachers to correctly identify this type of conduct as child sexual abuse or to understand its seriousness, let alone know what to do with their concerns.⁷²

Ms Atta gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that it was ‘very hard to explain why there was no training at the time’.⁷³ Ms Atta noted that guidance about responding to child sexual abuse was only introduced for principals, and then for teachers, in the early 2000s, and that it was ‘possibly’ reinforced by some training.⁷⁴ Ms Atta explained that major changes to improve training were introduced in 2016 following significant reforms driven by the Royal Commission and the Parliamentary Inquiry into the Handling of Child Abuse by Religious and Other Non-Government Organisations.⁷⁵

District inspectors apparently also received no training to appropriately respond to alleged child sexual abuse, despite it being a part of their role. A 1961 report by the Australian Council for Educational Research found that district inspectors received no special training when appointed.⁷⁶ Instead, they learned the functions and principles of their jobs from their previous teaching experience, a brief induction under an existing inspector, and a brief period in the head office.⁷⁷

Where training and procedures do not exist, staff can often struggle to know what to do in response to concerning behaviour, or can become indoctrinated into existing cultural practices such as those discussed in this Chapter. Staff may also form the view that the lack of training and procedures is a signal that prevention of child sexual abuse is not a matter of priority within the education system.

The Board of Inquiry considers that the Department’s failure to equip staff with basic training or instruction in relation to child sexual abuse resulted in a number of missed opportunities to respond to and address child sexual abuse when it was suspected or disclosed, and to manage the risk of further child sexual abuse occurring.

Poor record-keeping and information-sharing practices

Record-keeping

The Board of Inquiry found that between 1960 and 1994, there were no policies, procedures or guidance regarding record-keeping directly related to child sexual abuse.

Dr Howes gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that the Department was unable to find any information about historical record-keeping policies regarding allegations of child sexual abuse.⁷⁸

The Department did not put in place any policies, procedures or guidance requiring principals, district inspectors or senior staff to record disclosures of child sexual abuse, by children or adults, or actions taken in response to a disclosure.

While some record-keeping practices were apparent — for example, the disciplinary processes recorded in relation to Mr Ray and Mr MacGregor — the Board of Inquiry found that this was not a consistent or comprehensive practice.⁷⁹ Even within the records, detailed steps of the investigation and the findings were not recorded.

Despite the number of alleged disclosures and reports made, there were no departmental records found from the time of those disclosures detailing what had been disclosed or reported, let alone what had been done in response.

For example, the Department provided evidence that a district inspector was called in to investigate complaints about Mr Ray in 1975.⁸⁰ Dr Howes gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that ‘there is no record of a written investigation’ in regard to this matter.⁸¹

Dr Howes did give evidence that the Department had put in place a policy for schools to record incidents of physical safety. However, he also recognised that this policy seemed to have been put in place as a means to respond to civil litigation claims, rather than in the interests of student wellbeing and safety.⁸²

Even where an investigation was undertaken or a decision was made in response to allegations, the outcome was often not communicated to parents, the victim-survivor or others.⁸³

Further, the Board of Inquiry received information that showed that the Department did not always record the reasons for teacher transfers (described earlier in this Chapter). A former district inspector provided anecdotal information to the Department that there was a process of adjusting classroom numbers to create the impression that there was an excess of teachers at a school.⁸⁴ This apparent excess was then used as the mechanism to transfer teachers who had committed child sexual abuse without there being a record for why the transfer occurred.⁸⁵ In his evidence, Dr Howes accepted that this practice meant that schools receiving these teachers were unlikely to know about the teachers’ conduct and the associated risks or issues.⁸⁶

Reasons for transfers, even when it was used as a formal disciplinary mechanism, were not always recorded or shared. For example, in the case of Mr MacGregor, the Board of Inquiry understands that the Kunyung Primary School Council determined not to disclose the reasons for Mr MacGregor’s transfer because of ‘legal implications’, and instead to refer to it as an ‘administrative transfer’.⁸⁷

This practice made it difficult for other schools, organisations and individuals to manage risks. It was up to parents, teachers and other organisations to identify and manage risks informally.

For example, the Board of Inquiry received information that Mr MacGregor applied for and was successful in obtaining a teaching position at Langwarrin Park Primary School shortly after his suspension finished in late 1988. He was only prevented from commencing that role when the principal of Langwarrin Park Primary School wrote to the Department to object to the appointment on the basis of Mr MacGregor’s publicly known conviction.⁸⁸

The employment records of other alleged perpetrators also contained worryingly little information about key events or relevant facts. Following his resignation in the wake of an investigation, Mr Ray’s employment record was updated to include a note that he was ‘not to be re-employed without reference to the Director of Primary Education’.⁸⁹ However, there was no reference to his criminal convictions. The Board of Inquiry also received evidence that in the Department’s Resource Register Placemat Wyatt’s employment file only stated, ‘not to be re-employed or given [casual relief teaching] approval, without reference’.⁹⁰

Information-sharing

Based on the information the Department provided to the Board of Inquiry, it does not appear there were any departmental policies, procedures or protocols between 1960 and 1994 for the Department and Victoria Police to share information concerning allegations of child sexual abuse.

However, as discussed in Chapter 11(opens in a new window), based on a 1957 Police Standing Order and police manuals in the late 1990s, that there was an obligation on Victoria Police to share crime reports with the Department regarding information that a student had been sexually abused while in the care of a government school.⁹¹

It appears that Victoria Police did share crime reports with the Department in regard to Mr Ray. However, based on the information available to the Board of Inquiry, it is not clear whether crime reports were consistently shared. This may be partly related to the record-keeping practices of Victoria Police, whereby all files were paper-based prior to 1990. As a result, it is difficult today to comprehensively identify all the instances where information was shared with the Department.

Even if there were reports made to Victoria Police that should have been shared with the Department but were not, it is not clear that it would have produced a different outcome in any given case. In 1990, an official of the Department stated that ‘[t]he continued employment of teachers found guilty of indictable offences is assessed individually and a decision regarding future employment is made accordingly in each case’.⁹²

In this regard, Dr Howes gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that ‘there were no standard procedures for saying if someone is guilty of an indictable offence, here is what’s going happen’.⁹³

In the case of Mr MacGregor, despite the Department being aware of allegations of child sexual abuse against him and his subsequent convictions, the Department did not seek to have his registration revoked by the relevant registration body and he remained working in the Department, albeit in an administrative position.

Dr Howes accepted in his evidence that the lack of record-keeping and information-sharing in relation to child sexual abuse incidents reflected the culture in the education system at the time of ‘sweeping these issues under the rug’.⁹⁴ It also created an environment where the ‘problem’ was simply ‘moved on’ without being properly addressed. Clearly, this put children at risk.

No systemic reviews

Finally, and putting aside work the Department did in response to the commencement of this Board of Inquiry, the evidence before the Board of Inquiry establishes that the Department has never adequately investigated historical child sexual abuse in government schools in relation to the allegations about teachers at Beaumaris Primary School and other schools within scope of this inquiry. There have been no systemic reviews to understand the scope and scale of what occurred, as discussed below.

At the time: no investigations undertaken

Investigations at or around the time of the child sexual abuse by the alleged perpetrators were inadequate. An adequate investigation would have sought to establish whether other allegations of child sexual abuse or concerns about the alleged perpetrators’ behaviour were raised while they were teaching at government schools; and what steps, if any, were taken in response to any other allegations. The investigations would have relied not only on records, but would have involved interviewing relevant individuals, such as teachers and principals who worked with the alleged perpetrators, and parents and students who had raised concerns. There are various reasons why such investigations were important to undertake. Undertaking them may have affected decisions made about a teacher’s future employment; parents who had concerns about their children may have been contacted so they could take steps to support their children; and matters may have been drawn to the attention of the police. This list is not exhaustive.

As no adequate investigations were undertaken, the full picture of child sexual abuse could not be understood. For the sake of students and parents who raised concerns, and other children who may have been at risk, the Department should have taken all steps available to it to understand the behaviours of teachers it employed in government primary schools, once it became aware of concerns or allegations of child sexual abuse by a teacher.

In relation to Mr Ray, in November 1978 the Department became aware that Mr Ray had been charged with sexual offences against children.⁹⁵ The Department was also told he had admitted to ‘many’ offences.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, and despite the fact he had been teaching for years in government schools, no adequate investigation into his behaviour was undertaken. If such an investigation had been made in late 1978 or early 1979, it likely would have become clear to the Department that other allegations and concerns had been raised. It may have made a difference to decisions about whether Mr Ray should ever be re-employed as a teacher in a government school or in a position that enabled access to children, or whether the Department should seek for Mr Ray’s registration as a teacher to be revoked.

In relation to Mr MacGregor, in February 1985, a parent raised serious concerns with the Department in writing about Mr MacGregor’s conduct while he was still working at a primary school.⁹⁷ The Department’s own records show that by March 1985, it was aware of impending criminal charges against Mr MacGregor.⁹⁸ By May 1985, the same parent wrote to the Department advising that Mr MacGregor had been charged with sexual offences against children.⁹⁹

At the very least, once it was known that Mr MacGregor had been criminally charged, the Department should have conducted an adequate investigation into his behaviour. The need for such an investigation is highlighted by the length of time he had been teaching in Victorian government schools (more than 22 years). It may have been that an investigation in 1985 in relation to Mr MacGregor would not have revealed much more to the Department at that time. However, that is not the point. Without doing that work, the Department was not in a position to know whether its decision-making in relation to Mr MacGregor was sound. The Department did not seek to have his registration revoked by the relevant registration body, and only suspended him from teaching for three years, after he was convicted of child sexual abuse.

The same failure applies in relation to Wyatt. He was convicted of child sex offences in the mid-1990s.¹⁰⁰ Although it is unclear precisely when the Department came to know of this information, the Department knew enough by March 1997 to record that he should not be re-employed without reference.¹⁰¹ Yet there was no adequate investigation undertaken into whether, in his years of service as a government school teacher, other allegations had been made or concerns raised about his behaviour. As with Mr Ray and Mr MacGregor, if the Department had engaged in an investigation at the time allegations were first known, it is likely it would have identified the kind of information it later identified in 2000 and 2001, as discussed below.

In the 2000s: not joining the dots through a systemic review

Decades later, and with substantial information available, the Department appeared to have made no attempt to examine linkages between apparently connected incidents, particularly at Beaumaris Primary School.

Between 1978 to 1997, the Department was aware of criminal charges and convictions in relation Mr Ray, Wyatt and Mr MacGregor regarding sexual offences they perpetrated against children while they were teaching at government schools.

In the 2000 and 2001, in the context of civil litigation, the Department received additional information and undertook its own work in relation to allegations concerning Mr Ray and Wyatt. By this stage, the Department had a substantial body of material raising serious concerns about the conduct of Mr Ray, Wyatt and Mr MacGregor. The Department also knew that they had all been employed at Beaumaris Primary School for two years, 1971 and 1972; although for one of those years Mr MacGregor had taken leave.¹⁰²

Between 2000 and 2001, at least 14 former Department staff, parents and students, and other family members were interviewed by representatives of the Department. As a result of these interviews, the Department received information about at least 13 allegations or concerns of improper conduct in relation to Mr Ray, Wyatt and Mr Steele while at Beaumaris Primary School (noting that it was also said that some of these allegations or concerns were raised with the Department before 2000 and 2001).

Yet there was no broader review undertaken at that time (or at any time prior to the work done by the Department in response to the Board of Inquiry’s establishment) to understand what had occurred at the school. The evidence Ms Atta gave during the Board of Inquiry’s public hearings indicated that the Department had only conducted investigations of the alleged child sexual abuse on a claim-by-claim basis and had not conducted any review to understand the breadth and extent of the problem.¹⁰³

In relation to the schools within the scope of this Board of Inquiry, the Department failed to proactively examine allegations of child sexual abuse in a systemic way, prior to the work it did upon the establishment of this inquiry. This is despite the Department knowing that there were particular schools where multiple allegations of child sexual abuse had been made; having a substantial amount of concerning information about three of the alleged perpetrators, as well as information about the fourth; and knowing that they all taught at Beaumaris Primary School at the same time. In the Board of Inquiry’s view, this inaction in the early 2000s indicates a lack of reflection and commitment on the Department’s behalf to proactively acknowledge, and learn from, past failures.

Current day: a lack of systemic review and acknowledgement

The Department has undertaken a range of work in response to this Board of Inquiry. This work includes what the Department knew of allegations or complaints at the relevant time, and what action was taken in response, in relation to the relevant employees and the schools where they taught. Yet the Department has not undertaken a systemic review on a statewide basis.

As a result, not all victim-survivors of sexual abuse at government schools have access to the same kind of information. They do not all know how extensive child sexual abuse was at their school, and whether they were alone in their experience. Victim-survivors within the scope of this inquiry have had the benefit of understanding, for example, whether other reports of child sexual abuse were made at their school, whether parents or others complained, and what the Department did, or did not do, at the time. In contrast, victim-survivors outside the scope of this inquiry do not have the benefit of such a body of work, unless they are provided with such information as part of a civil claim. Information of this kind is often essential to a victim-survivor in their journey of recovery.

The Board of Inquiry considers this further in Chapter 18, Looking to the future(opens in a new window).

Results of the Department’s inaction

The Department’s failure to adequately investigate allegations of child sexual abuse more fully at or around the time of the sexual abuse and to engage in a wider investigation of certain individuals undoubtedly put children at risk.

This is demonstrated by the lack of action taken in the early 1970s in relation to Wyatt and in the early to mid-1970s in relation to Mr Ray. In the case of Mr Ray, there is no doubt that children were sexually abused after the Department was aware of alleged child sexual abuse. For example, after numerous adults made complaints to the principal and district inspector about Mr Ray’s behaviour at Beaumaris Primary School, he moved to Mount View Primary School, where he was later convicted of sexual offences against a student at the school.¹⁰⁴

This failure has also meant that many victim-survivors have remained silent and unsupported, unaware that their experiences of child sexual abuse may have been shared by others — and that they are all entitled to and deserve support and healing.

The Department’s inaction has also meant it remains largely unaccountable for not adequately identifying and responding to a serious issue that permeated certain government schools between 1960 and 1999. Without a statewide review, the scale of child sexual abuse throughout the government school system during this period is currently unknown.

A wholly inadequate response

The Board of Inquiry concludes that the Department’s response to allegations of child sexual abuse between 1960 and 1999, and specifically between 1960 and 1994, constituted a gross systemic failure.

As discussed, these relate to six findings regarding an absence of policies and procedures; an absence of guidance to staff; a culture of prioritising the education system over the safety of children; inadequate staff training; poor record-keeping and information-sharing practices; and a failure to undertake systemic reviews.

These findings relate to the whole education system and are illustrated in various examples, outlined in this Chapter, involving the four alleged perpetrators discussed in Chapter 11(opens in a new window).

The Board of Inquiry agrees with Ms Atta’s evidence that ‘the failings of the system were many’.¹⁰⁵ The absence of policies or processes to prevent child sexual abuse or provide guidance on how to respond to allegations was stark.¹⁰⁶ There was no training for teachers or staff to be able to identify warning signs of sexual abuse.¹⁰⁷

Dr Salter provided sobering evidence to the Board of Inquiry that:

The Board of Inquiry agrees to the extent that the Department failed both in what it did, and what it failed to do. A culture of sweeping child sexual abuse under the rug, in favour of teacher reputation and employment, significantly contributed to the risk of ongoing child sexual abuse.

Because of a dearth of policies and guidance related to child sexual abuse, the Department missed opportunities to properly respond to concerns about possible child sexual abuse and, in so doing, failed to put in place measures to guard against the risk of child sexual abuse.

In regard to its actions, the Department used transfers to enable alleged perpetrators to maintain their employment by moving them to other schools or positions.¹⁰⁹ There were mechanisms that could have been used to remove alleged perpetrators from their teaching positions but they were rarely, if ever, used.¹¹⁰

The Board of Inquiry heard from many victim-survivors who recalled that they were sexually abused as children by the four alleged perpetrators discussed in Chapter 11(opens in a new window). Many have been profoundly affected by this child sexual abuse across many aspects of their life courses. Chapter 8, Enduring impacts of child sexual abuse(opens in a new window), discusses these impacts.

The Department’s apology

On 17 November 2023, during the Board of Inquiry’s hearings, Ms Atta issued a formal apology on behalf of the Department to the victim-survivors within the Board of Inquiry’s scope.

In her apology, Ms Atta acknowledged the Department’s failings and the impacts that these failings had on victim-survivors, their families and friends, and communities.

A copy of the Department’s apology is provided in Appendix J(opens in a new window).

Introduction

As explored in Chapter 13, System failings(opens in a new window), the Terms of Reference required the Board of Inquiry to examine the response of the Department of Education (Department) to the historical child sexual abuse that was the subject of the Board of Inquiry’s work. As discussed in that Chapter, the Board of Inquiry has found that there were significant failings in the Department’s response.

One of the objectives of the Board of Inquiry, as set out in the Terms of Reference, was to ‘[r]eiterate the State’s commitment that such abuse must not happen again’.¹ Consistently with this objective, the Board of Inquiry has examined the changes over time in legislation, policies and procedures to prevent and respond to child sexual abuse in government schools, and has also examined the system currently in place. The Terms of Reference did not, however, extend to requiring the Board of Inquiry to examine the effectiveness of those changes, or of the system currently in place.

This Chapter provides an overview of the major changes in child safety legislation, policies and procedures over time, and how the current system addresses many of the system failings described in Chapter 13(opens in a new window).

Major changes across the years

As outlined in Chapter 13(opens in a new window), the Board of Inquiry has found that the Victorian education system did not have policies or procedures in place concerning child sexual abuse in government schools between 1960 and 1994.

From 1994 onwards, successive governments introduced new legislation, policies and procedures to better respond to allegations of child sexual abuse. From the mid-2010s, further reforms were introduced in response to landmark inquiries, including the 2013 Victorian Parliamentary Inquiry into the Handling of Child Abuse by Religious and Other Non-Government Organisations and the 2017 Royal Commission into Institutional Reponses to Child Sexual Abuse (Royal Commission).

Changes between 1994 and 2017

A number of legislative amendments and policies were introduced between 1994 and 2017 that provided guidance to employees of the Department on how to respond to child sexual abuse and manage teacher misconduct. This section provides a brief overview of the key changes during this period.

In 1993, the Children and Young Persons Act 1989 (Vic) (Children and Young Persons Act) was amended to include mandatory reporting for specified professionals.² The mandatory reporting obligation came into effect for some professionals in November 1993, with principals and teachers becoming mandatory reporters in July 1994.³

This mandatory reporting obligation required principals and teachers to report if a child ‘has suffered, or is likely to suffer, significant harm as a result of sexual abuse and the child’s parents have not protected [the child]’.⁴

The introduction of mandatory reporting legislation prompted the development of guidance for principals and teachers regarding their obligations to report child sexual abuse. This guidance initially included allegations of child abuse perpetrated by a family member and over time extended to include allegations of child abuse perpetrated outside of the family.

In 1994, Child Abuse and Neglect: The Teacher’s Response was published, outlining the mandatory reporting obligations of teachers under the Children and Young Persons Act in relation to familial abuse.⁵ These obligations included reporting to the then Department of Health and Community Services any physical injury to a child resulting from abuse, sexual abuse or neglect.⁶ The Board of Inquiry understands these guidelines did not include reporting obligations related to child abuse perpetrated outside of the family.⁷

In 1998, the Department published Managing Unsatisfactory Performance: A Guide for Principals.⁸ This document stated that ‘serious misconduct’ by a teacher should be dealt with under the Teaching Service Act 1981 (Vic) (Teaching Service Act).⁹ It was the first document to outline the steps that principals should take to respond to allegations of child sexual abuse by a teacher, including reporting to the Department’s then Complaints and Investigations Unit.¹⁰

In 2001, the Australian Industrial Relations Commission certified the Victorian Government Schools Agreement 2001, which was binding on all people employed in government schools in Victoria.¹¹ Consistent with this agreement, the Department published the Victorian Government Schools Teacher Class Handbook, which provided guidance on ‘[c]omplaints, unsatisfactory performance and serious misconduct’.¹² The Department also reviewed and updated the Protecting Children protocols (guidance to support staff to report child sexual abuse and refer information to Victoria Police) and extended them to include all Victorian schools.¹³

In 2005, the Department published Guidelines for Managing Complaints, Unsatisfactory Performance and Serious Misconduct in Relation to Teachers, following amendments to the Teaching Service Act.¹⁴ These guidelines were the first to set out the right of the Secretary of the Department to remove a teacher from teaching duties if a serious allegation had been raised — before an investigation was completed.¹⁵

In 2007, the Children and Young Persons Act was repealed and replaced with the Children Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic). The new Act established a framework for ‘promoting the wellbeing’ of children and young people.¹⁶

In 2007, the Department published Responding to Allegations of Student Sexual Assault: Procedures for Victorian Government Schools.¹⁷ This document stated that any allegation that a teacher or school employee had committed a sexual assault must be reported to Victoria Police and the Department’s Conduct and Ethics Branch.¹⁸ The document also set out procedures for principals to follow in responding to child sexual abuse, including immediate response, support for students, preservation of evidence, and reporting both within the Department and to Victoria Police.¹⁹

In 2010, the Department and the then Department of Human Services Child Protection co-published the Protecting the Safety and Wellbeing of Children and Young People protocol, which replaced the 2001 protocols.²⁰ The purpose of the new protocol was to define the respective roles of the child protection service (a statutory service provided by the then Department of Human Services Child Protection), the then Department of Education and Early Childhood Development, licensed children’s services and Victorian schools ‘in working together to protect children and young people from abuse and neglect’.²¹

This protocol also updated mandatory reporting procedures and outlined the responsibilities of school staff in responding to abuse and neglect, including child sexual abuse.²² It stated that if there was an allegation of abuse perpetrated by a staff member at a school, the matter must be immediately reported to Victoria Police.²³ Similarly, if the then Department of Human Services Child Protection received information alleging that a teacher abused a child or a young person, this information should be referred to Victoria Police.²⁴

In 2013, the Victorian Parliamentary Inquiry into the Handling of Child Abuse by Religious and Other Non-Government Organisations delivered its Betrayal of Trust report.²⁵ This report recommended landmark changes to how organisations should report and respond to child sexual abuse.

The Department gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that significant reforms occurred following the Betrayal of Trust report that affected its policies with regard to responding to allegations, complaints, notifications and reports of child sexual abuse.²⁶ These reforms included the implementation in 2016 of the first iteration of Child Safe Standards in Victorian government schools.²⁷

In 2017, the Royal Commission delivered its final report inquiring into institutional responses to child sexual abuse across Australia.²⁸ More than 8,000 victim-survivors engaged with the Royal Commission through private sessions.²⁹ The Royal Commission made systemic recommendations to improve the safety of children in institutions, including defining 10 National Child Safe Standards.³⁰ The existing Victorian Child Safe Standards were updated to reflect these national standards.³¹

Departmental areas with responsibility for responding to child sexual abuse

Under the current framework for child safety, the Department has a range of policies and procedures in place to prevent, investigate and respond to allegations and incidents of child sexual abuse in government schools.

To aid understanding of how these policies and procedures work in practice, an overview of the areas within the Department that have responsibility for preventing and responding to child sexual abuse in government schools is given in Table 4. Unlike the situation between 1960 and 1999, the Department now has formalised lines of accountability and responsibility for responding to child sexual abuse in government schools.

Table 4 Department: Areas with responsibility for responding to child sexual abuse (as at November 2023)

Current policies, procedures and practices in response to inquiries

Current policies and procedures that resulted from the Victorian Parliamentary Inquiry into the Handling of Child Abuse by Religious and Other Non-Government Organisations and the Royal Commission are outlined below.

Child Safe Standards and the Reportable Conduct Scheme

In response to the Betrayal of Trust report, the Victorian Government established the 2016 Child Safe Standards and the 2017 Reportable Conduct Scheme.⁴²

The Child Safe Standards and the Reportable Conduct Scheme exemplify the major reforms in child safety that took place from 2016 onwards, and establish the framework for child safety in Victoria today.

Child Safe Standards

In 2016, the Child Safe Standards were first put into operation in Victorian government schools.⁴³ The Child Safe Standards are compulsory standards that schools must legally comply with to keep children safe and protect them from abuse.⁴⁴

In 2017, the Royal Commission recommended and defined 10 National Child Safe Standards. These were endorsed by the former Council of Australian Governments in 2019 as the National Principles for Child Safe Organisations (National Principles).⁴⁵

The Department’s evidence was that in 2022, Victoria updated its Child Safe Standards to align with the National Principles.⁴⁶ Under Ministerial Order 1359, issued on 31 January 2022, all Victorian schools must comply with the current Child Safe Standards and embed a culture of ‘no tolerance’ for child abuse.⁴⁷

The Child Safe Standards also form part of the Minimum Standards for school registration (Minimum Standards) set out in the Education and Training Reform Act 2006 (Vic) (Education and Training Reform Act).⁴⁸ Under that Act, all Victorian schools must comply with the Minimum Standards, including the Child Safe Standards, as a condition of registration and continued operation.⁴⁹

Reportable Conduct Scheme

In 2017, the Reportable Conduct Scheme was introduced under the Child Wellbeing and Safety Act 2005 (Vic).

The Reportable Conduct Scheme is a ‘child safety mechanism’ that requires all employees of the Department, including all school-based employees, to notify the relevant officer of the Department when there is an allegation of ‘reportable conduct’ raised against employees of the Department, volunteers or school council employees.⁵⁰

An allegation of ‘reportable conduct’ refers to where a person has a reasonable belief that there has been a sexual offence, sexual misconduct (including child sexual abuse) or physical violence against, with, or in the presence of a child; behaviour causing significant emotional or psychological harm to a child; or significant neglect of a child.⁵¹

The Reportable Conduct Scheme sets out to whom a person should report an allegation, and when the Department should notify the Commission for Children and Young People (Commission).⁵² As discussed later in this Chapter, the Commission is a statutory body that promotes the safety and wellbeing of Victorian children and young people.⁵³

PROTECT

The Department gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that ‘[t]he resources and policies that support implementation of the Child Safe Standards are extensive’.⁵⁴

The Department has a website called PROTECT, which is an online repository of resources for implementing the Child Safe Standards.⁵⁵ For example, one resource available on PROTECT is the Identifying and Responding to All Forms of Abuse in Victorian Schools policy. This policy supports school staff to take action if they ‘suspect, receive a disclosure, or are witness to any form of child abuse’.⁵⁶

Other available resources include an action list, a policy template, a code of conduct template, a risk register and training presentations.⁵⁷

Current policies, procedures and practices: preventing child sexual abuse in government schools

The Department did not have any policies or procedures concerning child sexual abuse or the prevention of child sexual abuse in government schools between 1960 and 1994.

Today, the Child Safe Standards form the basis of the Department’s and government schools’ policies and procedures to ensure children feel safe and are safe at school.⁵⁸ Two major approaches to the prevention of child sexual abuse are effective employee screening and school registration.

Employee screening

Evidence was given to the Board of Inquiry that historically the Department did not have any processes in place to reduce the risk of employing someone who had committed a sexual offence in relation to a child.

Jenny Atta PSM, Secretary, Department of Education, gave evidence that the Department now undertakes ‘significant vetting of staff before they are employed’.⁵⁹ This includes registration with the Victorian Institute of Teaching (VIT). Registration requires individuals to meet a range of criteria, such as the absence of a criminal record.⁶⁰ If an individual has a criminal record, the VIT will assess their ‘suitability to teach’ on the merits of each case.⁶¹ This includes consideration of criminal offences and whether the individual has been the subject of a finding of reportable conduct by the Commission.⁶²

The Department also has a Suitability for Employment Checks policy and a Working with Children and Other Suitability Checks for School Volunteers and Visitors policy, which set out further requirements and guidance in relation to pre-employment checks.⁶³

In addition, the Department’s Recruitment in Schools policy sets out the steps a principal is required to take, and the matters they must be satisfied of, before a person commences employment.⁶⁴ These include ensuring that:

• the person is registered with the VIT
• the person is a fit and proper person and is suitable for child-connected work
• the person has a current Working with Children Check, if they are to be employed as an education support class worker.⁶⁵

The policy also requires a principal to confirm whether a person has an ‘employment limitation’ in place, and to ask questions of the person’s current or previous employer relating to how the person conducted themselves when working with children.⁶⁶

The Employment Limitation policy applies if a person is the subject of an allegation of misconduct with regard to their employment with the Department. This policy sets out the circumstances in which the Department can impose a ‘limitation’ on a person’s eligibility for employment in a government school or on a school council.⁶⁷ A limitation can be placed on a person following a disciplinary process for misconduct or unsatisfactory performance, or if they resign during the course of an investigation.⁶⁸

The Department can also place a limitation on a former employee if that employee engaged in misconduct during their employment, but the Department did not become aware of it until after their employment ceased.

In practice, a limitation may preclude a person from further employment in the Department or in the Victorian Government Teaching Service or limit the terms of a person’s employment (for example, a teacher may be restricted to a fixed-term period of employment).⁶⁹

School registration

The Department ensures that any registered school adheres to the Minimum Standards, which include the Child Safe Standards. Schools can only be registered if they meet the Minimum Standards.⁷⁰

The Minimum Standards place obligations on schools to effectively respond to and report child sexual abuse allegations, including the implementation of prevention measures such as governance, culture and training.⁷¹

The Department gave evidence that in term 2, 2022 (commencing 26 April 2022), it implemented a new model for assessing compliance with the Minimum Standards that was intended to be ‘more comprehensive and robust, and subject to greater quality control’.⁷²

Regarding the assessment of schools against the Child Safe Standards, in the 2022 calendar year:

• The Department initially assessed the majority of schools as fully compliant with 72 per cent of the Child Safe Standards.
• Ninety-one per cent of schools became fully compliant within three months of the initial assessment.
• All schools were fully compliant by the end of the ‘compliance assessment process’.⁷³

The Department gave evidence that the rates of school compliance were affected by the new assessment model and the new Child Safe Standards, which came into effect on 1 July 2022.⁷⁴

Current policies, procedures and practices: responding to child sexual abuse in government schools

The Department gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that, in addition to the prevention measures described above, it has a range of policies and procedures in place directed to ensuring an effective response to allegations of child sexual abuse.

Supporting teachers and staff to identify and respond to child sexual abuse

One of the Department’s historical failings in responding to child sexual abuse was the lack of training for teachers and principals in how to identify child sexual abuse, and how to respond to it and report it.

Staff training

The Department’s evidence was that schools are now required to train their staff annually in relation to certain child safety policies, procedures and practices; for example, the Protecting Children — Reporting and Other Legal Obligations policy.⁷⁵ School leaders, such as principals, are also encouraged to undertake training on the Minimum Standards.⁷⁶

In addition, the Department gave evidence that it provided training to support schools in transitioning to the 2022 Child Safe Standards. This included:

• online introductory briefings
• workshops to support schools to update their own policies and processes to align with the new requirements.⁷⁷

The Department’s School Compliance Unit assesses schools against the Child Safe Standards at least every five years (and in most cases every four years). This includes determining whether school staff have completed annual child safety training.⁷⁸

The Department’s evidence was that if schools are not compliant with the Child Safe Standards, the School Compliance Unit provides them with a ‘rectification plan’.⁷⁹ A rectification plan sets out the actions that a school must take to address the areas of non-compliance that have been identified.⁸⁰ The Department generally asks schools to address all rectifications within six weeks of receiving the initial assessment report.⁸¹ The school will then receive a final compliance report once all rectifications have been actioned.⁸²

Information on policies and resources

The Department now has a range of policies and procedures in place to assist teachers and school staff to identify and respond to child sexual abuse.

To support government school staff to access materials and understand their obligations generally, the Department introduced the Policy and Advisory Library (PAL) in 2020.⁸³ PAL contains policies, guidance and resources for all operational topics, as well as links to legislation and related policies.⁸⁴ These include policies about responding to allegations or incidents of child sexual abuse in government schools.⁸⁵ In contrast, PROTECT provides schools, early childhood services and higher education and training facilities with resources related to the Child Safe Standards and information and advice on how to protect children, create a child safe environment, and identify and respond to signs of abuse.⁸⁶

The Department communicates key changes to any policies or procedures via weekly emails to school leaders, such as principals, and administrative staff.⁸⁷ PAL also includes a register of all changes or updates.⁸⁸ When a significant policy change or a new policy is introduced, the Department publishes an article to explain what the changes mean in practice.⁸⁹ For example, when the new Child Safe Standards came into effect in mid-2022 the Department published an article that included advice and guidance on staff training.⁹⁰

Reporting and investigating

As outlined in Chapter 13(opens in a new window), the Board of Inquiry found that between 1960 and 1994 the Department did not have any policies or procedures governing how schools or officials should report and investigate child sexual abuse.

When asked about its current policies, the Department’s evidence was that it now has in place detailed policies and procedures for reporting and responding to allegations or suspicions of child sexual abuse in government schools.⁹¹

All schools are required to use the Four Critical Actions for Responding to Incidents, Disclosures and Suspicions of Child Abuse (Four Critical Actions), which are published on the PROTECT website.⁹² These actions are:

• responding to an emergency
• reporting to authorities
• contacting parents and carers
• providing ongoing support.⁹³

In line with these actions, a school must report all incidents, suspicions and disclosures of child abuse, including child sexual abuse, to Victoria Police.⁹⁴ The school is also required to report all incidents, suspicions and disclosures of child abuse involving a school staff member, contractor, volunteer or visitor internally to the Employee Conduct Branch and the Incident Support and Operations Centre within the Department.⁹⁵ Ms Atta gave evidence that these parts of the Department ‘work together to ensure that all next steps are taken’.⁹⁶

Incident Support and Operations Centre staff provide immediate advice to principals about what actions they need to take in response to a report.⁹⁷ This advice includes a reminder to implement the Four Critical Actions.⁹⁸

Actions in relation to alleged perpetrators, such as their suspension, are then managed by the Employee Conduct Branch.⁹⁹ Ms Atta gave evidence that as soon as a report of child sexual abuse is received, the branch undertakes ‘an immediate risk assessment’ before a formal investigation commences.¹⁰⁰ Action taken might include the suspension of a teacher or the removal of a teacher from the classroom.¹⁰¹

The Department’s evidence was that the Employee Conduct Branch considers any risks to students or other children, and provides advice to relevant decision-makers, such as a Regional Director or the Deputy Secretary within the Department, based on this risk assessment.¹⁰² The assessment includes consideration of the nature of the allegations, the current role and duties of the individual, action taken by Victoria Police and any steps already taken by the Department.¹⁰³

For allegations against current employees, or employees within the scope of the Reportable Conduct Scheme, the Employee Conduct Branch takes steps to assess whether a notification to the Commission is required.¹⁰⁴ For allegations against former employees, the Employee Conduct Branch will check if the person is still registered with the VIT and, if so, will inform the VIT of the allegation.¹⁰⁵

Under the Complaints, Misconduct and Unsatisfactory Performance — Teaching Service policy and guidelines, the Employee Conduct Branch also appoints an investigator to investigate the allegations of child abuse.¹⁰⁶

The Department liaises with Victoria Police before starting any investigation to ensure that it does not interfere with any criminal investigation or proceedings.¹⁰⁷ Ms Atta also gave evidence that if Victoria Police requests the Department to temporarily suspend an investigation to avoid interference with its own investigation, the Department would comply but would still take steps to ensure child safety, such as removing the teacher from the classroom.¹⁰⁸

Following a ‘significant child safety incident’, the School Compliance Unit assists schools to undertake a post-incident review to identify opportunities to improve child safety policies, procedures and practices.¹⁰⁹

It is clear that, in contrast to the historical position, the Department now has procedures in place to ensure that schools prioritise the safety of children when a report of child sexual abuse is raised, and understand clearly how to respond to such reports. As Ms Atta explained in her evidence, there are now policies for principals to ‘understand that the default is to report’ child sexual abuse.¹¹⁰

In addition, the Department has policies in place to identify an incident of child sexual abuse for which there has been no report and subsequently the failure to report may be investigated. In her evidence, Ms Atta said that these policies exist as ‘part of [a] culture of child safety and the priority given to child protection’.¹¹¹

The Department’s engagement with Victoria Police

The Department gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that the Employee Conduct Branch works with Victoria Police, as well as the Australian Federal Police and police in other jurisdictions, in relation to allegations of child sexual abuse connected to Victorian government schools.¹¹² This includes reporting allegations, assisting police with their inquiries, and ensuring that steps taken by the Department do not interfere with police investigations.¹¹³

The Board of Inquiry also received evidence that for every new arrest or charge in relation to child sexual abuse in government schools, the Department’s Sexual Harm Response Unit works with Victoria Police to ‘ensure any communications issued by the school will not compromise any criminal processes’.¹¹⁴

In addition, the Sexual Harm Response Unit will liaise with Victoria Police, the relevant Centre Against Sexual Assault or other appropriate support services, and with Child Protection within the Department of Families, Fairness and Housing, as appropriate.¹¹⁵ The Department gave evidence that:

The Department’s engagement with the Commission for Children and Young People

As noted earlier in this Chapter, the Commission is a statutory body that promotes the safety and wellbeing of Victorian children and young people.¹¹⁷ This includes scrutiny of services for children and young people.¹¹⁸

Under the Department’s Reportable Conduct policy, the Employee Conduct Branch is responsible for notifying the Commission of reportable allegations.¹¹⁹

When the Employee Conduct Branch becomes aware of a reportable allegation, it will provide the following information to the Commission:

• initial advice, including the nature of the allegation and identity of the alleged perpetrator, within three business days
• an update on the investigation, including details of the allegation and investigation process, within 30 calendar days
• other information upon request from the Commission.¹²⁰

The Employee Conduct Branch provides a report to the Commission at the finalisation of an investigation. This includes whether the allegations have been substantiated, the reasons for the finding, any disciplinary or other actions taken, and reasons for taking or not taking those actions.¹²¹ In the event that the Employee Conduct Branch reports to the Commission that the allegations of reportable conduct are substantiated, the Commission must notify the Secretary of the Department of Justice and Community Safety for the purposes of a Working with Children Check, except in some limited circumstances.¹²²

Where the Commission receives a direct notification from a member of the public that relates to the Department or a government school, the Commission will refer the allegation to the Employee Conduct Branch for investigation.¹²³

The Department’s engagement with the Victorian Institute of Teaching

The VIT was established in 2002 and is an independent statutory authority that regulates members of the teaching profession to ensure quality teaching.¹²⁴ It is a legal requirement for all teachers to be registered with the VIT.¹²⁵

The Department’s evidence was that the Employee Conduct Branch notifies the VIT of the outcomes of disciplinary investigations against teachers, in accordance with the Education and Training Reform Act.¹²⁶ This includes informing the VIT:

• of the outcome of reportable conduct investigations relating to employees of the Department registered with the VIT
• where criminal charges are laid or are likely to be laid in relation to a teacher or principal
• when an ‘employment limitation’ is put in place by the Department.¹²⁷

The VIT then shares information with the Employee Conduct Branch about the suspension of teaching registrations and decisions to cancel or not to renew registrations.¹²⁸

The Department’s engagement with Working with Children Check Victoria

The Working with Children Check was introduced in Victoria in 2006 under the Working with Children Act 2005 (Vic).¹²⁹ It is now established under the Worker Screening Act 2020 (Vic), which came into force on 1 February 2021 and repealed the 2005 Act.¹³⁰ The Working with Children Check is a screening process for assessing or reassessing people who work with or care for children in Victoria.¹³¹ It includes assessing an individual’s criminal history and professional conduct to ensure children are protected from sexual or physical harm.¹³²

The Department does not provide information directly to Working with Children Check Victoria.¹³³ Teachers are exempt from a Working with Children Check if they hold a current registration with the VIT.¹³⁴ This is because the VIT’s registration process closely aligns with the way Working with Children Checks are assessed.¹³⁵

Working with Children Checks are required for non-teaching staff who are not registered with the VIT.¹³⁶

Working with Children Check Victoria notifies the Department in writing if an employee’s or volunteer’s Working with Children Check is suspended or revoked.¹³⁷

The Department’s engagement with the Victorian Disability Worker Commission

The Victorian Disability Worker Commission regulates unregistered disability workers and responds to complaints about disability workers.¹³⁸

If an allegation of child sexual abuse relates to a ‘disability worker’ within the meaning of the Disability Service Safeguards Act 2018 (Vic), the Department must notify the Victoria Disability Worker Commission.¹³⁹

The definition of ‘disability worker’ captures education support workers providing support to a student with disability, but does not generally cover teachers.¹⁴⁰ The Employee Conduct Branch is responsible for assessing allegations to consider whether a notification to the Victorian Disability Worker Commission is required.¹⁴¹

Supporting children, families, parents and communities when child sexual abuse occurs

The Board of Inquiry found that between 1960 and 1994 the Department failed to put in place any policies or processes for the provision of support to victim-survivors, their parents and families, when they disclosed child sexual abuse.

The Department gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that one of its priorities today is supporting children, families and communities impacted by child sexual abuse.

In line with the Four Critical Actions, which are published on the PROTECT website, the Department must provide immediate trauma-informed responses to students affected by sexual abuse.¹⁴² This support is normally delivered by the area-based Student Support Service and school-based wellbeing staff, including specialist allied health staff.¹⁴³

The Department’s evidence was that the Student Support Service will work to re-establish student wellbeing and safety.¹⁴⁴ Depending on the circumstances, this may include liaising with the Department of Families, Fairness and Housing and sexual assault support services to respond to the needs of the victim-survivor and their family.¹⁴⁵

When a criminal charge is laid, or there is a substantiation of an allegation through an investigation conducted by the Department, the Sexual Harm Response Unit takes on responsibility for identifying how to best support victim-survivors, their families and the community.¹⁴⁶

The Sexual Harm Response Unit provides ‘end-to end case management’ and is responsible for assisting school principals and relevant regional or area teams to ‘appropriately support victim-survivors and their families, and to assist principals to appropriately notify and engage with school communities’.¹⁴⁷

The Department’s evidence was that the Sexual Harm Response Unit seeks to ensure the following:

• It undertakes a risk assessment to determine whether other individuals may have been sexually abused or harmed.
• Appropriate supports are offered to victim-survivors and their families, including an apology.
• School principals engage appropriately with school staff and communities, including by sending communications to the school community and past students.
• There is ongoing dialogue with Victoria Police throughout the criminal process.
• The school undertakes a post-incident review, with support from the Department, to evaluate its child safety and wellbeing policies, procedures and practices.¹⁴⁸

Disciplinary action in response to child sexual abuse

As explored in Chapter 13(opens in a new window) the Board of Inquiry has found that the Department failed in its approach to disciplinary action in response to child sexual abuse matters between 1960 and 1994. The Department’s approach had prioritised the reputation of the Victorian education system, including the reputation and continued employment of teachers, over the safety of children.

The Department gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that it now takes a very different approach to disciplinary action in response to child sexual abuse in government schools.¹⁴⁹

The Education and Training Reform Act sets out the legislative framework for managing allegations of child sexual abuse by a government school employee. Under this Act, the Secretary of the Department has the power to take action against an employee for misconduct or a criminal offence, following an investigation.¹⁵⁰ The Act also allows the Secretary to conduct an inquiry, where they reasonably believe there are grounds for doing so, and to suspend the employee from duty during the inquiry.¹⁵¹ The Secretary may take disciplinary action against the employee, including a reprimand, fine, demotion or termination of employment.¹⁵²

The Complaints, Misconduct and Unsatisfactory Performance — Teaching Service policy and guidelines establish how complaints will be handled and ensures that the Department conducts disciplinary processes in accordance with the principles of procedural fairness and in line with the Education and Training Reform Act.¹⁵³

Once the Department’s investigation is complete, the relevant decision-maker, such as the Deputy Secretary, is responsible for determining whether the allegations of child sexual abuse are substantiated and what disciplinary action will be taken, with guidance from the Employee Conduct Branch.¹⁵⁴

The Department’s evidence was that if allegations of child sexual abuse are substantiated, the disciplinary action is termination of employment.¹⁵⁵ In her evidence, Ms Atta confirmed to the Board of Inquiry that, under the Education and Training Reform Act:

Ms Atta also confirmed that the teaching registration for the perpetrator would be cancelled permanently.¹⁵⁷

This approach is significantly different to the Department’s responses to child sexual abuse between 1960 and 1994, according to the evidence the Board of Inquiry received. Despite legislation allowing for the suspension and dismissal of teachers, information was provided to the Board of Inquiry that some teachers remained employed in the education system after convictions for child sexual abuse offences came to light.

As explored in Chapter 13(opens in a new window), the Board of Inquiry also found that the Department previously used staff transfers as a way of managing a complaint or a report about child sexual abuse on the part of a teacher.

Ms Atta gave evidence that the option for transfers as an outcome of the disciplinary process was removed from legislation in 2004. While Ms Atta could not confirm if transfers had been used to manage a complaint about child sexual abuse in the years preceding 2004, her evidence was that it is:

Managing records of alleged child sexual abuse

The Board of Inquiry understands that the Department has introduced changes to improve record management policies in relation to allegations of child sexual abuse.

The current legal framework that governs the Victorian education system’s record management obligations comprises the Public Records Act 1973 (Vic) (Public Records Act), the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) and the Public Record Office Victoria standards. This framework specifically covers the education system’s management of documents relating to allegations of child sexual abuse.

In 2010, the first explicit requirement for public sector agencies to retain records related to child abuse allegations was introduced.¹⁵⁹ Since then, a range of new obligations have been implemented.

In 2022, following the new Child Safe Standards coming into effect, all government and non-government schools in Victoria were required to meet the same minimum record retention requirements for student health, safety and wellbeing records.¹⁶⁰

Several retention and disposal authorities (legal standards under the Public Records Act) now establish how the education system must treat and retain documents related to current and historical allegations of child sexual abuse, as well as relevant employment and disciplinary records.¹⁶¹

The Department must permanently retain all policy, strategy and procedural documentation related to prevention, reporting and investigations of child sexual abuse.¹⁶² The Department must also retain, for 99 years, all records relating to its reporting and investigation of any allegations of child sexual abuse.¹⁶³ In addition, the Department is obligated to retain all training documents related to responding to child sexual abuse for 45 years.¹⁶⁴

The Department’s evidence was that it now records and retains information on child sexual abuse allegations in keeping with these requirements.¹⁶⁵ For example, the Sexual Harm Response Unit maintains its own records of all new allegations and incidents of child sexual abuse.¹⁶⁶ Files are electronic and are stored securely with restricted access.¹⁶⁷

Ms Atta gave evidence to the Board of Inquiry that:

The Board of Inquiry understands that since the early 1990s, government schools also have responsibility for the storage, maintenance and disposal of records, including those pertaining to child sexual abuse (noting there was no explicit requirement to retain records related to child sexual abuse allegations until 2010).¹⁶⁹ This responsibility was conferred in the early 1990s, when the storage of school records was decentralised.¹⁷⁰ The Department provides records management guidance to schools, to help address record inconsistencies and loss.¹⁷¹ Schools must store records in line with the same legislative obligations that govern the Department’s record-keeping.¹⁷²

In 2019, the Department introduced the School Records Management Program, which aims to reduce record loss by retrieving records from schools and archiving them.¹⁷³

The Victorian Government has stated that it is ‘working to improve records and record keeping practices of institutions that care for or provide services to children’.¹⁷⁴

Responding to allegations of current and historical child sexual abuse

Based on information provided by the Department, it appears that the Department manages allegations of historical child sexual abuse in the same way it manages allegations of recent child sexual abuse. The information that the Department provided to the Board of Inquiry did not differentiate between how the Department responded to victim-survivors who had experienced historical child sexual abuse and how it responded to those who had experienced recent child sexual abuse.

For example, both current and former students can report allegations of recent or historical child sexual abuse to the Department through the same mechanism: a direct phone number and email address for the Sexual Harm Response Unit.¹⁷⁵

This section describes how the Department responds to allegations from current and former students of recent or historical child sexual abuse.

In March 2023, the Department reviewed the aspects of its website regarding how current and former students can engage with the Department about allegations of child sexual abuse.¹⁷⁶ As a result of this review, current and former students can now access a dedicated central contact line in the Department if they wish to raise allegations of child sexual abuse with the Department, in addition to being able to report to Victoria Police and the school.¹⁷⁷ In addition, the website includes information for victim-survivors about support schemes and justice pathways that they may be eligible for or may wish to consider.¹⁷⁸

The Department gave evidence that it has also expanded the Sexual Harm Response Unit’s functions to improve the Department’s response to, and support of, all victim-survivors of child sexual abuse in government schools — both current and historical.¹⁷⁹

When a victim-survivor contacts the Sexual Harm Response Unit, the Department gave evidence that its staff work with the individual in a trauma-informed way and are guided by the wishes of the individual.¹⁸⁰ It also gave evidence that its staff listen to people’s experiences and offer further information and contact with the Department if required.¹⁸¹

If the alleged perpetrator is currently working in a government school, or has worked in a government school in the past seven years, the Sexual Harm Response Unit undertakes a risk assessment for students.¹⁸² This includes identifying students who may have interacted with the alleged perpetrator and who may have been abused, in close collaboration with the school principal and Victoria Police.¹⁸³ The Department’s evidence was that the Sexual Harm Response Unit then takes steps to respond, including, where appropriate, communicating with those students or the school community.¹⁸⁴

The Department gave evidence that the Sexual Harm Response Unit’s involvement with historical child sexual abuse matters ‘is currently quite limited’.¹⁸⁵ Between late June 2023 (when the direct central phone number and email address for reporting abuse were published on the Department’s website) and 3 November 2023, six victim-survivors reported child sexual abuse that occurred before 31 December 1999.¹⁸⁶

When an allegation of child sexual abuse is made, the Employee Conduct Branch establishes whether the it relates to a current or former employee within the scope of the Reportable Conduct Scheme.¹⁸⁷ If the allegation relates to a current employee, the Employee Conduct Branch assesses whether the allegation should be reported to the Commission.¹⁸⁸ If the allegation relates to a former employee, the Employee Conduct Branch checks to see whether the person is still registered with VIT and, if so, informs the VIT of the allegation.¹⁸⁹

The Employee Conduct Branch also seeks to establish whether the allegation relating to a current or former employee has been reported to Victoria Police. If the allegation has not yet been reported, the Employee Conduct Branch will take steps to ensure a report is made to Victoria Police.¹⁹⁰

Further improvements

As explored throughout this Chapter, the Department has significantly improved its approach to preventing and responding to child sexual abuse compared with the period between 1960 and 1999. In saying this, it should be emphasised that the Board of Inquiry’s Terms of Reference did not extend to assessing the effectiveness of the Department’s current response. However, given that the Department’s historical approach was marked by a complete absence of relevant policies and procedures, the fact the Department now has extensive and detailed policies and procedures in place to provide guidance to schools and staff members regarding their obligations in preventing, identifying, responding to, and reporting child sexual abuse is in itself a considerable improvement.

Importantly, the Department’s approach now seeks to prioritise the safety of children, and the Department no longer uses transfers as a way of managing allegations of child sexual abuse against a teacher.

The Board of Inquiry is aware that the Department is continuing to explore opportunities to further improve its response to child sexual abuse in government schools, including consideration of:

• improvements to records management and the provision of documents to victim-survivors
• how it responds to victim-survivors of historical child sexual abuse
• how to incorporate learnings from historical child sexual abuse matters into current child safety practices.

Child sexual abuse still occurs today. Institutions need to continually reflect on how to best prevent and respond to child sexual abuse, so there can be ongoing learning and improvement. This is essential to achieving the State’s commitment that child sexual abuse ‘must not happen again’.¹⁹¹